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At a time when the global economy is being reshaped by conflict, volatility, and rising costs, Pakistan has responded not with sharper productivity strategies, but with softer work arrangements. Four-day workweeks, extended work-from-home practices, and widespread online classes are being framed as cost-saving measures. In reality, they risk becoming a subsidy to comfort at the expense of productivity.

The logic appears simple: fewer commuting days mean lower fuel consumption; remote work reduces operational costs; online classes save energy. But this is a narrow accounting view. It captures visible savings while ignoring the hidden but far larger costs of reduced output, weakened coordination, and declining human capital formation.

Recent data further weakens the core justification behind these measures. Despite reduced working days and increased reliance on work-from-home arrangements, there is little evidence of any meaningful decline in fuel consumption.

Mobility patterns have adjusted rather than contracted people continue to travel for non-work activities, staggered schedules, and multiple shorter trips. In some cases, reduced peak congestion has even encouraged additional discretionary movement. This is consistent with economic evidence on rebound effects, where perceived savings lead to behavioural adjustments that offset initial gains. If fuel use is not declining in any significant way, then the central claim of cost-saving collapses.

What remains is a policy that reduces formal economic activity without delivering measurable resource savings. In effect, we are not conserving energy, we are merely redistributing its use while silently absorbing the cost in lost productivity, weaker coordination, and diminished economic output.

Economic history is clear on one point: productivity—not cost-cutting—drives growth. From post-war reconstruction in Europe to East Asia’s industrial rise, countries responded to crises by working more efficiently, not less intensively. Pakistan, by contrast, seems to be moving toward a model where adjustment is achieved by slowing down economic activity itself.

Take the four-day workweek. In advanced economies, such experiments are backed by strong institutional capacity, high levels of automation, and measurable productivity benchmarks. Even then, the evidence is mixed and highly context-specific.

In Pakistan’s case, where public sector efficiency is already under strain, compressing the workweek risks reducing effective working hours without any compensatory increase in productivity. The result is not efficiency gain; it is output compression.

Work-from-home policies raise similar concerns. While remote work can be effective in high-trust, digitally integrated environments, Pakistan’s institutional setting is different. Weak monitoring systems, limited digital infrastructure, and a culture that still relies heavily on in-person coordination mean that remote work often leads to fragmented workflows and slower decision-making.

The informatisation of work within formal institutions comes at a cost: reduced accountability and declining service delivery.

The shift to online classes is perhaps the most consequential. Education is not merely the transfer of content—it is the formation of human capital through interaction, discipline, and engagement.

Evidence from pandemic years globally shows significant learning losses associated with prolonged remote education, particularly in developing countries. For Pakistan, already facing a learning crisis, normalizing online classes as a cost-saving tool risks deepening long-term productivity losses. These are not immediately visible in budgets, but they will surface in lower-skilled graduates, weaker labour market outcomes, and slower growth.

What is striking is that these measures are being justified under the banner of fiscal prudence. Yet the actual savings are minimal. Government wage bills remain unchanged. Fixed costs of administration continue. Energy savings are marginal and often offset elsewhere in the system. In contrast, the economic cost, through reduced public sector output, slower service delivery, and long-term human capital erosion, is substantial.

This reflects a deeper policy problem. Pakistan continues to manage crises by compressing activity rather than enhancing efficiency. Instead of asking how to produce more with fewer resources, policy is increasingly focused on doing less in the hope that it will cost less. This is not reform. It is retreat.

The global environment today demands the opposite approach. War-driven inflation, supply disruptions, and tighter financial conditions require countries to become more productive, more coordinated, and more competitive. This means improving energy efficiency, not reducing working days. It means digitizing governance to enhance output, not using digital tools to justify disengagement. It means strengthening education quality, not diluting it.

There is also an equity dimension. These policies disproportionately benefit segments of the urban middle class—those with stable jobs, access to digital infrastructure, and the ability to work remotely. Meanwhile, the informal sector, daily wageworkers, and export-oriented industries continue to operate under full pressure, without similar “comfort subsidies.” This creates a dual economy: one adjusting through reduced effort, the other absorbing the full shock.

If Pakistan is serious about navigating the current global turbulence, it must shift its focus from comfort to productivity. This requires a different set of policy choices: First, protect and enhance effective working time in critical sectors, especially in government services, education, and export industries. Flexibility should be linked to performance, not applied uniformly.

Second, invest in energy and operational efficiency rather than reducing activity. The goal should be to produce the same (or more) output with lower input costs. Third, treat education as a non-negotiable productivity sector. Any shift toward online modes must be driven by quality enhancement, not cost-saving considerations. Finally, adopt a clear principle: public policy should subsidize productivity, not comfort. Any measure that reduces effort without increasing efficiency should be treated as a cost, not a saving.

Pakistan cannot afford to slow down at a time when the world is accelerating under pressure. Crises do not reward those who retreat into convenience. They reward those who reorganize for productivity. Right now, we are choosing comfort. And calling it reform.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

Saima Nawaz

The writer is an Associate Professor at COMSATS University Islamabad and can be reached at [email protected]

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