Punjab’s experiment with wheat market deregulation was supposed to be a reform milestone. What it has become is a case study in how not to exit a legacy system.
In a rush to shed the fiscal burden of procurement and impress development partners, the government pulled back from the market without laying down any of the institutional foundations required to make a liberalized system work. The result? Chaos at harvest, farmer losses, panic among traders, and a credibility crisis for market-based reform.
The idea was not inherently flawed. Public procurement has long been inefficient, distorted by political interference, leakages, and debt accumulation. But what the reformers ignored—or perhaps underestimated—was the degree to which the old system, despite its flaws, had become a central pillar of rural economic planning. Government price announcements, even when not backed by real buying, shaped expectations.
The presence of a public buyer, even if unreliable, created a psychological and operational floor for market participants. Remove it, and the system does not liberalize—it fragments.
Punjab did just that. It withdrew procurement without building a floor price mechanism. It offloaded public stocks into a thin market right before harvest. It provided no clarity on how the Electronic Warehouse Receipt (EWR) system would realistically cater to small and mid-sized growers who need liquidity, not a crash course in commodity speculation. It relied on rhetoric, not readiness. Worse, the reform was sprung on stakeholders without adequate consultation, communication, or political groundwork.
First steps should have been obvious. Begin with deregulating flour and roti pricing, so that the artificial suppression of grain prices ceases to create structural distortions in rural markets. Deregulate trade—both exports and imports—with strategic intent, to ensure that local markets have a benchmark for pricing. International parity would have helped guide expectations for autumn and offered producers a clearer signal of what lies ahead in case of future supply-demand imbalances.
A rational EWR strategy must actively welcome aggregators into the system. If markup subsidies or free storage are to be offered, they must be conditional. Aggregators availing these facilities should be required to immediately discharge their financial obligation to growers at a pre-agreed premium above current market rates. This can be enforced through banking channel proof of above-market settlements. The concept is not novel—Pakistan already ensures fair sugarcane pricing through CPR-backed payments by sugar mills, without direct fiscal outlay.
These steps will undoubtedly result in short-term urban inflationary spillovers. But that is a trade-off worth confronting honestly. Explain it with humility: that domestic wheat prices are currently at a 48-month low, significantly below landed import costs, and no government subsidy—markup or otherwise—can undo the damage growers have taken this season. Urban consumers must bear part of the burden if Pakistan is to avoid a deeper food security crisis down the line.
Pilot EWR should not be marketed as a financial innovation but tested as a closed-loop transaction. Input financing must be matched against pledged produce at the point of harvest, allowing for self-liquidating repayment and a stable working capital cycle for growers. This is the only credible way to align warehouse receipts with the financial rhythms of the rural economy.
Legacy systems—however inefficient or distortionary—persist because they have historically delivered on key policy objectives. Their endurance is not accidental; it reflects the deep-rooted buy-in of a broad spectrum of stakeholders who have learned to navigate, benefit from, or at least survive within them. That is why reforming or dismantling such systems demands more than technical correctness—it requires political choreography. Reform sequencing must be deliberate and strategic, not just to minimize disruption, but to gradually build trust with an even broader coalition than the one that sustained the status quo.
Because when reforms are rushed, ill-timed, or poorly communicated, their failure does more than discredit the politicians behind them. It delegitimizes the very notion of reform. It hardens cynicism, emboldens vested interests, and hands reactionary forces a powerful narrative: that change is inherently destabilizing and best avoided.
Punjab’s reform failed not because it aimed too high, but because it forgot to build a ladder. For market reform and deregulation to succeed, the government must demonstrate—clearly, transparently, and tangibly—the benefits of reform to all stakeholders. Until arthis, aggregators, growers, and consumers see actual gains, no amount of reform logic will carry weight. The future of agriculture markets depends not on policy intent, but on political and economic sequencing. Reform will only succeed when it becomes a win-win—until then, expect resistance, distortion, and relapse.
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