At their first summit in Washington in November 2001, the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and the US President George W. Bush committed the two countries to a strategic partnership. In January 2004, the two countries announced "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership."
By virtue of this, the United States and India agreed to expand co-operation in three specific areas, viz, civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programs, and high-technology trade. In addition, they also agreed to expand their dialogue on missile defence.
It was expected that, "Co-operation in these areas will deepen the ties of commerce and friendship between our two nations, and will increase stability in Asia and beyond.
"In March 2004, the US Secretary of State Colin Powell announced Washington's intention to designate Pakistan a major non-NATO ally - an indication of the special status and long-term nature of their bilateral relationship.
There was considerable resentment in India of this US decision. An Indian analyst wrote, "The American message to New Delhi is that while the ideal of a long-term strategic relationship is on track, Washington's short-term interests will always have priority. We can only hope that Pakistan at least has learnt something and will continue on the path of détente set in January."
It is important to understand that the US-India relationship has been fundamentally altered in the past six years. The US has cultivated a genuine, long-term interest in its relationship with India. Its relations with Pakistan continue to remain important. But it would be a mistake to view the India-Pakistan-US triangle from a Cold War mindset.
In a recent speech, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Christina Rocca, stated the US vision of South Asia. She said, "With India we see great promise for a partnership offering enormous benefits to both our countries.
The challenge before us is to fulfil that potential." About Pakistan, she remarked, "The United States has had a long and, at times, complicated relationship with Pakistan - a country that faces many political and economic challenges. Our goal is a Pakistan that is secure, prosperous and a moderate democracy, contributing to growth and stability in the region. To achieve those goals, we are committed for the long term to broaden and deepen our relationship with Pakistan. "And on the US-India-Pakistan triangle, she had this to say, "The United States has been single minded in working to turn our parallel improvement of relations with India and Pakistan into what Secretary Powell has called a triangle of conflict resolution."
It is clear that the US has had long-term interests in South Asia and that it intends to play a significant role in the regional affairs - the role of a facilitator. Thus, the US becomes important from the point of view of India-Pakistan relations.
Colin Powell remarked once, "We do not impose ourselves as a mediator," instead, we "try to use the trust we have established with both sides to urge them towards conciliation by peaceful means." I have made an attempt here to understand this US role and to find out how to turn it to India's advantage.
CHANGING GLOBAL CONTEXT AND REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS: The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union brought about many fundamental changes in South Asian equations. The old New Delhi-Moscow and Islamabad-Washington axes broke down.
The South Asian region lost its importance to US policy following the end of the Cold War. India's policy of non-alignment lost much of its relevance. With the Soviet Union no more, New Delhi was forced to search for new allies - a search that continued through the nineties. Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan reduced American interest in the region substantially.
Pakistan too faced a problem due to this - thousands of Mujahideen fighting in Afghanistan returned home and could threaten domestic peace. Pakistan then evolved a two-pronged strategy, supporting Kashmiri guerrillas by providing arms, funds and training to them, on the one hand; and allowing the Mujahideen to infiltrate into Kashmir, on the other.
This low intensity war for almost a decade and a half has been the major bone of contention between the two neighbours in the recent past.
The US interest in Pakistan can be explained by three reasons in three different phases. In the 1950s, Pakistan was an ally in the chain of pacts created to encircle the USSR.
In 1970, it became a crucial link in US rapprochement with China. And since 1980, it became important for US strategy in Afghanistan. In the 1990s the importance of Pakistan for the US eroded fast. However, the declining importance of Pakistan did not necessarily mean increasing the significance of India, at least immediately.
Domestic fiscal indiscipline since the mid-eighties and the Gulf War of 1991 plunged India into a serious economic crisis. It was forced to borrow loans from the IMF and the World Bank, and under that pressure launched the Structural Adjustment Programme - the Indian Perestroika. India's enormous potential for investment and as a market could not be missed in the West. It was not until the mid-nineties, however, that the changed relations had sunk in.
The Indian foreign policy struggled before it came to terms with the changed international atmosphere. An indication of change was the announcement of the "Gujral Doctrine."
It was a major policy document by India in many years. I.K. Gujral, then the Foreign Minister and later to become the Prime Minister of India, announced the strategy of improving India's relations with its South Asian neighbours including Pakistan - the "principle of non-reciprocity." As a follow-up, Prime Minister Gujral launched a comprehensive dialogue with his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif.
The dialogue was cut short because the Gujral Government in India did not last long. The India-Pakistan dialogue of 1997 was not a result of US mediation or pressures. It evolved from within the two countries and was important for this reason.
NUCLEARISATION OF SOUTH ASIA: The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998 changed the regional situation quite dramatically. On 11th and 13th May, India tested five nuclear devices in all.
The Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes maintained that China was the primary nuclear threat to India. But the Indian tests also threatened, in fact more directly, Pakistan. Pakistan was quick to react and tested six devices on 28th and 30th May. Unlike in 1974, India declared the intention to weaponise after the tests.
Thus, the Bharatiya Janata Party, the largest party in the then ruling coalition, was able to fulfil its long-time ambition of making India a nuclear power. However, the strategic advantage, if any, that India seemed to have secured was short-lived. Pakistan was able to prove its ability to test and weaponise within fifteen days of the Indian tests and thus established strategic parity with India. This, in effect, negated the superiority of the conventional forces India had enjoyed for long.
There was widespread concern internationally over the nuclearisation of the South Asian region. The coalition government led by the BJP was not perceived to be prone to improving relations with Pakistan, at least at that time. With so many issues outstanding between the two neighbours, it was thought that the nuclear weapons would further complicate the matter.
Most people in the American decision-making circles believed that acquisition of nuclear weapons by the two regional neighbours, already engaged in bitter and protracted conflict, could make the region more unstable and could have disastrous effects.
There was also a fear of terrorist groups acquiring fissile material. The US President Clinton had, in fact, said that South Asia is the "most conflict-prone zone in the world." On nuclear proliferation, the Clinton administration held very strong views. It had vigorously supported the CTBT and such other international non-proliferation regimes. India's decision - and subsequently Pakistan's, as well - not to sign the CTBT had not gone down well with Washington.
A result of all this was imposing sanctions against both India and Pakistan. Washington deplored the tests and sought to prevent nuclear proliferation in the region by using the whip of sanctions. The single most important effect of nuclearisation of South Asia is renewed American concern and interest in the region.
Initially, the nuclear tests appeared to have created hurdles in improving India's relations with the US. But with growing contact between the people and the economies of the two countries, both realised the need to move beyond non-proliferation issues and towards developing a broader convergence. Growing US interest in the region was turned to India's advantage by an extensive dialogue between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott.
The Indian statesman was sent to conduct talks with the US Deputy Secretary of State by Prime Minister Vajpayee as his personal emissary. Later, Singh was appointed Foreign Minister, and continued to talk with Talbott.
The two met with each other as many as eight times between June 1998 and February 1999.
These two highly placed individuals in the respective governments explored issues of both bilateral and international concern. The dialogue also helped Washington understand "that sanctions were not the way to solve the region's problems and that America should accord more weight to India's strategic and economic potential."
The largest democracy in the world and a huge market, India had the potential to become a military as well as economic power of the twenty-first century. The US was also pleased with the results that economic liberalisation had produced in India and the continuation of the policy under three different governments.
Another factor must have caused a rethinking about India in Washington. In 1996, Yevgeny Primakov was appointed as foreign minister of Russia.
He brought about a shift in the Westward thrust of the Russian foreign policy and attempted to balance "Atlanticism" with "Eurasianism." Russia's relations with China had been improving rapidly, and it was getting increasingly uncomfortable with unipolarity. Primokov suggested that Russia, China and India should form a "strategic triangle" in Asia.
The Russian suggestion was obviously intended at balancing US influence in Asia. New Delhi, however, was not immediately forthcoming on this idea, as it did have many outstanding issues with Beijing. Indians have not shown any great inclination to the idea of "strategic triangle." But the possibility of such a development could have been a reason for a changed US attitude towards India.
The US was looking to India as a counter to China, and must have been keen on not letting slip its newly built advantages in South Asia. Thus, towards the end of the Clinton Presidency, Washington's interest in the region was revived, and it was clearly to "advantage New Delhi."
Following nuclearisation, India and Pakistan made another attempt to improve relations. Widespread international concern over the tests could have had some impact on the two governments. Nine months after the tests, an attempt to normalise relations was made in February 1999. Bus service between Lahore and New Delhi was resumed, among other things. Prime Minister Vajpayee decided to make a dramatic journey to Lahore on the first trip of the bus. He met with his Pakistan counterpart Nawaz Sharif at Lahore and the two leaders signed the "Lahore Declaration" on 21st February 1999.
They agreed to intensify efforts "to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir" and refrain from intervention in each other's internal affairs.
They declared their intention to "intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process." More important, they specifically agreed to "take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons," and to discuss confidence-building measures in nuclear and conventional field "aimed at the prevention of conflict."
The Lahore Process was not only a crisis management step on the backdrop of nuclearisation of South Asia, it was, in essence, the continuation of the Gujral Doctrine.
THE KARGIL CONFLICT: However, the hopes created by the Lahore Process were short-lived. Within two months of signing the Declaration at Lahore, the Pakistani infantry battalions alongwith some insurgents crossed the LOC in Kashmir to enter into Indian territory at Batalik, Dras and Kargil.
The Indian intelligence failed to anticipate this ambitious Pakistani movement in very inhospitable terrain. A Report by the International Crisis Group compares the Kargil conflict with the infiltrations in 1947. "The policy decision on both occasions was taken by the military. Both in 1947 and in 1999, the civilian leadership was ill-informed of the military implications of intervention."
The operation to recapture the points taken by the Pakistanis lasted for about two months. The Indian Government refused permission to the Indian Army to cross the LOC for political reasons. In these circumstances, the Armed forces resorted to airpower to assault Pakistani forces.
It appears in retrospect that Pakistan had completely miscalculated the reaction of the international community, particularly that of the US. The US did not show any inclination to bring the issue to the UN Security Council.
The Foreign Minister of India attempted to resolve the crisis by offering to talk to his Pakistani counterpart.
The attempt did not succeed. In the last week of June, the Commander-in-Chief of the US Central Command, General Anthony Zinni met with the Pakistani Prime Minister and told him to withdraw his troops. Later, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Gordon Lanpher visited New Delhi and informed the sources there about Zinni's visit and his message to Islamabad. Prime Minister Sharif visited Washington DC on 4th July, but failed to convince President Clinton that India was responsible for the crisis. As one analyst puts it, by "not accepting the Pakistani version of the origins of the Kargil crisis, the United States helped hasten its end." This obviously went down well with decision-makers in India.
Washington's response to the crisis was interpreted in New Delhi as an indication that the US was no more "tilted" towards Pakistan. It was widely believed in Washington that the Kargil conflict had the potential to become a nuclear conflict. The former US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott is quoted as having said that the Kargil dispute "had the potential of going all the way." Thus, they felt compelled to intervene.
CLINTON'S VISIT TO SOUTH ASIA: In March 2000, President Clinton arrived on a visit to the subcontinent. He stayed in India for five days, becoming the first US President to visit India in 22 years after Carter. The visit was hugely successful and the US President collected a lot of goodwill in India.
He proceeded to Pakistan where he stayed only for a few hours. By now, Pakistan's army chief (widely believed to be the "architect" of Kargil) General Pervez Musharraf had toppled the Sharif Government in a dramatic coup and taken over the reigns of Pakistan.
During the visit, the US President advised Islamabad not to destabilise the region. At the end of the Clinton presidency, as one scholar has rightly argued, "the declarations about the existence of a new 'strategic partnership' (between India and the US) that one heard from analysts, journalists and politicians in both countries wildly overstated the congruence of interests and outlooks that linked the two nations."
However, two things are absolutely certain. One, the US was convinced of the value of India, as a potential strategic as well as economic partner; so was India, about winning American goodwill in a unipolar world. And second, almost simultaneously, the importance of Pakistan had steadily declined for the US.
THE AGRA SUMMIT: There was no great improvement in India-Pakistan relations following Kargil. Once again India decided to take an initiative at improving relations and invited President Musharraf for talks to the historic Indian city of Agra in July 2001.
The talks were a complete failure. India and Pakistan failed even to issue a joint declaration at the end of the talks. It is believed that the talks failed because of Pakistan's uncompromising stand that Kashmir is a "core issue" between the two countries and should be negotiated and resolved ahead of everything else.
The valuable lesson learnt from the summit was that while summit diplomacy may be useful during the crisis, one couldn't expect dramatic solutions to protracted conflicts through it. One of the reasons for the failure of the summit was also the fact that it was not preceded by sufficient lower level negotiations preparing, ground for the two leaders to make a breakthrough. Also, the immaturity shown by the Indian media in overexposing the negotiations spoilt the show to an extent.
THE AFTERMATH OF 9/11: Most prominent analysts and decision-makers in New Delhi welcomed the election of George W. Bush as the new President of the United States. One, because Bush, unlike his Democratic counterpart, was not a non-proliferation protagonist and did not have much faith in international arm control regimes like the CTBT. Also, his administrative appointments, particularly that of the assistant secretary of state for South Asia and the Ambassador to India, pleased many of them.
The Indian response to President Bush's address on ballistic missile defence was "far more positive than those of most of the world's other major nations, US friends and potential adversaries alike." In May 2001, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's Asia tour included destinations Tokyo, Seoul and New Delhi, but not Beijing or Islamabad, "was the occasion of considerable Indian self-congratulation."
The frequency of high-level visits in both directions increased considerably and continued even in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks in the US.
But the US war against terrorism created new challenges for it in South Asia. Pakistan was needed as a crucial ally. History repeated, and for the third time in three decades the fortunes of another military regime in Pakistan changed due to the global designs of the US.
Pakistan became a "frontline state" in America's proposed "war on terrorism." The Bush administration lifted sanctions against Islamabad, offered generous economic aid and agreed to help them renegotiate debt obligations. But unlike in 1970 or 1980, courting Pakistan would not be at the expense of the carefully nurtured relationship with India.
The favours showered by the US, the self-declared leader of the international anti-terror campaign, upon a country perceived by New Delhi as the main perpetrator behind the insurgency in and terrorist attacks against India, was unacceptable to the Indians.
The irony of Pakistan being a frontline state in the US campaign against terror was not missed in lndia. Washington, thus, had to do a very delicate balancing act.
REPERCUSSIONS OF THE ATTACK ON THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT: The situation between India and Pakistan worsened following the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on 13th December 2001. The Parliament was in session at the time of the attack.
This attack was preceded by stepped up terrorist activities in Kashmir. The attack on the Parliament was believed to have made by terrorists belonging to the Lashkar-i-Taiba group of Kashmiri separatists and New Delhi had strong reasons to believe that these terrorists were actually supported by Pakistan.
Indian public reaction to the attack was extremely sharp, demanding suitable retaliation on the part of the Indian Government. New Delhi responded by recalling its High Commissioner from Islamabad and by shutting down road and air links between the two countries.
It demanded that Pakistan hand over some 20 persons wanted in India for act of terror. Most important, it began a massive mobilisation of its armed forces alongside the Pakistan border in order to pressurise Pakistan to acquiesce. New Delhi plunged into a flurry of diplomatic actions.
There were alarms in the US, as once again war looked imminent between the two nuclear neighbours. The immediate US reaction was to place the two Kashmiri extremist groups, viz, Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed on the list of terrorist groups prepared by the State Department and to freeze their assets in the United States.
It appealed to India to maintain restraint. Continuous US pressure made President Musharraf deliver his now famous 12th January 2002 speech in which he denounced the activities of a number of radical Islamic organisations operating from Pakistan. Later, he arrested many of their leaders.
However, he asserted that his government would not withdraw its support to the Kashmiri cause.
Tensions continued to remain high. There were daily exchanges of artillery fire as well as fiery rhetoric. The possibility of an actual India-Pakistan war loomed large on the subcontinent. Terrorist activities in Kashmir continued through May 2002, when in an attack by militants, family members of Indian soldiers were killed. In another incident, Abdul Gani Lone, the "voice of Kashmiri moderation" was assassinated.
The Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee spoke of a "decisive battle" in a speech delivered to Indian soldiers. In essence, the Indian Government was threatening to do what the US had actually done in fighting against terrorism. In this way they put pressure on both Pakistan and the US. Alarmed, as the events took a turn for the worse, the American diplomacy swung into action.
US Deputy Secretary of State Armitage visited South Asia in June, followed by Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld. International pressure on India and Pakistan to maintain sanity mounted too, as the Russian President Vladimir Putin and the British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw requested the two countries to follow restraint.
President Musharraf yielded under tremendous international pressure in general and US pressure in particular. He agreed to put an end to infiltrations by the Islamic militants into India and pledged to dismantle the militants' training and operational camps. When convinced about the genuineness of Islamabad's claim in this regard, New Delhi responded with moderate but positive steps.
It decided to resume commercial flights to Pakistan and send its High Commissioner to Islamabad. Demobilisation of forces along the border began in October 2002.
The 02-03 India-Pakistan conflict yet again underlined not just increasing US interest in South Asia; but also the significance of US diplomacy in crisis-prevention, and a tacit acceptance of both the South Asian neighbours of that US role.
The US used its influence in Pakistan to convince President Musharraf to stop all support to infiltration and insurgency in Kashmir. On the other hand, they convinced India that US goodwill in both Pakistan and India could work to India's advantage.
After all, President Musharraf had taken action against terrorist groups active in Kashmir under US pressure. There was considerable resentment against President Musharraf in India, as he was perceived to be responsible for Kargil.
The US diplomats argued that US support to the Musharraf regime has ensured that more extremist Islamic elements do not come to power in Pakistan. In other words, US backing of the Pakistan President works to India's advantage.
The international community had rejected support to Pakistani regulars at the time of Kargil. It denounced infiltration and militancy at the time of the attack on the Indian Parliament.
The conclusion for Pakistan may well be that, however legitimate the demands be (as Pakistan perceives in case of Kashmir), the only acceptable solution to the international community in the present circumstances would be a diplomatic solution. For India's part, the realisation may be the benefits of so called internationalisation of the Kashmir issue.
The role of American diplomacy in preventing a war could not have been missed in New Delhi. However, it must be noted that Pakistan does not accept the no-first-use of nuclear weapons policy. Nor does India accept a third-party role in resolution of the Kashmir dispute.
OPTIONS FOR INDIA: There is no doubt that in the aftermath of 9/11 the US has become a major actor in South Asia. It's leverage with both India and Pakistan has significantly increased. Today, Washington enjoys enough influence with both Islamabad and New Delhi and does not hesitate to use it for preventing a violent conflict between the two. And so long as the US interest demands, it will continue to do so. As the US Secretary of State Collin Powell remarked, "It is time to get started on making regional stability permanent.
Kashmir is on the international agenda. The United States will extend a helping hand to all sides so that they can achieve a more peaceful, less divisive future. We are looking to both India and Pakistan to take steps that begin to bring peace to the region and to ensure a better future for the Kashmiri people. The problems with Kashmir cannot be resolved through violence, but only through a healthy political process and a vibrant dialogue."
This American concern and interest can be converted into advantage for India. US goodwill in Islamabad can, in a sense, be beneficial to New Delhi. Diplomatic pressure can produce positive results if used skilfully - a fact demonstrated during the crisis following the attack on the Indian Parliament.
The US has shown willingness to co-operate on two other things, and India must make the maximum benefit of it. One is intelligence support and the other is equipment and technology for improving vigilance on the border.
That said, one important limitation on US role in the region must be noted. US role is essentially that of conflict-prevention and not that of conflict-resolution. And this is pretty much consistent with India's continued objection to third-party mediation or intervention in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute.
So, if India and Pakistan have to move beyond a troubled relationship and towards a stable peace in the region, they have to look only to themselves. In the last few months of the NDA Government in India, efforts to bring about a normalisation in India-Pakistan relations got under way.
In April 2003, about six months after the demobilisation of forces on the India-Pakistan border began, Indian Prime Minister offered once again to "extend the hand of friendship" to Pakistan. Pakistan responded positively. The two countries agreed to resume transport links. At the time of the visit of the US Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, President Musharraf declared that infiltration along the LOC has been ended and that any "remaining training camps would be immediately dismantled."
Later that year, the two countries exchanged Parliamentary delegations, released prisoners as a goodwill gesture and exchanged suggestions on confidence-building measures. Pakistan Prime Minister declared cease-fire along the LOC in Kashmir in November 2003. At the end of the 12th SAARC summit held in Islamabad in January 2004, the two countries announced that they would resume the "composite" dialogue that would cover all bilateral issues - Kashmir as well as trade and economic development.
The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan met in Islamabad on 18th February. That meeting set the modalities of the dialogue. After the General Elections conducted in April-May 2004, the Congress-led coalition has assumed power in India.
The new government declared immediately after taking charge that the dialogue with Pakistan will continue. On 25 and 26 May, official level talks between the two countries were conducted, laying ground for the next round of talks at the Foreign Secretary level, scheduled for June.
Two core areas India and Pakistan should be looking at: One would be, developing confidence-building measures. This is of primary importance for the security of the subcontinent.
The second would be, serious efforts to step up bilateral trade. Official trade between the two countries is meagre, less than 1 percent of their global trade. As an analyst remarks, this virtual "no trade area" is unnatural. "Commerce between rivals does not guarantee peace, but good economics can promote good politics. As it has elsewhere, economic interdependence on the subcontinent can promote trust and reduce tensions." In addition, the two should also be looking at promoting people-to-people contacts.
Cultural and academic exchanges, even contacts and co-operation between the NGOs/civil society will help in building interest in a durable peace.
There is no reason for excessive pessimism on the future of India-Pakistan relations. After all, between Simla and Siachen, there had actually been a twelve-year long period of relatively stable India-Pakistan relations. It may be recalled in this regard that, despite a pending border dispute and continuing Beijing-Islamabad friendship, India and China have made significant progress towards improving relations. For India-Pakistan relations, this may well be the model to emulate.
(From a paper presented at a seminar organised by the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad.)
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