It is often said that while soldiering is the art of attempting the impossible, politics is the art of getting someone else to do the impossible.
Such a truism might help to explain the continuous stalemate in Pakistani politics, which finds the civil and military establishments unable to agree on such basic matters as the fundamental nature of government or the priorities by which to achieve them, thereby dissipating the nation's energy in unnecessary confrontations.
At the present time, uncertainty persists due to a controversy in respect of the President's uniform, in the light of a reported agreement among parliamentary parties, including the major partner in the government coalition, for General Musharraf to relinquish his Army command, or the president's office, by the end of the year.
Although a President in army uniform is without doubt a constitutional anomaly, the issue is arguably less urgent than several other problems affecting civic life and economic development.
The inference that, by correcting this situation, the politicians in parliament will provide a more conducive environment for stable government is unfortunately not borne out by the historical experience or by the conduct of the existing House.
Nor is it credible that the controversy was motivated by a desire for constitutional propriety, considering that those agitating or negotiating the issue were the same persons that were prominent in welcoming the suspension of the constitution.
Whether or not President Musharraf remains the Army Chief come December 31, it does not escape notice that the important questions of presidential powers in a parliamentary government and the role of the military in civil affairs will remain unresolved.
Considering the direct bearing these issues have on political stability, it is a mystery how separating President Musharraf from his position as Chief of Army Staff can have a salubrious effect on the polity, bearing in mind that the fissures created in society as a result of 9/11 remain contained only because the President has the Army under his direct command and further that, since the advent of the civil government eighteen months ago, law, order and in particular the justice system are rapidly deteriorating into chaos.
If the confused state of civil governance is not a surprise, it is unclear by what analysis General Musharraf arrived at the conclusion that operating as a highly-empowered President through a combine of vulnerable and pliable individuals would enable him to continue with efficient administration or even pass muster as an independently functioning parliamentary government.
The President's linkage with a particular party is so deep it is difficult to distinguish where the inefficiency of the government ends and the responsibility of the President begins.
Such closely-linked arrangements failed to work for the presidential systems of President Ayub Khan and General Zia-ul-Haq, whose parliamentary creations, having no political philosophy other than loyalty to the President, lacked credibility with the people and, not surprisingly, like water took the path of least resistance, including to their own dissolution when shown the door by GHQ.
If since 1958 Pakistan has witnessed no constitutional or voluntary transfer of power, the principal reason would appear to be the inability of the political and military establishments to agree on the relative powers of parliament, Prime Minister and President, reconciling which into a working arrangement remains the elusive "Holy Grail" of our politics.
Army Chiefs have used their extra-constitutional powers less for strengthening parliamentary institutions and more to build up governments based on presidential power, relying for support on the politicians and bureaucrats they were supposed to act against.
Political leaders given a mandate by the people for democratic rule have instead used parliament to accumulate authoritarian powers for themselves, leading to inevitable institutional failures and collapses of government.
The military defeat in the 1971 war and consequent introspection of the Army officer corps provided a unique opportunity for the politicians to consolidate parliamentary power, but this turned out to be only a brief interlude because Zulfiqar Bhutto, from almost the very moment the 1973 constitution came into effect, misused the Prime Ministerial office as a seat of authoritarianism, creating by 1977 an opening for General Zia-ul-Haq to kick the door in and renew claim to the Army's institutional preference for a presidential government system.
Since that time the reform efforts are seen to have swung like a pendulum between greater powers for the two offices, depending for efficacy not on institutional checks but the personality of the individual. General Zia used his despotic powers to take society down a path of his own narrow-minded choosing; Ghulam Ishaque Khan was not content to play second fiddle in the President's office, while Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, who had the opportunity and public support to exercise unlimited delegated power, chose instead to accumulate despotic powers for themselves.
In the latest experiment, General Musharraf used his dictatorial powers as Chief Executive to good advantage for the promotion of societal and economic reform, but the same extra-ordinary authority when exercised as President in a parliamentary set-up has created a mutually exclusive situation, being obstructive for the development of Parliament as the center of power while having the potential to create a paralysis of government if Prime Minister and Parliament were to become more assertive in their constitutional role than at present.
The sanctioning of parliamentary oversight powers to the National Security Council has further compounded the power balance problem, flaunting the conventional wisdom that the military can have no role in the functioning of successful civil government, except as support for the lawful authority and that attempting to institutionalise the military as part of the lawful civil authority is not a solution.
But we also have to face the unpleasant truth that in Pakistan the civil establishment, whenever given unfettered responsibility, has failed to provide a stable governance environment.
Politicians claim, perhaps with some justification, that indirect military interference has instigated these failures, but it is not the intention here to argue this point.
Whatever the reasons, the failures of civil government have resulted in handing the Army an important role in the power equation, indeed political society has come to depend upon it, and it would be naïve to expect that the military's intervening capability, which arises from its power to successfully disregard civil law, can be checked simply by the addition of clauses to the legal code.
While everyone appears to be agreed that the solution lies in the strengthening and efficient functioning of civil and parliamentary institutions, the anomaly lies in how to arrive at the solution without military interference, knowing there will be future governance failures so long as an identifiable oligarchy is not separated from its hold over the electoral process.
Any evaluation of the consequences that will flow from President Musharraf relinquishing his Army command needs to be based three assumptions.
First, that the Army will continue to back him fully in view of the external exigencies and the direct Great Power interest in our domestic affairs; second, that if President Musharraf uses a tailor-made political party as an alternate power base, his political interests sooner or later are likely to come into conflict with the Army' institutional interests; third, the historical experience that since 1958 no Head of State or Government, civilian or military, in or out of uniform, has been able to stay in power when support was withdrawn by the Army High Command.
Keeping these factors in mind, as well as the fact that the problems relating to parliamentary power continue to linger, we can deduce that if, as a civilian, President Musharraf continues to exercise his existing high level of executive powers, this will at best be only a short-term solution that offers no significant contribution for strengthening of the parliamentary system.
And if the intention is to use such enhanced powers for the promotion of a de facto Presidential system, this too will prove futile, similar systems having been rejected twice already by the Pakistani people.
Conversely, if President Musharraf's powers as a civilian were reduced to the level normal in a parliamentary system, most certainly the economic and societal progress achieved under his leadership would regress immediately he lost the ability to apply his authority and power as Chief of Army Staff to the management of government, and such diminishing of presidential authority would also create a gap in administrative power that the existing fractious and leaderless parliament would not be able to fill.
Looking further, if, as demanded by the ARD, General Musharraf were to step down altogether from both his army command and the Presidency, the sudden weakening of central authority would generate within Pakistani society, with its multitude of uncontrolled armed political, religious, extremist and ethnic pressure groups, an intolerable internal security situation that the existing, or another elected, parliament would not be able to control.
Declaration of Martial Law would not be sensible or problem-solving, nor would making way for another General to occupy the President's office, because both options would invite serious external pressures and ignite de-stabilising sparks in the body politic.
If the President continues as Army Chief-cum-President using his present political support base, the end-game of such a situation is predictable, with only its timing subject to variables.
And if he chose to give up the Presidency to return to his Army post, he would have more confidence than the rest of us put together in the ability of the incumbent government not to tear itself apart through infighting within a month.
Quite clearly the December 31 deadline has led to an impasse, requiring a choice to be made between, on the one hand, constitutional propriety in the form of an empowered Parliament, knowing that this may invite chaos or, on the other, opting for extending an expedient extra-constitutional arrangement that holds the prospects of better governance.
The decision is made easier when taking into account General Musharraf's record as Chief Executive, in which, with some sorry exceptions that appear out of character, he has discharged well the responsibilities entrusted to him and proved himself a competent economic, not so much a political, manager.
Consequently, it can be argued that since no good will come if the President sheds his uniform on December 31, it might be better if he sheds before then his civilian baggage, if for no other reasons than the facts that the incumbent government's fence-sitting is impeding the path to moderation of society and its poor governance is hindering the considerable macro-economic accomplishments from being translated into financial benefits at the micro level.
In an opinion piece written shortly after the 1999 Coup, former Law Minister (now PML-Q Senator) S.M. Zafar had wondered why the people of Pakistan took to the streets on many issues but never when the constitution was overthrown.
The simple answer would be that the people are concerned with good governance, not constitutional dispensation, but the overwhelming electoral response to the dismissal of the presidential governments of Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq indicates clearly that their preference is for civilian parliamentary democracy.
The challenge facing President Musharraf is to use his authority to prove that in Pakistan good governance and parliamentary power are not incompatible; perhaps opening channels with the major political parties, instead of creating a new one, will help him to achieve this objective.
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