The cold Sunday afternoon in a New England Presbyterian church at the dawn of the 21st century was an odd place, time, and occasion for the mention of the Razakars, a Muslim militia of the mid 20th century Hyderabad, Deccan.
That Sunday afternoon, during an interfaith meeting, a middle aged Muslim gentleman, his voice cracking with emotion, puzzled his audience by publicly thanking the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for the help, he said, it provided to his imprisoned father, a Razakar (ridakar: now also spelled as radakars) languishing in the military prison of Trimullgherry in 1948.
How and why did the ICRC become involved in this matter? Who were these Razakars? What were their objectives? When were they active? Why were they doing what they were doing? Whatever happened to them?
An answer to these questions is not only of interest to historians of modern India but even for those who read newspapers for current events.
For instance, a member of the Andhra Pradesh legislature brought up the question of the Razakars during a debate on the events of 9/11/2001 in New York and Washington, DC in the United States.
Memoirs, correspondence, and other writings by the major actors in this episode constitute the primary informants of this study. Besides these sources, works by disinterested observers of the time, whether unpublished or published in Urdu or English, represent another source of information for the answer to the questions raised above. Needless to say, the interpretation given to the behaviour of the actors involved are entirely mine.
For nearly three centuries the area of Hyderabad state, (f.1720s), covering most of the central Deccan plateau remained under the Nizams.
The state evolved a culture in some ways distinct from the Nizams. The state evolved a culture in some ways distinct from others in India.
Following the administrative and fiscal reforms of Salar Jang I, the Nizam's diwan in the nineteenth century, Hyderabad emerged as an autonomous state with internal peace and a modern bureaucracy in the twentieth century.
The head of the state was the Nizam, whose dynasty ruled the Deccan for over two countries, followed by a large number of land holders who constituted the nobility, predominantly Muslim.
The Nizam was in treaty relations (since 1798) with the British colonial authorities in India, who guaranteed him internal autonomy in exchange for political subordination.
The state consisted of 82,000 square miles and a population of 16 million in 1941.
The majority of the population consisted of the untouchables, lower castes, tribes, and upper caste Hindus. Muslims constituted some 12-13 percent of the total with a sprinkling of other minorities.
The main languages spoken in the state were Telugu, Marathi, and Kannada in the rural areas and Urdu in the capital served together with Persian as the official language.
Muslims dominated the civil service, police, and the army, while the upper caste Hindu communities monopolized finance, trade, manufacturing and business.
Until the 1930s, the court intrigues on the one hand and the relationship between the Nizam and the British Resident and the Viceroy on the other formed the visible substance of the politics of Hyderabad.
The year 1938 marked the beginning of serious political turmoil and a severe deterioration in Hindu-Muslim relations in the state.
At issue was the future political order within Hyderabad and its place in post-colonial India.
The politically conscious upper-caste Hindu elites representing various shades of political opinions such as liberal, socialist, and the right-wing, encouraged by the Indian National Congress, desired a representative government in the State and its immediate accession to the Indian Union after the British departure in mid August 1947.
Hindu extremist opinion - calling for the overthrow of the Nazim and the state's immediate merger with India - was represented by the Arya Samaj (f. 1875) and the Hindu Mahasabha (f. 1906?).
The untouchable political elites were divided; some supported the idea of Hyderabad's independence while others opposed it.
The communists, operating under the banner of Andhra Mahasabha, active in the Telangana area of the state, violently oppose both the Nizam and the Nehru administration in New Delhi.
The Nizam desired to resume his pre-British status as an independent monarch. The Muslim middle class and the elite as represented by their political organization, the Majlis-i-Ittihad al-Muslimin (MIM. or the Majlis for short) preferred to remain independent of India, despite a non-Muslim majority population and the land-locked status of the State.
A minority Muslim opinion supported the view that democratic changes must be introduced in the State and that it should accede to the Indian Union.
THE MAJLIS AND THE BIRTH OF THE RAZAKARS: The Majlis was founded in 1927 by a group of Muslims representing various Islamic sects and ethnic groups. For about ten years, the MIM remained a largely apolitical, unremarkable organization.
However, the first outbreak of Hindu-Muslim violence in Hyderabad city in 1938 galvanized the Majlis into the forefront of the political arena.
In that fateful year, two Muslim young men, relatives of the Majlis President, Bahadur Yar Jang (1905-44), were killed in the Dhulpet locality inhabited by low-caste Hindu liquor brewers, called Lodhas.
This event saw the rise of Bahadur Yar Jang, who made the Majlis a popular organization among his co-religionists. Bahadur Yar Jang is widely regarded as a charismatic leader, a rousing orator, and a deeply pious man, even though coming from the class of jagirdars and land holders who were generally not known for any positive attributes.
Apart from making the Majlis the most popular organization, Bahadur Yar Jang is credited with the proposition that Muslims as a group were the "rulers of the Deccan." At the Majlis conference held in January 1941, he proclaimed, "We are the kings of the Deccan. The Nizam's dynasty is the symbol of our political and cultural power.
The Nizam is the soul of our kingship and we are its body; if he does not exist, then we do not exist, if we do not exist, then he does not exist."
Thus Bahadur Yar Jang tied the destiny of the Deccani Muslim with that of a dynasty. Meanwhile, alarming political changes around the Hyderabad State were taking place.
The Indian National Congress, came to power in Madras, Bombay and the Central Provinces in 1937, casting the shadow of coming events once the British left.
While the Congress assumption of power emboldened its followers in Hyderabad, it signalled to the Muslim elite that their privileged position was at risk should democratization be extended to a princely state such as Hyderabad.
The Congress government's unfair treatment of the Muslim minority in the British provinces reinforced the determination of the Majlis to maintain Hyderabad's independence in the post-colonial political order.
As part of its preparation for an independent Hyderabad, the Majlis organized a paramilitary unit modeled on the Khaksars, a Muslim militia in the British provinces. Bahadur Yar Jang once stated that "the Muslim is by nature a soldier and his deliverance in the future lies in his being confirmed and established as a soldier."
He condemned "the daintiness and effeminateness that is increasing daily in our youth." The supposed lack of vigorous manliness was only "preparing the nation/community millat, for the grave."
The working committee of the Majlis resolved in June, 1940 to formally establish the Razakaran, the volunteers, with a board of directors and a statewide organization comprising units, Jami'ats.
This was the birth of the famous Razakars, erroneously spelled Razakars in the Indian English Press. But before the organization could grow, the, British imposed a ban on all the uniformed militias shortly after the World War II broke out, effecting Hyderabad as well.
To counter the anticipated official measures, Bahadur Yar Jang advised his followers to organize the men - with or without uniform. He opined, "every Majlis branch should maintain a register of the Razakars. Physical exercise, five obligatory daily prayers, recitation of two to three Qur'anic verses was mandatory for being a Razakar."
Upon violation, "the head Razakar was required to publicly punish the violators - thus creating the passionate condition for action. I have no doubt that this programme would be more beneficial than military parade."
Once the ban on the uniforms was lifted, the Razakar regiments were required to perform military drills for at least, fifteen minutes every day and to render community service, Khidmat-i-Millat. Their uniform was a Khaki shirt, Khaki pant, Khaki-coloured knee-high socks, and a 'military belt.' According to the organizational rules, each regiment was to have a commanding officer responsible for the training and discipline of the volunteers.
He was to carry a revolver and a sword. The rank and file was to be armed with a poleaxes, tabars (hatchets) - more menacing objects than the Khaksars' shovels. The entire corps was designed to be a replica of a real army, complete with buglers.
The Razakars only lacked real weapons. The Majlis' annual report for 1940, delivered by the working committee member Muhammad Abd al-Rauf, complained of insufficient funds. Abd al-Rauf was pleased, however, that gymnasiums had already been established in nearly every district.
The Razakars came predominantly from the ranks of low-income Muslim families. In a speech at the annual meeting of the Majlis held at Darussalam, the MIM headquarters, Bahadur Yar Jang complained, "those who have acquired a good place in the society are unwilling to come forward as Razakars." By the December 1942 conference, the Razakars had expanded to some six hundred men. They sang at the 1942 conference,
"The country of the Deccan is independent And every youth of it is a hard steel sword."
The Razakars were designed to be the future army of Hyderabad in embryo. The official army was the Hyderabad State Force (HSF) controlled by the government.
Unlike, the NSF, the Razakar training imbued the volunteers with the spirit of Jihad. The refrain of their taranah (anthem) was:
-- We are the holy warriors bearing banners afloat
-- We are leaders brave and relentless.
ANOTHER VERSE READ AS:
-- We are the soldiers in the army of Allah
-- We are ready to die in war.
Following the lead of the colonial authorities in New Delhi, the Hyderabad government banned all paramilitary organizations in September 1940. Groups with uniforms and military drill were prohibited from gathering.
Unlike the ban on the Majlis in 1938, this ban on the Razakars was not enforced. Bahadur Yar Jang spoke at a Razakar camp in Jalna district in January 1942 without government interference.
The address was even published in the main daily paper, Rahbar-i-Deccan. This nominal ban proved to be temporary. The Nizam legalized paramilitary associations in January 1943.
The following year Bahadur Yar Jang passed away. His unexpected death by cardiac arrest on 25 June 1944 deprived the Majlis of its most popular leader. His funeral procession drew tens of thousands, of mourners into the streets, including the Nizam himself.
Deprived of his commanding and charismatic presence, the Majlis leadership gradually degenerated into factions. For the next two years Abul Hasan Sayyid Ali and Mazhar Ali Kamil, mere shadows of the departed leader, led the Majlis.
At the close of the year 1946, a lawyer from Latur, a small town in Parbhani district became the president of the Majlis. This was Sayyid Ali Muhammad Qasim Rizawi, (1900-70). During his leadership of the Majlis, the Razakars became an even more powerful organization dreaded by its opponents.
Their aim was to maintain, what they perceived as the Muslim domination over the Deccan, by force if necessary.
THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE RAZAKARS: According to an official publication of the Indian government, in July 1947, "Seventy thousand men, women and children have undergone training; 1,500,000 members are on the rolls, and recruitment is going on briskly to reach the target figure of 500,000 Razakars.
Secretary V.P. Menon of the India's Ministry of States, the leading figure in New Delhi-Nizam negotiations, gave an even more astounding figure of 200,000 as the number of the Razakars. None seems to know the exact number of the Razakars.
The official account of the Indian military operations gave yet another total.
THE CHARGE-SHEET OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT WAS AS FOLLOWS:
A. Staging frequent demonstrations all over the state;
B. Terrorizing individuals connected with movements which seek the accession of Hyderabad to ..... India, or the introduction responsible government;
C. Organizing of border raids into the Indian dominion territory;
D. Inflicting reprisals, with or without the Police or the Military, on village or individuals suspected of being pro-State Congress or obstructive to the Razakars;
E. Taking upon themselves the duties of Customs Officers in searching the luggage and belongings of railway a road passengers.
F. Preventing official investigations by agencies individuals into the internal situation in Hyderabad;
G. Overawing the public by staging marches of uniformed volunteers with spears, swords, or muzzle-loaders on [bi-] cycles, in buses and lorries, by firing shots into the air;
H. Infiltrating into Indian Dominion territory in order carry on espionage work; to smuggle arms and ammunition into the State; recruit volunteers from Dominion territory for the army, the police, and other services and to create disaffection among the Muslims of India; and to carry on a Jehad (Religious war).
According to the same publication, the Razakars possessed transport - lorries, jeeps, and fuel supplied through contacts in the Nizam's government. The Razakars supposedly had "a large number of looted and locally manufactured arms."
According to Prime Minister Mir La'iq Ali, "Of the guns ... displayed by the Razakars not even half could fire a shot; quite a few of the rest were as much a source of danger to the user as to the target."
The Communists, opposed both to the Razakars and the Nehru administration, contemptuously called the Razakar weapons as "Rizawi banduq (rifle)."
The Razakars had access to the Press and the Deccan Radio over which the Indian dominion and its leaders were attacked every day. The Indian government also claimed knowledge of "10 to 30 thousand rupees" which were allegedly spent by Razakars daily.
Allegedly looted gold and silver was reported to be spent on the refugees from India into Hyderabad.
The Indian government published a long catalogue of the Razakar misdeeds, which is corroborated by a number of contemporary sources and by former Razakars in memoirs written after Hyderabad fell to India in September 1948.
Moreover, Hyderabad's own Prime Minister, Nawab Ahmad Sa' id Khan of Chhattari and his cabinet were roughed up by a Razakar mob during the Dichpalli mosque - also known as the Shah Manzil incident on 15 March 1946. In an even more ugly incident, (27/ 28 October 1947) an official delegation of the Hyderabad government suspected of treason by Qasim Rizawi was physically prevented by the Razakars from flying to Delhi.
While the list of the Razakar atrocities is fairly lengthy, the record of the Nizam's opponents, whether that of the Andhra Mahasabha, the Socialists, or even the state Congress, is not violence-free either. Nor is the case with the conduct of the Indian army on the borders of Hyderabad state.
The evidence for violence directed by the Nizam's opponents is now increasing. Govindas Shroff, a Congressman from Marathwada, sought and received Mohandas K. Gandhi's tacit approval when he told him that his party was using violence against Hyderabad.
Thirty years after the overthrow of the Nizam, Shroff's role in Marathwada came into severe criticism, as he was accused of anti-Dalit activities as he opposed the naming of a university after Dr Ambedkar. Similarly, a Socialist Party leader confessed how arms initially smuggled into the Nizam's dominion from India were later diverted to Nepal when Hyderabad fell.
In one instance, militant Congressmen looted a bank at gunpoint in Umri and made off with the money. After Hyderabad fell, Congress factions fell out over who did what with the looted bane funds.
According to S. Nijalingappa, the amount looted was a staggering 17 lakhs (Rs 1,700,000) a huge sum at the time.
The man accused using the looted funds was none other than the state Congress Chief Ramananda Tirtha. PV. Narasimha Rao, later Prime Minister of India (between 1991-95), a Congressman from Karimnagar, helped blow up the lines of the Nizam State Railways in 1948, "Congress militants burnt down railway stations, attacked police stations, and loot their arms ... Narasimha Rao indulged in gun-running from Chanda in the erstwhile Bombay province ... He shuttled between Chanda, Nagpur, Pune, Bombay, and Bangalore to smuggle arms and ammunition which he procured from the cantonments and other sources..." Besides the HSF, hastily trained Razakars were patrolling the India-Hyderabad border.
In many instances the Razakars were defending Hyderabad enclaves a border villages from incursion by overzealous Indian forces. On 5 April 1948, the Prime Minister of Hyderabad informed his counterpart in New Delhi ... camps have been allowed to be established in the areas bordering Hyderabad from which raiders armed with modern weapons, Sten guns, Bren guns and the like make frequent incursions into the State derailing trains and destroying life and property, with a view to shattering the peace and tranquillity of Hyderabad..."
The village of Nanej, near Barsi, Sholspur saw one such action on 24 July 1948. Defended by just seven Razakars, Nanej was attacked by a heavily armed detachment of the Indian army. Even when outgunned and outnumbered, the Razakars beat back the Indian troops, inflicting heavy losses.
The defenders were eventually killed after dogged resistance when the Indians brought in additional troops to occupy the village. The Nanej episode illustrated the raw courage and the grim determination shown by the Razakars.
The raids and the counter raids along the India-Hyderabad border despite Standstill Agreement signed on 29 November 1947 demonstrated that future of the Nizam's Dominion was far from decided.
Claiming deterioration in the internal security in Hyderabad, India demanded the Nizam's government to ban the Majlis and the Razakars in a communication addressed to Prime Minister Mir La'iq Ali on 23 March 1948.
For several more months futile negotiations went on between governments with the two sides dug in their positions: Hyderabad insisting on independence while India demanding unconditional accession and the introduction of a responsible government.
Meanwhile, internal peace within Hyderabad was disturbed. Shuaib Allah Khan, an obscure journalist, struck down, allegedly on the orders of Qasim Rizawi. Indian sources routinely accuse the Razakars of the atrocity.
However, contemporary anti-MIM sources blame Shuaib's personal rivalry with his assailants for his death. On September 13, Indian troops led by tanks invaded Hyderabad in a five-pronged attack named Operation Polo, the Indian army's code for the invasion.
The Indian Air Force subjected Hyderabad airstrips in Bidar, Warangal and elsewhere to intense bombardment. Inexplicably the Hyderabad State Force (hence HSF) offered only nominal resistance to the invading army.
However, the poorly armed, ill-equipped, mostly untrained Razakars resisted the vastly superior Indian troops on many fronts." In numerous instances, many simply flung themselves into the chains of India's British-made Sherman tanks hoping to slow down the march.
In the words of a former Razakar, Mehdi Ali Seljouk, "We the defeated were an army of military men of all ranks and stages of training, half-trained militia-men, rustics in uniform, villagers in rags, illiterate men from far-off villages to whom even the sight of an armoured car was new, and men of all ages and background from the captured kingdom of Hyderabad.
More than 20,000 of them surrendered as the ammunition of all kinds ran out and as the bayonets and shovels and pickaxes were broken in the chains of incoming tanks. 45 Several hundred Razakars were killed and many thousands injured.
In many places, the Pathans, hardy warriors from the Northwest Frontier domiciled in the Deccan for two centuries, joined the Razakars. Another small group called the Dindars also resisted the Indian armoured drive." Outgunned, out numbered and out manoeuvered, the Hyderabad State Force chief, Major General Sayyid Ahmad al-Aidarus (also Edrus) surrendered to India's Major General J.N. Chaudhuri on 18 September 1948. The flower of the Muslim youth in the Deccan was destroyed.
The HSF troops who fought against the Indian army were treated as prisoners of war, disarmed and released.
However, the fate of the Razakars was a different story. As the Indian troops began entering the Bolarum cantonment in Secundarabad, the Razakars began burning their uniforms, discarding their weapons, and mingling with the civilian population.
Soon wells, cattle pens, and dumps filled up with antiquated weapons better suited in a museum than on a battlefront. A day after Major General Al-Aidarus surrendered. Qasim Rizawi was arrested on 19 September from Darussalam where the Razakar chief was staying.
The Razakar organization was banned, though the Majlis was not. Soon a massive retaliation began against Muslims in general. Armed Congress gangs began indiscriminate retaliation against the general Muslim population disregarding distinction between those who resisted the Indian army and those who were simply passive, uninvolved, innocent spectators.
The Razakars, real or suspected were of course the prime target. Neutral observers, for instance, witnessed instances of indiscriminate retaliation, for example by Wilfred W. Russell. According to Russell, "We reached Hyderabad city after curfew, having been delayed all along the line by Razakar hunts at every station.
The train would stop for longer and longer halts at the numerous stations where the local purging committees produced their strings of men accused of being Razakars.
They had been pretty well beaten up before reaching stations, but on arrival they were usually chased up and down the platforms by most of the passengers, all of who turned out to see the fun.
This delayed the train still further, as the Guard was reluctant to hurry people along while they were enjoying themselves so much. Mehdi Ali Seljo a young Razakar who was tortured in the prison, confirms Russell's observations.
The list of victims can be multiplied manifold. The thousands arrested were those who escaped killing. A few top Razakars escaped to Pakistan. Most languished in the camps and prisons. The chief was in the military prison of Trimullgherry in Secundarabad.
Unable to prove political charges, the new administration implicated Rizawi account of a dacoity at village Bibinagar. Experienced attorneys defend him.
This was far from the case of ordinary Razakars. There simply was no one to provide legal defense to these unfortunate young men.
THE RAZAKARS BEHIND BARS AND THE ICRC INTERVENTION: The atmosphere of the immediate post-Operation Polo era was too communally charged for anyone to come to the Razakars rescue.
The Muslim community was reeling under the massive blow just inflicted upon them. Leaderless, the Muslim elite simply retreated to the safety of their homes. Unrelieved gloom had descended on thousands of imprisoned young men.
In this dark horizon, help came to the Razakars from an entirely unexpected quarter. On 17 September 1948, the Geneva-base International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) telegraphed to the Prime Ministers of India and Hyderabad. Known for its absolute impartiality, an unblemished record of service to prisoners of war across the globe without regard to religious affiliation, the CRC was and remains a universally respected organization.
In his telegram, ICRC President Paul Ruegger conveyed to the governments of India and Hyderabad an offer of services "in conformity with traditional humanitarian mission, the CRC offer their services in all cases where a neutral intermediary based on the stipulations of the Red Cross conventions was required, proposing to arrange for the exchange of lists of captured army personnel, the visiting of places of internment by the Committee's delegates and the exchange of news, distribution of relief supplies placed by donors at their disposal.
" It also planned the possibility of sending an ICRC representative to the scene. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru rebuffed Ruegger's offer of help. In a telegram to the ICRC chief, he told Ruegger on 19 September, "as you will have learnt already, hostilities have ceased in Hyderabad, there is no need therefore to ask for services of the Red Cross. I am grateful all the same for your offer and the spirit behind it."
The matter seemed to have ended there, but for the intercession of the Pakistan Red Cross Society. In a letter in late October 1948 to the CRC chairman, the Pakistan Red Cross Society (PRCS) (Chief) said: "The Razakar corps was a recognized volunteer body raised by the State for the purpose of civil defense.
It would appear to have fulfilled the conditions laid down in Article I of the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention of the 18 October 1907, which read as follows:
The laws, rights and duties of war apply not only to the army but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling all the following conditions:
1. They must be commanded by a person responsible for the subordinates;
2. They must have a fixed, distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.
3. They must carry arms openly;
4. They must conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
The PRCS letter went on to say, "In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army or form part of it, they are included under the denomination of army. If this is agreed, it clearly follows that the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929 relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War apply."
The PRCS then cited a Press report dated 21 September in which the Chief of the Indian Army Staff Lieutenant General Rajendra Sinhji "declared that Razakars who had been captured would not be treated as prisoners of war.
They were not members of the Hyderabad State Forces and would be treated as ordinary prisoners..." [the Press reports continues] "a batch of 78 prisoners from Hyderabad taken during the operations were brought to Madras yesterday under police escort for detention, as supplied by Associated Press of India.
The PRC Society has been greatly surprised and distressed by this statement.
The Government of India is a signatory to the Geneva Convention, my society suggests that this declaration of Major General Rajendra Sinhji is not only a violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions but is against all humanitarian principles of the Red Cross. I ... request steps may kindly be taken to bring this contravention of the Conventions to the notice of the Government of India and to call upon them to honour the Convention by treating the Razakars as prisoners of war.
Nawab Mo'in Nawaz Jang who had represented Hyderabad's case to the United Nations' Security Council supported the PRC Society's request.
On representation from these quarters, the ICRC wrote to India's Ministry of External Affairs to enable to Razakars to be treated as prisoners of and to obtain the right to visit them. Before the CRC wrote to the Indian government, it seems to have done a thorough homework.
The ICRC cited an official publication of the Indian Ministry of Information Broadcasting in which the Razakars were described as "military volunteer corps in uniforms openly displaying weapons during a public parade.
In response to the CRC letter, R.K. Ramadhyani, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Defence wrote to ICRS on 7 December 1948: "Regarding prison taken during the Hyderabad operations, my enquiries show that regular troops of the Hyderabad State Force, who were taken prisoners, have been disarmed and released.
Razakars and all others who are not part of the State Force have been handed over to the civil administration Hyderabad. It does not appear in these circumstances that any question of inspection by Red Cross representatives arises."
Upon another entreaty by the ICRC on 7 January 1949, an Indian official L.G. Mirchand, Deputy Secretary, replied: "I understand on enquiry that there were Razakars detained in Hyderabad. All the Razakars who were under detention were awaiting their trial in a court of law. This being the case, there seems hardly any point in Red Cross representative visiting State. It is open, however, to any one to visit Hyderabad and [if] you any other representatives of the Red Cross wishes to do so we would glad to inform the local administration of the visit."
The ICRC remain dissatisfied with the response and repeated the request, as the ICR Legal Commission rejected the Indian contention that the Razakars were not military combatants deserving the status of prisoners of war.
The New Delhi government was put in an awkward position. In its campaign against Hyderabad state before the fall the Indian government paint the Razakars as a militia, supported by if not raised by the Hyderabad government, but when it came to treating the Razakars after the fall, backtracked as exemplified by the letter of A.C. Chatterjee of India's Ministry of States, dated 4 March 1949.
According to Chatterjee, "The Razakars were a trained volunteer corps of the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen surreptitiously armed and not part of the regular forces or state police.
Those among the Razakars who are in custody today are so because there are serious criminal charges against them.
The Hyderabad Governor is conducting investigations into these charges. Where, on investigation, the charges against individual Razakars are not proved, orders are issued for their release.
Those against whom a prima facie case has been established are being put up for trail and will be dealt with according to law. In the circumstances explained above you will appreciate that there can be no question of treating these Razakars on the same footing as prisoners of war.
They have never formed part of the administration and in view of the serious of fences committed by them, they cannot be treated other than as criminals. Since they are being dealt with according to law, the question of the application of any international convention does not arise at all.
The Government of India would have no objection to your visit if after reading this letter you still desire to do so."
Despite this further rebuff, the ICRC remained steadfast in demanding access to the Razakar prisoners. On 25 March 1949 Dr Marti asked the Indian Ministry of States permission to "visit the Central Jail in Hyderabad, where numerous Razakars were detained as well as the detention centers at Bolaram and Trimullgherry where 25,000 Razakars and officials of the Hyderabad government were being held."
Apparently the Indian government asked the ICRC representative in Delhi to contact M.K. Vellodi, then with the Ministry of States, and later the Chief Minister of Hyderabad, who informed the ICRC on 5 April 1949 that most of the Razakars have been freed, except for 1521 who were waiting trial for serious charges. on 9 April 1949, the ICRC, dissatisfied by the bureaucratic response, took up the matter with the Military Governor J.N. Chaudhuri, who confirmed the figure of 1520 Razakars behind bars, but insisted they were not in the military penitentiaries of Bolaram or Trimullgherry.
Upon hearing this, the ICRC asked M.K. Vellodi to: a. confirm the figure of the Razakar prisoners in writing; b. allow an CRC representative to visit them. Both requests were denied. President ICRC demand triggered frustration in Vellodi, who told CRC President Dr Marti: "You would cause Hyderabad Government serious embarrassment by visiting the prisoners."
When the CRC representative inquired the States Ministry for the dogged refusal, the reason for rejecting ICRC requests became clear. An Indian official told the ICRC representative "the negative response of the Indian government is due certainly to the upcoming hearing of the Hyderabad case at the United Nations Security Council, which in fact happen twice on May 19 and 24, 1949
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