‘Pakistan in the SCO: silent or strategic?’

This is apropos a letter to the Editor titled ‘Pakistan in the SCO: silent or strategic?’ by this writer carried by the newspaper yesterday.

In Tajikistan, China has invested approximately $3 billion in road and power infrastructure projects, while the Khorgos Gateway on the China-Kazakhstan border, a major logistics hub, has seen $2 billion in investments.

Energy and industrial projects in Uzbekistan have attracted about $4 billion, and agricultural cooperation with Kazakhstan has involved around $1.5 billion.

The China-Russia energy cooperation, particularly through the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, represents a $55 billion investment, while the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor has seen investments of $15 billion to enhance connectivity and trade.

The dividends of China’s aggressive integration with other SCO members have been immense. Since the formation of the SCO, bilateral trade and investment with its members have significantly expanded.

Trade with Russia reached a record $190 billion in 2022, fueled by energy cooperation and infrastructure investments.

In Central Asia, China’s trade with Kazakhstan surpassed $25 billion. Uzbekistan saw trade grow to around $8 billion, complemented by Chinese investments in agriculture and industrial sectors.

During our discussion, a key factor regarding Pakistan’s inability to fully utilize the SCO forum became clear. Pakistan, with its limited road connectivity, has failed to establish direct road, air, or rail links with other SCO members, especially Central Asian countries (CAC), Belarus, and Russia.

Unlike other SCO countries, which have multiple transportation links, Pakistan’s reliance on the KKH as its only road connection with China makes it vulnerable to disruptions and limits its scope for increasing trade or engaging in regional transportation networks.

Qamar Bashir

Copyright Business Recorder, 2024