“Why would anyone want to be prime minister now anyway?” a BBC columnist quipped a couple of months ago as the UK economy was in grave turmoil after two Prime Ministers stepped down within six weeks. Here in Pakistan, that question is even more relevant for would-be PMs, considering that the economic crisis is getting dire by the day. After having a good look, even a competent technocrat may balk at the opportunity to apply ruthless economic pragmatism. Why would a political leader want executive power in these precarious circumstances if the remedy is more pain on people and the result of mass alienation?
In that context, the fact that former PM Imran Khan has been bent on his demand for early elections is a bit perplexing. There is no magic wand at his disposal to suddenly raise non-debt foreign inflows to a level that the country’s reliance on external loans becomes less existential. And after failing to grow economic cooperation with traditional allies China and Saudi Arabia during his first term, it seems less likely that Mr. Khan’s next government will be able to convince these countries to extend more loans and deposits.
The same is true for the PDM government, which has failed to time foreign debt inflows with the scheduled outflows in recent months. Just as with the PTI government, the incumbents, too, have been unable to keep the IMF on their side for longer than a few months at a time. To the neutral observer, choosing between sticking with the current government (to avoid more economic uncertainty) and supporting early elections (to end prevailing political instability) is like finding oneself between the devil and the deep blue sea.
The majority of players across the political spectrum have no incentive to call it quits just yet. The constituency for early elections is limited, found mainly within the PTI. Before it fizzles out, the party’s post-government popularity spurt must be en-cashed by Mr. Khan and co. via early polls, delivering a potential majority in the next Parliament. While some skeptics have suggested that the incessant talk of early elections is a red herring to keep the government on its toes, it looks too real to be discarded as a ruse, especially when the threat of dissolution of the Punjab and KP assemblies appears ripe to be enforced.
On its own, the PTI cannot force early elections if other dominant players in the system are not interested. The prevailing view in the PML-N still appears to believe that the battered party can recover its political capital over the next seven to eight months and become more competitive come the next elections late next year. The PPP, which is already in power in Sindh, probably won’t get a similar chance anytime soon to enjoy so many federal ministries. The JUI-F, which has had to patiently wait for power, won’t like to give it all up just a few months in.
Some observers maintain that PTI might get early polls by April/May next year if, in return, it sat down with other parties and developed something akin to a ‘charter of the economy’. If so, it might signal to internal stakeholders and external financiers that future governments would follow fiscal prudence and reforms. That still leaves the institutional powers: will they stick with the difficult economic landscape under pliant politicos until late next year or choose a more challenging state of affairs under a defiant party within a few months? As of now, the political status quo appears likely to hold, unless a middle ground is found.
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