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EDITORIAL: Pakistan’s power shortfall crossing 11,000MW again exposes the old fault line in the sector: generation has been expanded while distribution, transmission, and system management remain unable to carry the load. The latest crisis has been triggered by zero RLNG supply, plant outages and constraints in moving surplus power across the grid, but the deeper failure is more than a decade old.

For 11 to 12 years, policymakers have known that adding generation capacity without fixing Discos, transmission bottlenecks and loss-making feeders only shifts the crisis from one point to another. Pakistan now has around 46,000MW of installed capacity, yet actual available capacity is far lower because key plants are offline, fuel is unavailable, and the grid cannot always move power where it is needed.

This mismatch did not develop by accident. Generation projects attracted attention, financing, and political ownership. Distribution reform, loss reduction and feeder-level accountability remained slower, less glamorous and administratively harder. The result is visible today: expensive capacity exists, consumers still face load-shedding, and the circular debt problem remains embedded in the system.

The current shortfall also shows how fragile the system remains when one fuel source is disrupted. RLNG-based plants with around 5,500MW capacity are idle due to fuel unavailability. Neelum-Jhelum remains offline, Guddu is operating below full capacity, and hydel output is constrained by lower provincial water releases. Transmission limits are also contributing to prolonged load-shedding in Central Punjab.

The government’s call for night-time conservation is reasonable in the immediate term. Consumers and businesses will have to adjust while fuel supplies remain tight. But conservation cannot become a substitute for competence. A system this large cannot be run through emergency appeals every time fuel markets tighten or a major plant develops faults.

The more uncomfortable issue is institutional capacity. Successive governments have relied on the same administrative habits and often the same bureaucratic approach to a sector that requires technical depth, commercial discipline and operational urgency. The present government appears no different. The recurring inability to align generation, transmission, and distribution suggests that the right expertise is still not driving decisions.

Discos remain the weakest link. High losses, poor recovery, weak governance and political interference continue to undermine the sector. Economic load management on high-loss feeders may be unavoidable, but it also confirms the persistence of basic failures in billing, enforcement and distribution efficiency. Until these are addressed, each supply shock will produce the same outcome.

Pakistan does not lack power-sector reports, projections or reform plans. It lacks execution. Demand scenarios up to 2035 already show how serious the challenge will become if peak requirements keep rising without demand-side management and grid strengthening. The difference between a manageable system and a collapsing one will depend on whether reforms are implemented before the next crisis, rather than after it.

The immediate priority is to restore fuel supply, bring idle plants back into operation and resolve transmission constraints. But the lasting solution lies in fixing Discos, reducing losses, strengthening grid capacity and appointing professionals who understand the sector beyond files and briefings.

The country has paid enough for half-reforms. Installed capacity means little when households and industry remain without reliable electricity. The power sector needs competent execution, not another round of bureaucratic explanations.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

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