Arab unrest: perspectives - VIII

Writing in The North Africa Journal, Arezki Daoud says he strongly believes that after bin Ali and Mubarak, Qadhafi is now next in line. He argues: "Sandwiched between two countries that started it all, he is now next in line. But until he officially leaves, the mercenaries will continue to wreck havoc and the body count will continue to rise as well."
Although, the Editor of this prestigious publication appears quite optimistic about the fall of Qadhafi during this month, many other analysts think it may not happen anytime soon because Libya is not Egypt or Tunisia.
Why Libya is not Egypt or Tunisia? The answer given by Qadhafi's son Saiful Islam, who played a major role in Libya's rehabilitation with the West, on state TV a couple of nights ago in the face of growing anti-government protests was that Libya is not an Arab society with political parties; it is a society based on tribes and sects with alliances, etc. His could be a partially correct answer. But this profound question could find its best answer in the role being played by Libyan army at this point in time, which may ultimately lead to a different outcome from those obtained in the two other African countries-Egypt and Tunisia--in the immediate term at least.
In Egypt, the army was seen thinking hard as the protests against Hosni Mubarak crystallised into a formidable challenge to his 30-year rule. It was being pushed hard by the US to make it clear to an embattled President that he has become a huge liability for the Egyptian people, Egyptian army and the US. Egyptian army was consolidating itself throughout the three-week-long protests. It had not allowed a power vacuum to take place as it timely cashed in on an opportunity thrown up by a highly fragmented and disorganised opposition to seek to midwife a true and genuine democratic process that leads to a fair and free general elections in the most populous nation of the Arab world, although its intentions are being doubted with a measure of caution and anxiety.
For example, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy points out that the Supreme Military Council (SMC) has retained state-of-emergency powers and has not invited any civilians to share in its deliberations.
It says: "What happens within this body -- its dynamics, processes, and evolution -- will be a key to Egypt's future. And although the military is currently displaying a united face, there is no guarantee it will remain so going forward. Indeed, human factors, good and bad, will influence how the SMC plays its role, whether it is able to meet the demands placed on it, and whether Egypt's transition to democracy is smooth, rough, or even aborted."
As feared by some commentators, unlike Egypt and Tunisia where armies effectively maintained a neutral posture, Libyan army is appeared to have taken a different course: it has divided itself into two major groups - one is staying loyal to Qadhafi while the other has pitted itself against his rule, brightening the delirious prospects of "rivers of blood" as threatened by Saiful Islam.
Dominic Waghorn, Sky News' Middle East Correspondent, also shares the view that the Libya's military cannot play the same role as Egypt's and Tunisia's because "it is weak and demoralised".
In his article for The National Interest, Israeli historian Professor Benny Morris has forecast two highly interesting scenarios. According to him, "when the dust settles", one will see that Western-and Israeli-interests in the Middle East "will have been substantially undermined and anti-Western-and anti-Israeli-interests substantially bolstered".
Professor Morris seems confident that the governments such as "Iran's, Syria's and possibly Libya's" will overcome the challenges thrown up by the political turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa where protesters have threatened the grip of long-entrenched despots.
He argues: ".... .Similarly, one will see that the regimes which are, by nature and tradition very brutal, such as Iran's, Syria's and possibly Libya's, will weather the storm whereas those which are softer, more inclined to measures of liberalisation, partly because of attentiveness to messages from Washington, will either have fallen or will have given ground, and a large measure of power, to anti-Western, often Islamist, elements within each country."
Qadhafi, it seems, will hold on to the bitter end. He has been termed one of "the nastiest" rulers by no other than Fawaz A Gerges, Professor of Middle Eastern Politics and International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science and the author of highly acclaimed The Far Enemy: Why Jehad Went Global, at BBC HARDtalk the other day. The host, Zeinab Badawi, had asked him and Libyan opposition member Guma El-Gamaty whether Libya is set for civil war.
But the stage for a full-scale civil war has already been set by Qadhafi's son, Saif-ul Islam (who earned his doctorate from London School of Economics and was known as the soft face of the Brotherly Guide of the Revolution). In his speech, which was generally received as "condescending, divisive and scary" by many, he made it abundantly clear that he is a critical and an integral part of the system, only adding to the chaos on the streets of Tripoli, Benghazi and other Libyan towns.
But many commentators do not term the growing violence in Libya a civil war-they describe it as 'genocide'. Their argument is premised on the narrative that an overwhelming majority of Libyan people is subject to deliberate destruction at the hands of Qadhafi and his security apparatus.