Intra-Afghan talks

EDITORIAL: The long, winding road to peace in Afghanistan seems even more of a maze whenever moves towards a peaceful solution seem to be finally yielding results. The agreement between the US and the Taliban signed in February 2020 in Doha was meant to be followed by intra-Afghan talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. This arguably was the most critical part of the process since the US had announced its decision to draw down its forces (which it is doing) in exchange for guarantees from the Taliban that they would not attack foreign forces or allow terrorists to use Afghan soil against the US or its allies. The exiting US has therefore extracted what it could from the Taliban and is eager to be on its way home so that US President Donald Trump can use the withdrawal as an election card come November 2020. That still leaves the imbroglio of the continuing civil war in Afghanistan. The prisoner release agreed in Doha did not have the imprimatur of the Afghan government. Despite its objections, however, it had no choice but to go along with the agreed prisoner release. Out of the 5,000 prisoners to be released by Kabul, 400 were retained on the argument that they were the most dangerous terrorists and would go back to their ways as soon as they found their freedom. Finally, partly under US pressure, partly to find a face saving legitimacy for the release of the remaining 400, Kabul convened a Loya Jirga that pronounced earlier this month that the remaining 400 prisoners should be released in the interests of kicking off the intra-Afghan dialogue. As it transpired however, only 80 had been released when the French and Australian governments objected to the release of some prisoners responsible for killing their nationals and soldiers. Whatever the pretext or genuine concern regarding ties with these countries, the planned release of the remaining 320 prisoners has now been delayed again by the Afghan government in apparent contravention of the Loya Jirga's consensus.

Even if the impasse is resolved in some manner that satisfies the French and Australian governments, the whole slow, halting, cumbersome process of mutual prisoner releases simply reflects the level of distrust between the opposing sides of the Afghan civil war. Even during the Loya Jirga discussions, women and other groups that had been targeted by the Taliban in the past had protested against the prisoner release. Their concerns regarding a return of the Taliban to power, frightening as the thought is based on their stint at the reins in 1996-2001, were strengthened by the fact that despite the Doha agreement and the Taliban not attacking foreign troops, the development simply seemed to have freed the Taliban to escalate their attacks on Afghan forces and civilians. That portended the trouble that might lie ahead even if the much delayed intra-Afghan talks do finally get off the ground. First and foremost, it is not clear what the agenda of such talks would be. If the Taliban stick to their past position of describing the Afghan government as a US puppet, logically they may come to the table and demand its unconditional surrender. On the other hand, even if the Taliban take a more conciliatory position in the interests of not interrupting the momentum of US withdrawal by agreeing to some form of power sharing, where is the guarantee they will not roll over their Afghan government rivals as soon as the US and other foreign forces finally leave? The Afghan conundrum, despite the best efforts of all stakeholders to view the peace process as a glass half full, may well still turn out to be a glass half empty or even worse.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2020