The respite after the Iran war has failed to restore strategic stability in the Middle East. Renewed Saudi-Houthi hostilities expose the fragility of the region’s security architecture, threatening global energy supplies and trade.
Yet the deeper danger is geopolitical. The region’s predicament is no longer simply about competing military capabilities. It concerns the erosion of the international order, the weakening of conflict-resolution mechanisms and the growing race of promoting self-interests.
More troubling, the crisis is unfolding in a world where those capable of containing conflict may be less willing to intervene than some who stand to benefit from disorder. The most disturbing feature of the present crisis is the imbalance between those who can destabilise the region and those expected to restore order.
The Gulf is discovering that a pause in hostilities is not peace. Renewed Saudi-Houthi tensions have revived the prospect of another prolonged confrontation, placing energy infrastructure, maritime commerce and regional investment at risk.
The Strait of Hormuz carries roughly one-fifth of global petroleum consumption, while the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb connect Gulf producers to European and international markets. Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline provides an alternative route to Yanbu, but its strategic value diminishes if Red Sea shipping is also threatened.
This geographical vulnerability has global consequences. Attacks on energy infrastructure or disruption of either maritime corridor could raise oil and gas prices, increase insurance premiums and freight costs, and reignite inflation. Even without a sustained physical shortage, uncertainty alone can add a geopolitical risk premium to energy markets.
The consequences would extend to electricity, fertiliser, manufacturing, and food prices. Energy-importing economies, particularly those with limited fiscal space and foreign exchange reserves, would be disproportionately exposed.
The Houthis can impose disproportionate costs through relatively inexpensive drones, missiles and threats to shipping. Iran’s regional relationships add strategic depth to the confrontation, although the Houthis retain their own interests and agency. Other regional actors may exploit the distraction to advance territorial, political or strategic objectives. In such an environment, even limited hostilities can attract additional participants with little incentive to facilitate a settlement.
The fixers, by contrast, must bear the costs of containment. Saudi Arabia must protect its population and energy infrastructure while avoiding another open-ended campaign in Yemen. The United States and other Western powers must balance freedom of navigation, energy security and military commitments against competing global priorities. Regional governments must contain the damage to their economies without being drawn into a wider war.
This asymmetry favours the spoiler. Disruption is relatively inexpensive; restoring confidence, securing shipping and rebuilding damaged infrastructure can cost billions. A spoiler needs only to keep uncertainty alive, whereas a fixer must deliver a durable settlement.
The danger is compounded by the absence of a credible regional security framework capable of reconciling competing interests. Military deterrence can impose costs, but it cannot substitute for a political settlement. Without sustained diplomacy, every temporary reprieve risks becoming an interval between confrontations.
The crisis also needs to be viewed through the wider contest over the international order. China and Russia have reasons to welcome a weakening of uncontested American primacy, particularly if Washington is forced to divert military, diplomatic and financial resources towards another Middle Eastern crisis.
Both countries have substantial economic or strategic interests in the region and could contribute to diplomatic efforts. Yet neither necessarily has an incentive to assume the full cost and risk of stabilising a regional order from which it believes the United States derives disproportionate influence.
Their preference may therefore be to remain engaged at arm’s length: preserve relationships, protect selected interests and exploit diplomatic openings without assuming the burdens of a comprehensive security commitment. China can emphasise its economic reach and diplomatic credentials; Russia can seek to preserve its regional influence and leverage its relationships with competing actors.
This is a strategic calculation, not an indication that either power is engineering the conflict or deliberately directing its course. Their interests are not identical, and both would suffer if energy disruption became prolonged or regional instability threatened their own commercial and security priorities. There interests are best served in a stable Middle East.
Nevertheless, there is a larger advantage to be gained if repeated crises erode confidence in the existing international order. When Western powers are preoccupied with managing conflicts, the relative influence of alternative powers can grow without those rivals having to provide an equivalent security guarantee.
The potential gain lies not in the crisis itself, but in the strategic vacuum it may leave behind. If China and Russia can expand their influence while others absorb the cost of containment, the balance of global power could shift incrementally in their favour.
For Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners, the lesson is clear: economic transformation cannot rest on the assumption that external powers will guarantee regional stability. Vision 2030, the UAE’s global commercial ambitions and Qatar’s energy expansion all depend on secure infrastructure, predictable trade routes and investor confidence.
The region must strengthen its own capacity for collective security while pursuing negotiations that address Yemen’s unresolved conflict. That requires restraint, protection of civilian and energy infrastructure, secure maritime passage and sustained engagement with relevant parties. It also requires Gulf States to avoid allowing their rivalries to become instruments through which external powers expand their influence.
The United States and its partners must recognise that military intervention without a credible political endgame can prolong the very instability it seeks to contain. China and Russia, in turn, cannot indefinitely claim the benefits of a stable global economy while remaining insulated from the responsibilities required to preserve it.
The Gulf stands at a crossroads. Its challenge is not merely to prevent another war, but to ensure that recurring insecurity does not become a permanent feature of the regional order.
The Gulf risks paying the economic price of instability while competing powers collect its geopolitical dividends. In a world where conflicting interests converge around opportunities to exploit the crisis, meaningful external support for restoring regional stability cannot be taken for granted.
The Gulf States must therefore look beyond outside guarantees and take ownership of their security through regional cooperation, pragmatic diplomacy and a collective commitment to resolving their differences. Ultimately, they must recognise that no external power will prioritise their stability above its own strategic interests; the most durable solution must come from within the region itself.
(The writer is a former President OICCI; Global Business Leader and Strategic Affairs Analyst)
Copyright Business Recorder, 2026
The writer is a former President OICCI; Global Business Leader and Strategic Affairs Analyst
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