Afghanistan, long a theater of war and humanitarian crises, is re-emerging as a central node in the evolving geopolitics of Asia and Eurasian alignment—the one driven by economics, regional interest, and realism rather than ideological divides. This time the recalibration of the region is driven by the regional stakeholders while the West is taking a back seat in a region it once tried to reshape by force.
In a profound shift across the region, Central Asian Republics are reconnecting with Afghanistan after a 50-year hiatus. Russia has extended diplomatic recognition to the Taliban regime. China has secured economic and strategic footholds under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The United States, though militarily withdrawn, continues to eye Afghan mineral wealth.
Most notably, Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan have now agreed to cooperate within China’s BRI framework—a move that redefines the regional chessboard and redraws lines of influence across Asia.
Meanwhile, Pakistan is positioning itself as a bridge between South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, one that passes through Afghanistan.
India, watching from the eastern flank, sees both a strategic exclusion and a threat. As regional alignments shift westward and northward, New Delhi faces the reality of being sidelined in a reconfigured Eurasian connectivity map. In South Asia also, it is facing a threat of exclusion as, upon the demise of SAARC, China and Pakistan are exploring a Beijing-led regional alternative to revitalize cooperation in South Asia. This development could redefine regional power dynamics, marginalize India’s influence, and establish parallel regional orders. For India, it raises alarms of encirclement along its borders.
Moscow’s recognition of the Taliban government breaks the ice for other regional actors. Russia’s move is not merely symbolic; it, in fact, opens the door for Afghanistan’s inclusion in Eurasian multilateral structures such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
For the Central Asian Republics it could mean a historic reconnection particularly for Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. For these landlocked nations, the Afghan corridor offers the shortest and most viable land route to the Arabian Sea via Pakistan’s Gwadar and Karachi ports.
For Pakistan, projects like the Mazar-i-Sharif to Peshawar railway, CASA-1000 power corridor, and even revived interest in the long-stalled TAPI gas pipeline signal a major strategic turn. Central Asia, once reliant on Russian routes or Iranian pathways, now sees Afghanistan-Pakistan connectivity as essential for energy exports, trade diversification, and independence from existing bottlenecks.
This renewed regional attention to Afghanistan is not coincidental; it is part of a broader BRI-enabled connectivity model where infrastructure diplomacy supersedes ideological alignment.
Three key advantages emerge for Pakistan:
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Strategic geography is monetized - where instead of serving as a buffer or battleground, Pakistan can now convert its location into an economic asset through transit fees, trade routes, and regional energy flows.
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Geopolitical leverage - with Iran and China converging on Afghan stability and regional integration, Pakistan’s central role gives it enhanced diplomatic weight—especially in multilateral forums like the SCO and ECO.
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Stabilization through connectivity - by anchoring Afghanistan into a web of economic interdependence, Pakistan also serves its own security interests. Stability in Kabul directly affects security in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.
However, political instability, internal militancy, and inconsistent policy execution could undermine Pakistan’s regional potential. Strategic clarity and institutional continuity are the prerequisites.
Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
The writer is a former President OICCI; Global Business Leader and Strategic Affairs Analyst
























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