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Print Print edition: 2011-01-19

Space for the pious

Published Updated

The Holy Quran is revealed in Arabic, our Constitution is written in English. The people of Pakistan are not well-versed in either language and rely on interlocutors of doubtful wisdom and integrity for shaping opinions on important matters of religion and state. If the assassination of Governor Salmaan Taseer and controversy surrounding the blasphemy law remind us of the dangers inherent in this knowledge gap, reactions to the incident indicate the beginning of a new phase by the pious in their struggle for control of the constitutional state.
The assassination of Taseer poses three new challenges to the country's unfinished constitutional-piety discourse, these being, first, the proposition that citizens can be marked for death merely for advocating a change in the blasphemy law; second, the notion that the religious zeal of a pious individual may supersede his duty to the state; and third, the apparent acceptance by government and courts that "fatwas" issued in respect of Governor Taseer were acts of faith rather than transgressions of the law.
Considering that the government has repeatedly stated its commitment not to amend the existing blasphemy law, even its procedural aspects, there is need to examine why the religious parties continue to agitate and mobilise public opinion on the issue, insisting that parliament must not even discuss this law, that justice in this sphere is outside the realm of the civil laws and threatening violence for any display of public sympathy or mourning for the late Governor.
This timing of this mobilisation, during a period of internecine political strife overshadowed by intense social flux, ethnic rifts and sub-national movements; and the sudden unity among religious parties who disagree violently among themselves on interpreting the Sharia,, indicate a strong element of political opportunism, perhaps because, for the first time in a decade, the mainstream religious parties perceive circumstances favourable for political intervention.
At the electoral level, space arises from failure of elected representatives to respond to economic and governance problems and, at the constitutional level, from the PPP's insistence on identifying the party with the state, a mindset that undermines not only the pluralist basis of parliamentary democracy but dilutes the concept of undivided loyalty to the State. Governor Taseer, it may be recalled, used to emphasise that his loyalty as a party "jiyala" took precedence over his high constitutional office while his assassin allowed emotional moorings to overcome duty to the state.
There is space for the pious in the area of justice, where jirgas have re-emerged as a parallel system at the lower level while, at the higher level, non-compliance of court orders by the political, bureaucratic and military establishments indicate that these "Brahmins" of Pakistani society have little taste for a judiciary that can hold them accountable. Not surprisingly, in this vacuum, the Federal Shariat Court has recently expanded its decision-making into the constitutional domain and the religious parties exploit the Salmaan Taseer murder to claim monopoly, to the exclusion of courts, on an issue concerning religion.
The greater space for the pious has been provided by softness of the state towards the militants captured in the on-going armed rebellion for establishing an "Islamic" emirate. The reluctance of the Federal Government and main constitution-committed political parties to own the fight against extremists has further weakened the state's commitment to constitutionalism, encouraging the pious to impose their opinions and views in other areas of society, as exemplified in the case of Governor Taseer.
Of course, it is possible that the high profile religious activism is prompted by the pious elements positioning themselves, and being supported in this effort, to become part of an "Islamist" leaning future Pakistan government for pursuit of close working with the Taliban-inclusive that is expected in Afghanistan post the US retreat. Alternatively, this resurgence of the religious forces within Pakistan may be a stage-managed bogey to remind the Americans of the strategic discomfort they would face in case Pakistan is excluded from its desired "right of first refusal" role in the future of Afghanistan.
Either way, it appears that the considerable street power of Pakistan's religious parties and their capability to influence events, by shaping public through exploitation of religious sentiments, may again be used for internal and external policy objectives. Such proxy arrangements are, of course, a bonus for the religious establishment, because each time it is they, not the State, that emerges stronger from these marriages of convenience.
Pakistan's Islamists, ie, those advocating a Sharia-based society, are not deterred by rejection at the ballot, since for them the election process is a means towards the end and they continue to aggressively exploit religious issues for promotion of their political agenda, the objective of which is to convert the country into an Islamic emirate. This is a vision that is rooted in classic Islamic theology, which, as explained by Dr Muhammad Hamidullah, recognizes religion as the only political basis of the state and rejects the Western concept of a constitutional nation-state founded on linguistic or ethnic affinities.
Consequently, the pious elements are more comfortable in dealing with military regimes and encourage these, because martial law undermines the legitimacy of the constitutional state and creates space in the public mind for alternate systems of governance. It is a mutually convenient arrangement, because, to be fair, the pious elements are free of the linguistic and ethnic tensions that bedevil Pakistan's political canvas, therefore the military turns to the pious rather than the political parties for support in stabilising internal polity.
Coming back to the matter of Governor Taseer's assassination, the state may choose the path of least confrontation by focusing its inquiry into the "security lapse" aspect, but this does not take away from the real question, which is whether individual religious sentiments should take precedence over duty to the state. It is an issue that strikes at the very heart of the country's security paradigm and, if left undecided, will further impair the ability of the state to exert power over non-constitutional political forces.
For many years now, Pakistan's power wielders have attempted, without success, to fuse the demands of the religious lobby with state imperatives, best exemplified by the Army's policy of motivating its soldiery on religion-based nationalism, an India-centric ideology that has proved to be a hurdle in operations against an enemy that possesses national and religionist symmetry with our forces.
Governor Taseer's murder, it should be noted, did not emerge from a void. Within the past year, the two major political parties have publicly lent support to a Baloch leader who offered "head money" for the murder of a former President and Army Chief; while an applicant, arguing in favour of the supremacy of a pious state, flung a copy of the constitution to the floor during a hearing in the Supreme Court. No notice was taken of either event by those charged with guarding the constitution and the law.
The past, they say, is another country but in the case of Pakistan it is a script written to describe future events. The comments of Justice Munir and Justice Kiyani in their "Report of the Court of Inquiry 1954 (Punjab Disturbances 1953)" could well have been written for 2011 - "... the challenge of the Majlis-i-Amal was not treated seriously by either (Federal or Punjab) Government. Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din was hoping to the last moment that something happy will turn up, while the Provincial Government seemed satisfied that the agitation will start in Karachi...... the administrative machinery had completely failed and no one was willing or anxious to face the responsibility of enforcing the law, either by arresting offenders or preventing the perpetration of crime....the whole situation was treated as a peaceful theatrical performance where processions are stage-managed and slogans raised for the benefit of a contented audience."

Copyright Business Recorder, 2011

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