US' apprehensions about supply routes

Fresh press reports suggest that Pak-US relations continue to deteriorate. One indication is the US military's decision, as reported by The Washington Post, to expand its Central Asian supply routes to the Afghan war, fearing that Pakistan could cut off the supplies. The paper goes on to point out that in 2009, the US moved 90 percent of its surface cargo through the Karachi port and onward through the mountain passes into Afghanistan.
That has now come down to 60 percent with almost 40 percent of the surface cargo arriving in Afghanistan through the 'Northern Distribution Network'. Seeking to raise that volume to 75 percent by the end of the current year, the US government is in negotiations with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and some other countries.
That route though is not as advantageous as the one going through Pakistan. This country offers the shortest and cheapest passage to Afghanistan - at a time when the war's price tag has become a major issue of concern in the US. Equally, if not more, importantly is the fact that Pentagon's 'Northern Distribution Network' does not allow free flow of military supplies; they are restricted to food, water, and construction materials.
Shipment of weapons and other 'lethal' military equipment is not allowed. Yet another restrictive factor is that the existing agreements permit one-way movement only. That can prove to be particularly troublesome at this point in time when the US troop drawdown is to start soon. Unless Washington renegotiates the terms of its agreements with the Northern Route Network countries, it will have serious problems retrieving military equipment the withdrawing troops would leave behind and may have to rely on the exorbitantly expensive aerial lifts.
It is also worthwhile to remember that two big powers, Russia and China, have significant interests in the region. They may not be so accepting of the US use of Central Asian Republics (CARs) as a supply line than when the war began. But both wary of Muslim extremists within their own borders, may hence be willing to lend a helping hand to the US in its fight against al Qaeda and its Taliban hosts. It may also be recalled that Russia, still seeing Central Asia as its backyard, gave a grudging approval to the supply route and American military presence in some of the CARs, losing no time, nonetheless, to set up its own bases and enter into security pacts with those countries. During recent years, Moscow has amply demonstrated its determination to resist US' influence in what it views as Russia's 'near abroad'.
Hence try as it might, the US may not be able to use the northern route on terms that suit its purposes. It requires Pakistan's help to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion. Its current policy of bypassing Islamabad in peace negotiations with the Taliban is unlikely to yield much success. Both countries, therefore, need to work with rather than against each other in resolving Afghanistan.