IWT: PCA’s ruling

The Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (PCA’s) August 2025 decision on the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is more than a dry legal pronouncement — it is a diplomatic milestone in Pakistan’s decades-long efforts to safeguard its lifeline rivers from upstream interference.

In its ruling, the Court declared it has full jurisdiction over Pakistan’s complaint regarding India’s hydropower projects on the Indus system’s Western Rivers — the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab — and that India must design such projects strictly in accordance with the treaty’s specifications.

The phrase “strictly” is indeed the heart of the matter. For years, Pakistan has criticized India for bending the rules in the name of “best engineering practices” to exert more control over water flows. The Court has now affirmed that the treaty does not permit such unilateral reinterpretation.

Signed in 1960 with World Bank’s mediation, the IWT divided six rivers between the two countries: three eastern rivers to India and three western ones to Pakistan. While India was allowed limited non-consumptive uses, such as run-of-river hydropower on the Western Rivers, those rights came with clear technical limits on dam designs and water storage.

The Ruling by the court is a ‘Legal Win’ for Pakistan and a ‘Political Test’ for India. But, this is not the end of it. It may well be a head start for Pakistan on the long process of the dispute resolution. What lies ahead is complex and challenging.

The following challenges could unfold as the process moves on:

1. Sanctity of the court ruling and ‘India’s legal room to manoeuvre’:

The Court’s decision is binding, but enforcement is a different game. India has little legal ground to “overrule” the PCA. The IWT’s own dispute resolution mechanism — agreed to by both countries — provides for binding arbitration if bilateral talks fail.

What New Delhi can do is political and procedural: delay implementation through extended technical discussions, seek “clarifications” on design changes, or partially comply with the ruling while keeping its projects largely intact. India might also use the verdict to re-open the broader debate about modernising the treaty, a move that could dilute Pakistan’s hard-won protections.

2. India’s acceptance of the PCA ruling:

An unconditional “yes” is improbable. But, legally, overturning the ruling is nearly impossible; politically, India can slow-walk or sidestep compliance.

India has already expressed discomfort with the arbitration path, preferring the “neutral expert” process that offers more room for technical compromise. Accepting the ruling without challenge could be seen domestically as conceding strategic ground to Pakistan.

More likely is a pattern of selective compliance — making some design adjustments with a view to appeasing the Court while ensuring that the core of India’s hydropower ambitions remains unaffected.

3. The ‘Enforcement Gap’ in relation to Court’s ruling:

The PCA cannot send inspectors or impose sanctions. Its power lies in the moral weight of international law and the political cost of open defiance. The World Bank, as treaty guarantor, can exert diplomatic pressure and even influence the flow of international development finance. Still, without active global backing, enforcement risks could become a slow grind of procedural follow-ups rather than a decisive action.

4. Developing Scenario:

In the near term, the most likely scenario is “managed tension.” India delays, Pakistan protests, but both avoid a direct treaty breakdown. The IWT has survived wars and political crises for over six decades; neither side wants to be blamed for killing it.

Yet, climate change and domestic politics are making the ground more unstable. Melting glaciers, erratic monsoons, and growing populations are intensifying competition over water. If relations between the two countries take another sharp downturn — as they did after Pulwama in 2019 — water could move from being a managed dispute to an openly weaponised tool of statecraft.

The nightmare scenario for Pakistan is an Indian withdrawal from or suspension of the treaty, something periodically floated in Indian political circles. Such a move would trigger a diplomatic firestorm and invite international intervention — but in a more multipolar, transactional world, that risk cannot be dismissed.

5. A moment to ‘build on’

For now, Pakistan can justifiably claim a legal and diplomatic victory. But this win will only matter if Islamabad can convert it into enforceable compliance. That requires sustained engagement with the World Bank, alignment with other riparian states facing similar upstream challenges, and careful public diplomacy to keep the issue alive at international forums.

For Pakistan, the stakes are existential: about 80 percent of its agriculture and a significant share of its hydropower rely on uninterrupted flows from these rivers. Any upstream alterations — even those framed as “minor” — can disrupt planting cycles, power generation, and rural livelihoods.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2025