Leaks without reckoning

Pakistan has spent an entire decade turning revelations of offshore wealth into political theatre. Names emerge, television studios erupt, inquiries are promised, and the public waits.

Governments change; the machinery protecting unexplained wealth survives. The question in October 2026 is no longer whether Pakistan can obtain information. It is whether those controlling the state will allow that information to disturb the privileges of their own class.

The trail runs through Swiss Leaks in 2015, Panama and Bahamas in 2016, Paradise in 2017, Pandora in 2021 and Suisse Secrets in 2022. These were distinct disclosures, involving different institutions and periods. Their Pakistani connections demanded systematic investigation.

Offshore ownership is not itself an offence; tax residence, beneficial ownership, lawful funding and disclosure obligations must be established. Precisely for that reason, serious inquiries were indispensable. Neither a leaked name nor a politician’s denial settles a case.

Panama produced an extraordinary political and judicial confrontation, including three-time premier Nawaz Sharif’s removal in 2017. His Avenfield and Al-Azizia convictions were overturned in 2023. Those acquittals (sic) must be respected. What happened to the wider population of identified persons?

How many inquiries established lawful ownership? How many assessments survived appeal? What tax was actually recovered, and what proceeds of crime were returned? Notices issued and demands created are not money recovered. Pakistan needs an independently verified, publicly audited balance sheet of enforcement, not another recital of sensational names.

Our warnings long predate Panama. “Probing Swiss accounts” [Business Recorder, August 15, 2014] challenged unsupported claims about $200 billion and demanded properly grounded information requests. “Mini-budgets and illicit money” [The News, February 15, 2015] contrasted regressive taxation with inaction over overseas wealth. “Paradise Papers: another wake-up call” [Business Recorder, November 12, 2017], “The corrupt, tax cheats, ‘secrecy’ & RTI” [Business Recorder, January 12, 2020], and “Retrieving untaxed/ill-gotten assets” [Business Recorder, February 26, 2020]returned repeatedly to the same failure: governments could find the compliant taxpayer but lost their resolve when wealth acquired political protection.

International cooperation subsequently made the excuse of informational helplessness weaker. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) records that Pakistan began automatic exchanges of financial-account information in 2018.

The Common Reporting Standard operates through administrative-assistance and competent-authority arrangements. It must be distinguished from the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Multilateral Instrument (MLI), which entered into force for Pakistan on April 1, 2021. The latter modifies covered tax treaties, including safeguards against treaty abuse; it is not a universal offshore-account retrieval mechanism. Neither instrument automatically collects a rupee. Information must be matched against returns, wealth statements and ownership records; discrepancies require lawful investigation, assessment and recovery. Criminal proceeds require the appropriate evidentiary and cooperation processes.

Announcing treaty participation while failing to demonstrate results confuses access with achievement. Parliament should demand separate accounts of information received, information used, enforceable liabilities established and cash collected. Otherwise, international cooperation becomes another credential displayed abroad while its domestic purpose remains frustrated.

The Swiss story needs its own reckoning. Our earlier investigations questioned delays in revising the tax treaty and the loss of opportunities to pursue older information. The government should now table the chronology: negotiations, effective dates, requests submitted, replies received and cases concluded.

Historical bank balances cannot simply be labelled stolen money, nor can a fall in those balances be celebrated as repatriation. Funds may move elsewhere. Only verified transactions and recoveries establish what Pakistan actually secured.

Amnesties reveal the political choice with unusual clarity. According to the November 7, 2019 parliamentary briefing reported contemporaneously, 135 persons declared approximately Rs. 62.335 billion under the 2018 scheme, paying Rs2.89 billion. Another 56 declared Rs31.78 billion under the 2019 scheme, paying Rs1.694 billion.

Together, that was roughly Rs 94.1 billion regularised for Rs 4.584 billion: about 4.9 percent. These were cases discussed in the context of overseas information already reaching the authorities. The state offered concessionary settlement when it should have demonstrated credible enforcement.

This ratio is not a calculation of tax legally recoverable in every case. Residence, years of acquisition, exemptions, limitation and evidence matter. Our indictment does not require inflated estimates. The documented concession is damning enough.

A salaried person cannot negotiate away deductions at source by promising future compliance. Those who concealed assets were offered precisely the accommodation denied to citizens whose income was already visible. The incentive was unmistakable: compliance brings immediate liability; concealment may eventually purchase a discount.

We have consistently argued that the 2018 and 2019 asset-whitening arrangements were unconstitutional. Their unequal treatment of compliant citizens engages Article 25; their secrecy raises Article 19A of the Constitution concerns. Use of the Finance Act route for provisions extending beyond the constitutional scope of a Money Bill raises a separate Article 73 objection. That remains our constitutional position; it must not be confused with a final judgment invalidating both schemes. A government cannot answer them merely by displaying the revenue collected under its own preferential legislation.

Imran Khan as premier failed this test. His administration inherited the opportunity to translate anti-corruption promises into impartial enforcement. Instead, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf supplied its own 2019 amnesty after denouncing such concessions in opposition.

Pandora then exposed offshore structures associated with members of his political circle; the investigation did not suggest that Khan himself owned offshore companies. His responsibility was governmental: establish the facts, apply the same standard to allies and opponents, and publish credible outcomes. Moral denunciation of predecessors could not excuse reproducing their fiscal indulgence.

The Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 2017 offered another test. Rules arrived in March 2019. The Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) then invited people with undeclared benami properties to use the 2019 declaration scheme before enforcement followed.

The contradiction was institutional: build machinery to uncover disguised ownership while advertising an escape from its consequences. A law intended to expose the real owner became part of the sales pitch for another whitening opportunity.

It would nevertheless be inaccurate to say benami enforcement produced nothing. FBR has reported 27 confirmed references involving Rs7.4 billion. A separate release records more than 187 references and the Islamabad commissionerate’s first confiscation of immovable properties: two plots transferred to the federal government.

These are reported milestones, not a consolidated October 2026 total. They strengthen the demand for disclosure: how many references became final confiscations, how much value was realised, and how many beneficial owners faced successful prosecution?

The present ruling elites cannot treat Imran Khan’s failure as their acquittal. Publicly unresolved questions about their wealth require the same scrutiny. Nor does filing an asset statement establish the lawful origin of everything listed.

Section 137 of the Elections Act, 2017 requires annual statements covering members, spouses and dependent children. Materially false particulars can trigger corrupt-practice proceedings within its specified 120-day period. This demands timely verification. Routine acceptance of forms, followed by expiry of the statutory window, is no substitute for scrutiny.

The Election Commission and FBR should reconcile declarations through lawful channels, examine unexplained changes and refer discrepancies for competent proceedings. Where assets are established as lawful, that conclusion deserves respect. Where concealment or unlawful acquisition is proved, political position must confer no protection.

Neither foreign property nor family connection proves guilt; equally, neither electoral victory nor public office supplies the missing money trail. The same evidentiary standard must govern treasury benches, opposition and every privileged institution.

Gunnar Myrdal’s analysis of the soft state in Asian Drama illuminates this disorder: rules exist, but their enforcement bends before entrenched interests. In our setting, the alliance of lawmakers, law keepers and law breakers describes a system in which those designing accountability can also frustrate it. Institutional weakness becomes profitable for people powerful enough to organise exemptions from its consequences.

The cost reaches beyond forgone revenue. Each preferential settlement tells honest businesses that their less compliant competitors may receive better treatment. It weakens the credibility of the next enforcement campaign and encourages people to wait for another concession.

Citizens asked to finance public services deserve an explanation of why the state repeatedly compromises claims against hidden wealth while demanding punctual payment from those it can readily reach.

The remedy begins with a parliamentary account of every major disclosure, identifying aggregate investigations, closures, recoveries, prosecutions and reasons for delay, while respecting lawful confidentiality. Benami performance must distinguish attachment from confiscation and confiscation from realised revenue.

Asset declarations require verification, not ceremonial receipt. Future amnesties should be rejected, and the constitutional objections to earlier schemes squarely adjudicated. Independent scrutiny must follow the money across changes of government. Pakistan cannot keep taxing visible livelihoods while making unexplained fortunes negotiable. A decade after Panama, the enduring scandal is the state’s willingness to bargain with concealment.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026