Diplomats mourn 'death' of EU defence policy over Libya

The European Union has been toying with the idea of creating a common defence policy for at least a decade. Diplomats say that the Libyan crisis has put an end to that illusion. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) "shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence," the EU states in the Lisbon Treaty, its main rulebook.
But when it came to launching military action against Qadhafi - nobody turned towards the CFSP mechanism. France - once an ardent supporter of the EU developing its own capabilities to counterbalance Nato's supremacy over European defence - embarked on an ad-hoc international coalition with Britain and the United States to enforce a United Nations-mandated no-fly zone.
Nato - while torn over whether it should take control of the no- fly zone operation - took five days to apply another plank of the UN- authorised action against Qadhafi - policing an arms embargo with naval patrols in the Mediterranean.
"We could have done that, but the truth is that if we tried we would have taken three months, not three days, to approve an operational plan," an EU diplomat told dpa.
EU foreign ministers were due to consider the option on Monday, but approved a far more low-key role for the CFSP - planning to co-ordinate European military planes and ships getting in and out of Libya to evacuate people and deliver aid.
Speaking to EU deputies on Wednesday, EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton said there was "unanimity of views ... on the essential nature of our humanitarian support" - effectively ruling out other types of CFSP engagement.
A diplomat who took part in Monday's talks said that a military role for the EU was hardly contemplated - as ministers' discussions focused on the brewing row at Nato over its role in the war effort.
"The CFSP died in Libya - we just have to pick a sand dune under which we can bury it," the source quipped. "For anyone who is a committed European, Monday was a very painful day," another EU diplomat said.
Asked whether Germany's point blank refusal to countenance military action against Qadhafi, as opposed to France and Britain's leadership of the no-fly zone coalition, had made forging an EU policy more "difficult", the same source replied: "We have no difficulty in taking a stance, because we have no stance at all to take." In a remarkably frank outburst, Ashton told EU deputies that steering the EU's foreign and security policy is "flying an airplane while we are still building the wings and somebody is trying to take the tailfin off at the same time."
In a commentary for the Friends of Europe think tank, Giles Merrit pointed a finger at Ashton, warning that EU diplomacy "risks becoming irrelevant, thus robbing Europe of its global voice" as long as its boss "remains a low-profile operator." Ashton was a relative foreign policy novice when she was appointed in November 2009, with her previous international experience consisting chiefly of having been EU trade commissioner for the previous 13 months.
One EU diplomat suggested, maliciously, that she was chosen to reassure her home country Britain, which had the strongest reservations about strengthening Europe's foreign and defence policy.
"The appointment of Ashton was the last poisoned chalice the Brits served us over the Lisbon Treaty," the source said, referring to the landmark EU treaty which created Ashton's office.