Al Qaeda core in Pakistan retains capability to conduct attacks: State Department releases annual report on global terrorism 2010

The US Administration considered the al Qaeda (AQ) a pre-eminent terrorist threat to the United States in 2010. Though the AQ core in Pakistan has weakened, it retains the capability to conduct regional and transnational attacks. The annual report on global terrorism 2010 released by US State Department reveals that co-operation between al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan-based militants was critical threat the group posed.
In addition, the danger posed by Lashkar-e Tayyaba (LeT) and increased resource-sharing between AQ and its Pakistan-based allies and associates such as Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Haqqani Network meant the aggregate threat in South Asia remains high.
The US administration says that Pakistan remained a safe haven for extremists including high-level al Qaeda leaders and groups such as Taliban's Quetta Shura and Haqqani Network, who use western Pakistan to plan attacks against US interests in Afghanistan.
The annual report states that TTP continued using Pakistan's tribal belt to plan attacks against the government of Pakistan and diversified its set target by seeking to attack the US directly. In other parts of Pakistan, groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba remained a threat to the stability of the region and beyond.
Pakistan experienced hundreds of bomb blasts, suicide attacks, and sectarian violence, resulting in more than 2,000 deaths and scores injured in 2010. The Afghan Talaban, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and al Qaeda have a significant presence in Pakistan and maintained the capability to plan, influence, and assist violent extremist organisations within Pakistan and regionally.
The global report further states although government authorities arrested many alleged perpetrators of terrorist violence but few were convicted. A 2010 review by the US of Pakistan's Anti-Terrorism Court rulings revealed that Pakistan remained plagued with an acquittal rate of approximately 75 percent. The review, in conjunction with information provided by Pakistani law enforcement partners, painted a picture of a legal system almost incapable of prosecuting suspected terrorists. The review determined that the accused in numerous high-profile terrorism incidents involving US victims had all been acquitted by the Pakistani legal system.
The Anti-Terrorism Bill 2010, proposed on July 28, 2010, remained before Pakistan's parliament. It proposes 25 amendments to Pakistan's original anti-terrorism legislation, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997, including provisions that broaden the definition of terrorism, expand the authority of law enforcement agencies investigating terrorist incidents, authorise detention of subjects for 90 days before presenting them a court, and allow increased electronic surveillance and wiretapping.
The report further highlighted that Pakistan strengthened its counterterrorist finance regime and committed to making additional improvements. However, Pakistan's terrorist financing law is ambiguous on key points and the country's implementation of UNSCR 1267 was incomplete.
The report states that despite progress, deficiencies in Pakistan's anti-money laundering/countering terrorist finance (AML/CTF) remained. The criminalization of the financing of terrorist acts committed against foreign governments and international organisations was ambiguous, as was the criminalization of financing groups that have not been explicitly banned by the government or designated by the UN.
As an active participant in the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, Pakistan has been under review by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) because of deficiencies in its AML/CTF regime. Another significant concern was Pakistan's weak implementation of UNSCR 1267. UN-designated terrorist organizations were able to skirt sanctions simply by reconstituting themselves under different names. They made little effort to hide their connections to the old groups and gained access to the financial system using new names.
The report further disclosed that Pakistan continued to cooperate in regional and international counterterrorism forums but this co-operation with India was missing in 2010.
The report criticised that the Pakistani military continued to conduct operations in areas with known terrorist activity but was unable to expand its operations to all areas of concern. Increased sectarian violence between the Sunni and Shia communities and against religious minorities also resulted in numerous attacks with high casualties. These attacks continued the trend of employing suicide bombers and remotely detonated explosives to perpetrate violence. Attacks using similar methods were also carried out against government and police facilities.
Pakistan, particularly the Federally Administered Tribal Areas region and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, continued to be used as a base for terrorist organisations operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Pakistani security forces undertook substantial efforts to counter these threats. These organisations recruited, trained, and conducted fundraising for terrorist operations in Pakistan, and used Pakistan as a transit point for cross border movement to Afghanistan and abroad. Pakistan's Frontier Corps and military initiated large-scale counterinsurgency operations in Mohmand, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Orakzai, and added one battalion in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Pakistan's ability to continue robust operations was negatively impacted by the need to divert resources to provide relief from the 2010 floods, which caused severe, long-term damage to Pakistan. The ability to establish and maintain security in densely populated urban area or areas with a historically poor security presence also remained a major challenge for Pakistan.
When Pakistan conducted operations to eliminate safe havens in the country, it often lacked the capability to ensure these areas remained under the control of Pakistan's security agencies. Given its inability to pursue the complete elimination of the terrorists' presence and fully eliminating terrorist safe havens, Pakistan utilised a strategy to conduct limited operations to "contain" terrorist operatives in known areas of activity.