Lahore Resolution revisited

Since our independence, the political narrative in Pakistan confirms and reiterates every year that the Lahore Resolution distilled the demand for a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India. This, indeed has become the political belief of the majority as the history books, public holiday celebrations on that day, public seminars radio - TV programmes, special supplements of newspapers and officially sponsored colourful functions, all tend to reinforce the acceptance of this particular interpretation. Is this true and the only exposition of the significant day?
Interestingly enough, the resolution and its import for the Muslims of British India is surrounded by controversies. The majoritarian view held in Pakistan notwithstanding, the British and the Hindu majority led Congress offer their interpretations. And the scholars of different pursuations present their perspectives to add to the polemics.
Amid these controversies, Jaswant Singh's book entitled, 'Jinnah: India-Partition - Independence (2009) caused a political storm as the author challenged the political establishment of India, invalidating the majoritarian point of view, which was also embraced by the Congress and the BJP parties. This elevated and conferred a status to Mr. Jinnah that he was a nationalist and it was the stubborn attitude of Nehru and his colleagues that was responsible for the partition. Mr. Singh had to pay a price for it and the launching of this book in Pakistan by the author left many wonderstruck and others having a bad taste in their mouth, who viewed the heroic struggle of Mr. Jinnah culminating in the birth of Pakistan.
As the truth of an event is not the monopoly of anyone and is susceptible to interpretations as a student of social science will quickly point out. Seeking inspiration from the fact that human affairs cannot be put in a strait jacket and the same event can be interpreted in a number of ways to draw different conclusions; this venture attempts to interpret the Lahore Resolution in yet another way.
There is a consensus about Mr. Jinnah that he was a Constitutionalist and fought a legal battle for the creation of Pakistan. Additionally, he was a man of integrity, who always conducted himself according to the rules of the game. Did he put forth the demand for Pakistan through this resolution? Perhaps not.
The political struggle of the Muslims had not matured yet and the All India Muslim League was in the process of reorganization after its spilt in 1927. It seems highly inappropriate to pre-maturely articulate the demand for a separate homeland.
Mr Jinnah saw the Constitutional evolution in British India and reacted to the Government of India Act 1935, which introduced the federal system. His concerns about the Muslim's plight in different parts of India moved him to criticize the imperial federal device and also motivated him to express his views within the framework of the new Act. Therefore, the Lahore Resolution should be examined and evaluated in the context of the arrangements under the federal system. The elections under the Act and two years Congress rule authenticated the fears and apprehensions of the Muslim minority in a Hindus majority country and when the Congress resigned from its ministries, Mr. Jinnah declared it as a 'deliverance day'.
Mr Jinnah was operating within the contours of the Government of India Act 1935 but wanted to secure the interests of the Muslims through greater meaningful autonomy to the Provinces and creating separate Provinces where the Muslims were in majority (Balochistan and Sindh).
The credentials of Mr. Jinnah as a constitutionalist were indisputable and he conducted his negotiations with the British and the Congress leadership in that context. If we examine his intellectual journey, the evidence of his ideas goes back to the late 20s, which manifest in the Lahore Resolution. The 'all white Simon Commission', which visited India to have dialogue with the Indian political leadership to decide about the future constitutional installment for India in 1927, was boycotted. As a protest, the Congress formed a commission to present its own version of constitutional arrangements eventually called the Nehru report. Broadly speaking, it was a prescription that very well suited the interests of the Hindu majority rule under a limited democratic dispensation. This report did not allay the fears and apprehensions of the Muslim community, which dreaded the 'permanent Hindu majority rule'. Mr Jinnah reacted to the contents of this report and presented his point of view to be called the 14 points. He reiterated the demand for separate electorate (conceded by Congress in 1916, which changed its stance to joint electorate). More importantly, he pressed for granting Provicial status to areas 'having Muslim majority'. It seems that the Allahabad address of 1930 is an extension of these ideas and Allama Iqbal saw the destiny of the Muslims of India in the North-West of India, the areas that constitute Pakistan today.
The Politics of the British India mostly operated within the framework of the constitutional installments introduced by the British periodically and regularly, keeping in view the changing political dynamics. The Government of India Act 1935 introduced the federal system and was implemented in 1937. Its repercussions for the Muslims were annoying, distasteful and detrimental. Within the confines of this Act, Mr. Jinnah formulated his response demanding a larger dose of autonomy for the Provinces, which at least would bring benefits to the areas having Muslim majority. The word Pakistan was not used in the resolution. If the demand for Pakistan had been clearly articulated, there would have been no need to amend this resolution in 1946 in the All India Muslim League session, which then spelt out the demand for a separate homeland unambiguously.
As we view Mr. Jinnah in a constitutional mode (who never went to jail for his political activities), the resolution in 1940 reflects his prudence and sagacity as a lawyer. He saw events through the legal lens and gave exposition of his views in that context.
The arguments of Ayesha Jalal in her book 'The Sole Spokesman', highlight that the demand was 'inspired' by the British authorities which acquired urgency as the Congress demanded immediate independence for India in its Ramgarh session of 19th March 1940 and also suggested that the solution of the communal problem shall wait the verdict of the Constituent Assembly after independence?
It is highly unlikely and improbable that Mr. Jinnah would be in league with the British to counter the Congress in a matter of two days and to move that resolution carrying the ruler's directives. The Lahore meeting was planned long before the Congress meeting of 19th March 1940, but in fact the ideas of Mr Jinnah were in the context of the 1935 Act and the experience of the two year rule (1937-39) crystallised his thinking to safeguard the interests of the Muslims in a federal context. Ayesha Jalal's position is untenable because in Mr Jinnah we had a leader of integrity and even his worst critics concede him that. To be a partner in a conspiracy was incompatible with his personality. Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that Mr Jinnah had meetings with the British representatives nor any exchange of correspondence to that effect.
The 1940 Resolution, therefore, can be seen in the ambit of the constitutional developments in British India, where Mr. Jinnah made his contribution as a constitutionalist. Hopefully, this exposition will add yet another perspective on the Resolution attracting scholar's attention to continue with the debate.
Sajjad Naseer is a political analyst and Senior Fellow at the Lahore School of Economics