Global 'great power politics' returns to Middle East

With Russia sending warships to discourage foreign intervention in Syria, and China drawn more deeply into Iran's confrontation with the West, "great power" politics is swiftly returning to the Middle East. After Russia pulled back from the region at the end of the Cold War, the United States and its Western allies faced few external rivals in attempts to influence events. But as the US withdraws from Iraq, emerging economic powers reshape the globe and are themselves sucked ever deeper into the Gulf by their energy needs, that era seems over.
"What we are seeing is the US losing its ability to shape events in the region, even though it remains by far the pre-eminent military power," says Waleed Hazbun, director of the Centre for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies at the American University in Beirut. "You're seeing others moving in to fill the gap." In some ways, experts say, there are echoes of 19th and 20th century scrambles for resources, territory and influence.
"Bottom line: there will be more players in the sandbox," says Hayat Alvi, lecturer in Middle Eastern studies at the US Naval War College. "The Middle East has always been the venue for the "Great Game"... Rising powers will see opportunities and advantages in engaging in (that), just like the colonial powers." Whereas Moscow and Beijing remained largely on the diplomatic sidelines for the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars and even last year's Libya campaign, they increasingly demand their voices are heard.
Both have signalled a clear intention to prevent any "regime change" intervention in Syria; but Russia's deployment of its flagship aircraft carrier and escorts to Syria's port of Tarsus this month drew a starker than usual line in the sand. Whilst some Russian officials talked down the importance of the visit, saying it was preplanned, others said it was intended as a signal. The warships have since moved on, however, and as violence continues to escalate, Moscow is finding itself under ever greater pressure to abandon its one-time ally.
Meanwhile, the success of US and EU sanctions against Iran will be almost entirely dependent on the extent to which China joins with growing signs Beijing views Tehran as a useful tool to divert US military force from Southeast Asia. India, too, looks reluctant to play along with the wider western strategy of attempting to strangle Tehran economically to push it from its nuclear program and is also seen as a rising regional player. There are stark differences to the colonial era, however.
Outside players must contend with increasingly assertive local powers, particularly Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran itself, keen to fill the gap left by a US pullback. To make matters more complex, the "Arab Spring" overturned long-held assumptions of stability and the control governments can exert on events. "Things are becoming less manageable as the region degenerates into deepening socio-economic malaise," says Asher Susser, professor of Middle Eastern politics at Tel Aviv University, "Local trends are forcing external powers to pay attention and not vice versa."
Nevertheless, the more muscular regional approach of Moscow and Beijing in particular appears already increasingly tied to their wider global agendas. Russia's support for Syria's Bashar al-Assad is seen largely as a move to defend its Cold War-era foothold in the country as well as block the road to future Libya-style intervention. With presidential elections due later this year, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is seen keen to show himself facing down the West and making his mark beyond Russia's borders.
With both Moscow and Beijing facing an uptick in protest on their own territory in the last year, neither has any desire to watch another autocratic leader dragged from office. If the Kremlin allows passage of an Arab League proposal to the UN Security Council for Assad to yield power, it will do so only with great reservations and provision excluding military force. With its own colossal energy reserves, Moscow has little need to keep the region's energy states on side. China's dependence on Middle Eastern oil and gas, however, is expected to rise further in the years to come, perhaps drawing Beijing ever deeper into its conflicts and politics whether it wants to be or not.
If the United States succeeds in its ambition to become more energy self-sufficient with new technology and greater domestic resource exploitation and pulls back from the region, some believe China could even become the pre-eminent external power in the Middle East perhaps in a growing rivalry with India, also pulled in by its energy needs.
In the shorter term, there are clear signs the face-off over Iran's nuclear program may also be tied into a wider growing geopolitical rivalry with the West. With Beijing increasingly concerned over the build-up of US forces in its immediate neighbourhood, some voices argue Iran plays a useful role in keeping US forces deployed elsewhere.