Patients' deaths: Seven Khyber Teaching Hospital officials suspended over negligence

(Karachi) At least seven officers including the director of Khyber Teaching Hospital (KTH), have been suspended over negligence that resulted in the deaths of six patients, local media reported on Monday.

Six patients died on Sunday due to scarcity of oxygen at the KTH. Five of the patients who died were in the COVID isolation ward and one was in the ICU.

As per details, a preliminary report was submitted which stated that seven officers, including the Medical Training Institute (MTI) Hospital director Dr Tahir Nadeem Khan, were responsible for the tragic incident. All the officials have been suspended.

The initial inquiry revealed that while the hospital has an oxygen storage tank of 10,000 cubic meter capacity, it is never filled to capacity. There is no backup system for oxygen supply as recommended by the health technical memorandum. “Ideally there should either be a primary backup (another tank) or secondary backup (manifold),” it noted.

The contract to supply oxygen to the health facility is with Ms Pakistan Oxygen limited but the contract expired on June 30, 2017 and no renewal/extension of contract is available in the record provided by the manager pharmacy. The supply chain manager confirmed the extension telephonically till June 30, 2020. The hospital oxygen tank was last filled on December 4 by 3,040 cubic meters.

The report also transpired that the staff at the oxygen plant lack proper technical skills and training. The on duty manager of services received a call from main operation theatre about low oxygen pressure and called the oxygen plant operator, but he was not picking up. He then physically visited the plant and found that the two on duty staff members were not present.

The pressure at the plant at the time was zero according to the pressure gauge reading. The report said the oxygen plant assistant failed to perform his duty as he is responsible for the oxygen plant and has a liaison with the supplier.

At the time of the incident, there were 90 patients at the hospital, 20 on BiPAP, two on ventilators and the remaining on mask oxygen. The hospital ordered 13 patients to be shifted to the accident and emergency department where backup supply in the form of manifold was available and the remaining patients were put on cylinder oxygen supply.

There was no organized emergency rescue squad at the hospital as required for disaster management under such conditions, the inquiry found.

“Six patients in the isolation ward expired. Three patients were missing, one is still untraceable and the other two were traced and are alive,” the report revealed.

It found that the Hospital Biomedical Engineer and his technical team have failed to train the oxygen plant staff to monitor and maintain the service history and look after the biomechanics of this important life-saving equipment.