Everyone is busy talking about the currency crisis facing Pakistan. But few have pointed out towards an ‘invisible currency’. That money comes in the form of “political capital” – accrued by the majority party after every general election. Onto the question, then: how much influence can the PTI realistically exert on the parliament, the institutions and the public to push through its agenda, or any iterations of it?
Internally, the PTI has just enough numerical strength to form a stable, if not a strong, government at the center. Barring some absurd twist of fate, the party also looks set to bag the office of the President, have its CMs in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab, become part of the Balochistan government, and install governors in all provinces. This is one better than the political whitewash piloted by PML-N back in 2013.
Against that executive strength, the nascent opposition alliance already looks shaky. But the opposition will be running the table in the Senate as it is expected to claw back the office of the Senate Chairman. Until at least 2021, the opposition’s Senate majority may pose challenge to the PTI’s attempt at getting major, non-budgetary legislations passed. However, given that the PTI is much closer to the PML-N on economic issues and to the PPP on social issues, the ruling party will do well to divide and rule.
Outside the parliament will be a rather benign territory for the so-called reformers. Institution-wise, the PTI is seemingly on good terms with the ones who really matter. If the party is indeed favoured by the establishment, it remains to be seen if it can help the PTI create administrative space. Will it be enough to cool the judiciary’s economic activism? Will the bureaucratic baboos, feeling hounded in the wake of NAB’s accountability drive, be any more forthcoming to the PTI than they have been to its predecessors?
What about the public? Will it show greater patience with a party that is new to running the entire country? Symbolic measures – having a small cabinet, shunning the protocol, the premier living simple, etc. – may help top-up the credibility account. Though the opposition is still making claims of widespread vote-rigging, it will help the PTI that the partisans among the public seem to have already moved on. This is evident in the lack of mass protests over the vote-counting fiasco. And there is no PTI in opposition!
In short, Khan’s party looks to have sufficient political capital to administer the needed medicine of spending austerity and economic reforms – with the precise prescription and dosage to be determined by the IMF soon. But with or without the IMF, the window of opportunity is such that the PTI should quickly gather the competent “professional talent”, fine-tune its economic reforms agenda (much of the PTI’s ‘First 100 Days Agenda’ has already been analyzed in this space), and start implementation pronto.
Best if the party follows a consultative approach, stays clear of political controversies, and retains political capital for real issues marring Pakistan’s competitiveness as an investment decision: governance, rule of law, and regional integration. Will the party really go after institutional corruption as well? How seriously will it touch the issue of judicial reforms? How will it de-politicize law enforcement agencies? Can it really act on its desire to make peace with neighbors and boost regional connectivity? Those questions, more than anything else, will test the PTI in its time.
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