The following are excerpts from the State Bank of Pakistan's report on State of Economy 2-15-16 released on Thursday: One of the key objectives of public policies is to improve living conditions of the country's population. It is well recognised that improvement in social welfare requires focused policy measures, in addition to usual growth enhancing and stabilisation policies. This is why social sector development remains an integral part of economic programs formulated by both domestic policymakers as well as organisations of international co-operation. Social progress in Pakistan has also made strides over the past decade or so, with improvements in poverty alleviation, infant and maternal mortality rates, immunization coverage, and indicators relating to HIV prevalence and environmental sustainability noted during the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) timeframe
(Box 7.1).Despite this, the country still has to go a long way to go before achieving a satisfactory level of social and living standard for its people; something that is necessary for climbing the development ladder. Social services (education and health in particular) require special focus, as the country is still far from achieving MDG targets. Moreover, Pakistan's progress has lagged behind its regional peers in terms of both scale and pace. For instance, in the year 2000, average life expectancy was nearly the same in both India and Pakistan (62.63 vs. 62.77 years); but by 2014, the indicator for India had improved to 68.01, whereas it could reach 66.18 years for Pakistan.1
Another common metric to compare the country's standing in social indicators relative to its peers is its ranking on the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI). This index ranks countries on the basis of primary characteristics associated with a good living standard.2 In 2014, Pakistan was ranked 147th out of 188 countries; despite an improvement in absolute HDI score over this period, Pakistan's relative performance was not encouraging (Table 7.1).
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Table 7.1: Human Index Rankings*
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2000 2014 Change (percent)
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank **
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Pakistan 0.499 138 0.538 147 7.8 -9
India 0.577 124 0.609 130 5.5 -6
Bangladesh 0.478 145 0.57 142 19.2 3
Malaysia 0.782 59 0.779 62 -0.4 -3
Indonesia 0.684 110 0.684 110 0 0
Sri Lanka 0.741 89 0.757 73 2.2 16
China 0.726 96 0.727 90 0.1 6
Vietnam 0.688 109 0.666 116 -3.2 -7
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-- Total countries ranked were 173 in 2000, and 188 in 2014.
-- Negative sign means deterioration, and plus sign means improvement. Source: Human Development Reports 2002, 2015, UNDP
A number of factors are responsible for this low ranking, including the prolonged war on terror, policy focus on stabilisation due to recurring balance of payments crises, and more importantly, inadequate budgetary resources, along with poor capacity of public institutions to formulate and implement internally consistent policies for social service delivery. Moreover, high population growth, and social exclusion of a large segment of the female population from education and labour force, also undermined social sector development in the country.
Box 7.1: Millennium Development Goals In September 2000, leaders of all UN member states (189 at the time, currently 193), in addition to representatives of some of the world's largest development organisations, had gathered and agreed on a time-bound framework to tackle extreme poverty, reflected in all its dimensions (income poverty, hunger, disease, lack of adequate shelter, and exclusion). They also agreed to promote gender equality, education, and environmental sustainability, while ensuring that the cover of universally guaranteed basic human rights related to health, education, shelter and security extended to their entire populations, by the year 2015. In order to measure progress, a set of indicators was selected for each MDG.
With the framework concluding last year, there is no doubt that the world has collectively made significant progress in achieving the targets set 15 years earlier. Notable improvements have been observed in poverty reduction and in primary school enrolment (the number of out-of-school children of primary school age worldwide has fallen by almost half, to an estimated 57 million in 2015). The literacy rate (for youth aged 15 to 24) has increased globally from 83 percent to 91 percent between 1990 and 2015; whereas the proportion of girls to boys in primary schools in South Asia has risen from 74 to 103. Improvements have also been made in health-related MDGs: the global under-five mortality rate declined by more than half between 1990 and 2015; about 84 percent of children worldwide received at least one dose of measles vaccine in 2013 (up from 73 percent in 2000); and maternal mortality ratio in South Asia dropped by 64 percent between 1990 and 2013. Similarly, new HIV infections fell by approximately 40 percent between 2000 and 2013.
While these improvements should be acknowledged, it is also important to differentiate between the progress made during the period, with the current level of social development indicators, particularly in developing countries. For instance, according to the UN's final MDG assessment, the South Asia region has either met or made excellent progress in reducing extreme poverty. Yet, the organisation still classifies the region as one suffering from "high poverty". Similarly, despite achieving "fair progress" in halving the proportion of population without sanitation facilities, South Asia still has "very low coverage" in this area. Besides, there has been significant variation in progress achieved by different countries in the same region as well as across different regions.
This basically means that governments need to continue investing their efforts and resources to not only consolidate the gains they have already made in socio-economic development, but to also expand these efforts for the benefit of the people whose lives have yet to witness visible improvement.
War on terror Unfortunately, Pakistan has been afflicted with the war on terrorism for the past many years. Both economic growth and social sector development have been severely hampered by terrorism-related incidents. Apart from causing immeasurable human suffering (casualties and displacements), these have also resulted in: (i) foreign investors shying away from the country; (ii) domestic investors adopting a wait-and-see stance; (iii) exporters being unable to fulfill their orders (due to disruptions in supply chains, among other reasons); and (iv) a general slowdown in intra-country trade. According to an estimate, the country has suffered direct and indirect losses from terrorism to the tune of US $118.3 billion from FY2002 to FY2016,3 which are almost double the level of Pakistan's external public debt.
Macro factors also played adversely The global financial crisis of 2007-09, and multiple devastating natural disasters - most notably the earthquake of 2005 and the floods of 2010 - also affected Pakistan's economy, and have had direct as well as indirect consequences on social spending.4 Hence, years of subdued economic growth, frequent resort to stabilisation programs, and natural calamities have meant that the country has spent more time struggling with these challenges rather than improving public service delivery.
Provincial social and development priorities The responsibilities related to social sector uplift - particularly for education and health - have been shifted to provincial governments as a result of the 18th Amendment and the 7th National Finance Commission Award. Conversely, the federal government's share in overall health and education spending has declined. Yet, even after five years of devolution post-18th Amendment, provincial governments are still struggling to make any notable progress in service delivery, particularly related to healthcare and education.5
Although provinces have enjoyed a significant jump in their resources (being recipients of funds under the divisible pool), they are not able to channelize enough funds towards social sectors. One reason behind this under- spending is a disproportionate focus on infrastructure projects, including those related to transport and construction (Figure 7.1).
A cursory look at provincial development spending shows that infrastructure projects (including construction-related ones) have been prioritized by provincial governments over the past few years; this has led to their relatively higher share in overall development expenditure. While we acknowledge that these projects provide jobs to thousands of people and are necessary to cater to the demands of a rising population, they also provide ample opportunities for unwanted rent-seeking behaviour.
Provincial obligations for fiscal consolidation Here, it is also important to realise that under the IMF program, the provinces were urged to show fiscal surpluses to keep the consolidated fiscal deficit under check. Therefore, they were underutilizing the resources coming from the divisible pool during the past few years. As a result, at the national level, Pakistan's spending on social sectors (as percentage of GDP) is much less than its regional peers. From FY11 to FY15, public spending on education went up marginally, from 1.8 percent of GDP to 2.2 percent. Similarly, Pakistan spends the second-lowest amount on per capita (purchasing power parity) basis on health among SAARC countries (after Bangladesh).
Lack of capacity to measure social needs; formulate policy; make allocations; and monitor progress Formulating a comprehensive, equitable and sound social sector policy requires the combined expertise of a wide range of stakeholders, including professionals, practitioners, and researchers. For instance, quantifying the monetary needs for provision of education and healthcare facilities in a province (disaggregated at the district level) is a massive undertaking and requires in-depth technical expertise. In some projects, international donors are active, but in most cases, they have to rely on information provided by local and provincial authorities. Due to these capability issues, provincial governments have been allocating less on social development than what is required to bridge the service delivery gap. Importantly, they have been utilizing even less. In addition to this, there is a lack of effective monitoring and audit of utilised funds,6 which compromises the quality of spending on social sectors to some extent.
Social exclusion of female population Apart from institutional and macro factors mentioned above, social sector development in Pakistan is also restrained by the exclusion of female population from national economic and social uplift.
Despite some improvements lately, a large segment of the female population in Pakistan continues to remain excluded from formal education and the labour force. Female enrolment lags behind that for males across all education levels (primary, secondary and tertiary), while Pakistan's female labour force participation rate, at around 25 percent, is lower than that for regional countries like India and Bangladesh. Moreover, the lack of adequate health facilities also disproportionately affects women:
Pakistan's maternal mortality rate is among the highest in the region (at over 170 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2013). Pakistan has performed quite poorly in MDGs related to females.
Private services not affordable for a large segment of the population As the public sector has been unable to fulfill its obligations to a major part of the citizenry, the private sector has naturally stepped in to fill the gap. Both in education and healthcare, the penetration of private facilities has increased significantly over the past few years. The quality of private service is also considered superior over public ones. However, this has led to two main problems: rural areas have been largely left out, and private services are not affordable for a large segment of the population. This problem is more severely reflected in education and thus in the job market: students graduating from public schools are increasingly finding it difficult to compete in the job market with those coming from high quality private educational institutions, based on anecdotal evidence. Therefore, the poor segment of the population, which was earlier able to catch up with the high income groups by improving their educational level, is now being left behind.
Going forward Keeping in view the growth rate of Pakistan's population,7 the country will need to sizably increase its allocations for social development just to maintain the current level of its social indicators, let alone make any meaningful improvement therein. While the country has failed to achieve a number of MDG targets, the clock for achieving the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has begun ticking. The SDGs comprise a more comprehensive set of indicators, which, in addition to human development and social inclusion, also incorporate targets related to economic development and inclusive growth (Box 7.2).
Fortunately, Pakistan is now better placed to progress along the targeted agenda: the security situation has improved; foreign investment is reappearing; the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is expected to bring economic activities to remote areas; and the age structure of Pakistan's population is such that it can reap the benefits of the demographic dividend.
However, this will not be possible without a rigorous reform process in public service delivery. In addition to allocating more funds for social sectors, provincial governments also need to build capacity, and develop working relations with private practitioners to utilise their services for unbiased and accurate monitoring of state spending. In the meantime, it is important to encourage the private sector to be a partner in economic development; side by side, this sector should also be urged to incorporate checks and balances over the quality of its services. In areas where public service is lacking, the government should continue to focus on making private services affordable for the underprivileged (via targeted programs like the Benazir Income Support Program).
To achieve this, it must put in place a wide-ranging social security strategy, and implement poverty alleviation measures like subsidies in a more targeted fashion. For example, a national public service delivery strategy having quantifiable targets should be developed. To that effect, we believe that the state's existing efforts to deepen financial inclusion in the country, with the National Financial
Inclusion Strategy, will play a crucial role in bridging the gap between the haves and the have-nots. All of this will ultimately support the government's target for inclusive growth in the country.
Box 7.2: Sustainable Development Goals On September 25, 2015, the United Nations General Assembly formally adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), a successor to the recently concluded Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The transformation of the MDGs into the SDGs reflects the continuing dissatisfaction of the global community with the current state and quality of social development.
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Table 7.2.1: A Comparison of SDGs and MDGs
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SDGs (17 Goals) MDGs (8 Goals)
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Group-1 (Human Development) SDGs 1 to 6
1 End poverty in all its forms everywhere; 1 Eradicate extreme hunger and poverty
2 End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and 2 Achieve universal primary education
promote sustainable agriculture;
3 Ensure healthy lives and promote wellbeing for all at all ages; 3 Promote gender equality and empower women
4 Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote 4 Reduce child mortality
lifelong learning opportunities for all;
5 Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls; 5 Improve maternal health
6 Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and 6 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
sanitation for all;
Group-2 (Economic Development) SDGs 7 to 12
7 Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern
energy for all;
8 Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full
and productive employment, and decent work for all;
9 Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable
industrialization, and foster innovation;
10 Reduce inequality within and among countries;
11 Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and
sustainable;
12 Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns;
Group-3 (Climate Changes & Global Partnership) SDGs 13 to 17
13 Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts; 7 Ensure environmental sustainability
14 Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources
for sustainable development;
15 Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial
ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification and
halt and reverse land degradation, and halt biodiversity loss;
16 Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable
development, provide access to justice for all and build effective,
accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels;
17 Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global 8 Develop a global partnership for development
partnership for sustainable development
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Broadly speaking, the SDG framework follows a more comprehensive agenda, as it includes a total of 17 goals, compared to 8 MDGs. As evident in Table 7.2.1, SDGs can be divided into three major groups, showing a wider and more comprehensive coverage of global priorities for sustainable development. The first group (SDGs 1 to 6) predominantly relates to human development or social inclusion, and overlaps almost completely with the first six MDGs. The second group (SDGs 7 to 12) relates to economic development or inclusive growth, which is a new set of goals. Finally, the third group (SDGs 13 to 17) pertains to climate changes and global partnership, which subsumes the 7th and 8th goals of the MDGs.
The consultation process behind the SDGs was also more open than the procedure pursued in the formulation of the MDGs.
Specifically, while the discussion on MDGs occurred behind closed doors by a group of experts, the formulation of SDGs involved discussions with civil society, governments, and other international stakeholders. Furthermore, the SDGs are broader in a sense that they are applicable for all member countries, irrespective of their state of economic development.8
The comprehensive nature of this development agenda also entails an ambitious funding plan involving the World Bank, IMF, official development assistance (ODA), governments and private donors.9 According to estimates, the total global investment needed under SDGs would be around $5 to $7 trillion per year; out of that, developing countries alone would require $3.3-$4.5 trillion per year.10 As the current level of investment is insufficient, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates an investment gap of $2.5 trillion per year for developing countries.11 Given that the private sector covers only $900 billion, this leaves a huge burden of $1.6 trillion per year for public sector and ODA sources of funding.12
Pakistan is one of the signatories to the SDG framework. On October 10, 2015, the Planning Commission and UNDP signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for implementing SDGs in Pakistan.13 We expect that support from the international community would also facilitate the social development targets set under the Vision 2025. That said, the challenges for achieving SDGs have become more cumbersome following the devolution of education- and health-related policies to provinces after the 18th amendment. This means that a successful implementation of SDGs would require closer co-ordination between the provinces and the federal government. In the same way, attracting local private investment in social and development sectors would also be inevitable. As far external funding is concerned, Pakistan will have to compete with other nations to access ODA and inflows from private donors and investors.
Financial inclusion: a way to reduce poverty An inclusive financial system not only contributes to economic development, but also provides the marginalized segments of the country an alternative to costly financial services available in the informal sector. Pakistan is one of those countries where access to finance is quite low: only 2.4 percent of the entire adult population uses formal channels for borrowing.14 Therefore, the government and SBP developed a broader National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS), to address the constraints responsible for the low level of financial inclusion in the country. Aiming to enhance access to formal financial services for 50 percent of the adult population by 2020, the NFIS has prioritized areas like branchless banking (BB), digital payment systems, agriculture & MSME finance, housing finance, Islamic finance, consumer protection, financial literacy, insurance, and pensions, etc. The strategy also works exclusively on revising the existing legal framework that impedes the provision of innovative financial services.
Steady progress has been made in achieving the strategy's objectives. For instance, SBP has introduced several measures for the promotion of agriculture finance. These included the implementation of a credit guarantee scheme for small and marginalized farmers; livestock and crop loan insurance schemes; financing for agriculture value-chain; and capacity and awareness-building programs. Similarly, to encourage microfinance, SBP introduced credit guarantee schemes and allowed the extension of digital credit in order to facilitate real-time disbursements with aggregate exposure. The microfinance banking industry was able to increase its microcredit portfolio by 59.9 percent (or Rs 27.3 billion) in FY16 to Rs 72.9 billion. A corresponding growth of 31.2 percent was noted in the number of borrowers, which reached beyond 1.7 million.
Similarly, to enhance economic empowerment of women, concerted efforts have been made to increase the flow of financial resources to female entrepreneurs.15 The idea is to target an improvement in female education and healthcare issues by making women financially independent.
Similarly, the strategy also caters exclusively to providing financial services to the farmer community in rural areas, by revising the existing legal framework that impedes the provision of innovative financial services.
As for branchless banking, SBP is emphasising the setting up of a tier of simplified accounts - m- wallets - and extending the BB agent network. Fortunately, Pakistan has a very conducive market environment for the growth of branchless banking, in terms of cellular connectivity (132 million subscribers), digital identity verification (97 percent of adult coverage in NADRA), large agent network, payment connectivity platform (1-Link), mutual collaboration among stakeholders, and transparency and disclosures. The number of BB accounts had increased to 14.6 million by end-June 2016; the average deposit size in these accounts was Rs 769. The number of agents responsible for opening and maintaining these accounts rose to 346,716.
In overall terms, the access points are increasing, and product offerings by formal financial institutions have started showing diversity. More importantly, branchless banking has begun to play an important role in delivering transparent and quick government-to-person (G2P) payments, especially to beneficiaries of the Benazir Income Support Program (BISP), Watan cards, and Employees Old-Age Benefits Institution (EOBI). This implies that the poorest of the poor are now benefiting from the formal financial system: this will go a long way in strengthening their faith in the country's financial infrastructure as well as in the government's support schemes.
The remaining part of this chapter will discuss in detail the current state of social development in Pakistan, encompassing issues in population dynamics, poverty, income inequality, healthcare, and education.
7.2 Population dynamics With the estimated population exceeding 188.9 million (in 2015) and growing at an average of 2.1 percent per annum (during 2010-2015), Pakistan faces the daunting task of providing for an additional 120.7 million people by the year 2050.16 Of the nine countries expected to account for more than half of the increase in the world's projected population during 2015-2050 (ie, 2.8 billion people), Pakistan will contribute the third-highest number of people.17
With the population growth rate depending on many factors, both internal and external, projections are naturally marred with uncertainties. Yet, there appears to be a universal view that fertility (as measured by the total fertility rate) is the primary driver of population growth, with migration and mortality playing secondary roles.
Although data from both government and non-governmental sources indicates a gradual reduction in Pakistan's total fertility rate (ie, the average number of children borne by a woman during her entire reproductive years), these differ markedly in terms of absolute levels. For instance, the latest Economic Survey (2015-16) has projected the country's current total fertility rate (TFR) at 3.1; this is considerably lower than the Population Council's recent estimate of 3.9.18
And even though Pakistan's average TFR declined from 6.6 in 1960-65 to 3.7 in 2010-15 (second only to Afghanistan in South Asia), the pace of this decline was quite slow. As can be seen from Figure 7.2, Bangladesh, which had a higher average TFR than Pakistan in 1960-65, was able to bring it down three times during the same period.19
Besides, there seems to be a considerable variation in TFR rates in urban and rural areas. One indicator is the smaller proportion of children under the age of five in urban as opposed to rural areas, which suggests that recent declines in fertility have been more evident in the former than the latter.20
Moreover, data shows that a woman with no formal education is likely to, on average, bear two more children in her life than a woman having completed post-secondary education.21 These two points have significant policy implications, the most important being that family planning and literacy campaigns need to be reoriented towards rural settings, with renewed vigour.
Onset of demographic dividend While these population projections should indeed be a cause of worry for all stakeholders, it is equally important to realise the opportunities they present. While a rising population implies a further strain on resources, the changing age structure provides Pakistan with a rare opportunity to drive economic growth going forward. Pakistan is said to be in the third stage of demographic transition, where the birth and death rates are both declining and the rate of population growth has slowed down.22 An outcome of this transition is the so-called "demographic dividend," which basically refers to the direct and indirect opportunities presented by these changes to increase per capita output, over a period of about 40-50 years. During this period, the proportion of the working age population increases significantly owing to reduced proportions of dependent children.23 Demographic dividend has been recognised as a major factor that stimulated economic advancement in other countries.24
With a mean age of around 22.5 years, Pakistan's population is still relatively young, and has witnessed little variation during 1991-2013; the proportion of the population under the age of 25 has varied between 60-63 percent. During the same time, the percentage of the population under age 15 has decreased from 45 percent to 39 percent (indicating fertility declines during the period). Consequently, the proportion of people of working age (15-59 years) has increased, whereas the proportion of the elderly (age 60 and above) has not changed substantially.
In other words, the dependency ratio, ie ratio of the dependant population (0-14 years and 65 and above) to the working age population (15- 64 years), is falling in the country. A persistent decrease in the dependency ratio signifies the onset of a demographic dividend.
Not only will the higher number of working age people present an opportunity to generate more income and savings, it should also lead to diverting resources previously spent on children to improving the quality of healthcare and education.
That said, the current age structure will change in the future. A reduction in the TFR means that, with fewer births, the growth rate of younger generations will gradually become lower than that of the older generations. As shown in Figure 7.3, the under 19 population is on its way to stabilising (a result of declining fertility), while the population aged 65 and over (which currently forms a small proportion of the total), is projected to grow at a rising rate after 2050, leading to an increase in the dependency ratio. This means that the country has a limited amount of time available to benefit from the demographic dividend (Box 7.3).
Box 7.3: When is the Demographic Dividend Ending? Theoretically, the demographic dividend is said to be in play when the difference between the rate of growth of working age population and the total population, favours the working age population [Mason (2005), and Durr-e-Nayab (2006)]. This concept, when applied to multiple population datasets, paints an interesting picture.
According to Durr-e-Nayab (2006), based on UN projections of 2005, Pakistan was set to experience the demographic dividend from the late 1980s to 2045. In 2013, the Population Council revisited the issue, applied its own population projections and revised estimates of Nayab (2006) on the UN's 2010 population projections. The updated projections showed that the demographic dividend had not started at the end of the 1980s as Nayab (2006) earlier proposed, but had been delayed to the early or mid-1990s.
A re-estimate of the Nayab study, when applied to recent UN projections (2015), proposes that the dividend would end in 2040 (as compared to 2045 earlier). Furthermore, the rates of growth of the working age and total population are predicted to equalize for an instant around 2019. While differences in the pace of fertility decline account for variances, across the years, a similar trend suggests that the "window of opportunity" - or the duration of the demographic dividend in Pakistan - will be from around 1990 to 2045 (on average).
Therefore, in order to maximise the size of the demographic dividend, fertility must decline as much as possible to further reduce the dependency ratio, and as fast as possible so that the benefits of the dividend could be availed for a longer period of time.25
(To be continued tomorrow)
1. Source: Haver Analytics.
2. The HDI ranks over 180 countries based on three principal human development characteristics: leading a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy at birth); the ability to acquire knowledge (measured by mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling); and the ability to achieve a decent standard of living (measured by gross national income per capita).
3. Till March 2016. Source: Annexure IV (Impact of War in Afghanistan and Ensuing Terrorism on Pakistan's Economy), Economic Survey of Pakistan 2015-16.
4. Pakistan suffered from 21 major floods between 1950 and 2011, which led to an estimated (cumulative) loss of US $19 billion to the national economy. Of this, US $10 billion in losses came from the 2010 floods alone (source: Asian Development Bank, Indus Basin Floods: Mechanisms, Impacts and Management 2013).
5 Though the provinces did have some influence over primary and secondary education even before the 18th amendment, after the amendment, these areas became the prime responsibility of the provincial governments. Correspondingly, the federal government's share in overall education as well as health spending declined. In FY10 (ie a year before devolution), the federal government's share in overall education spending stood at 25.3 percent; by FY15, it had fallen to 16.9 percent (source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2009-10, 2015-16).
6. One glaring outcome of insufficient monitoring is staff absenteeism. The World Bank (2010) found 58 percent and 45 percent of doctors in basic health units in Balochistan and Sindh respectively to be absent from their posts during multiple surveys (source: Expanding Quality Health, Population and Nutrition Services, Pakistan Policy Note 10, 2013, World Bank).
7 From 2010 to 2015, Pakistan's population grew at an average 2.11 percent YoY. This was the second-highest growth rate among South Asian countries, behind Afghanistan's 3.02 percent (source: World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, UN Population Division).
8. In comparison, the MDGs focused mainly on improving the social status of the developing regions around the world.
9. On the other hand, funding for MDGs relied on official aid flows.
10. Investment refers to capital expenditure, as defined by UNCTAD.
11. This estimate is conservative in the sense that it covers investment in power, transport, telecom, water and sanitation, food security and agriculture, climate change, biodiversity, health and education. Investment needed for capacity building and institutional development are not part of this assessment.
12. Source: World Investment Report, Investing in SDGs: Action for Private Investment, UNCTAD (2014).
13. Pakistan, in co-operation with UNDP, has been establishing SDG centres in the federal capital and in all provinces.
14. Source: Access to Finance Survey, SBP. For details, see Special Section 1: Why Credit-to-GDP ratio is falling in Pakistan? A comparison with regional economies, SBP Annual Report on the State of Pakistan's Economy 2014-15.
15. In line with the efforts to channel funds for poverty alleviation, collaborative arrangements have been made with international agencies like the ILO, UNDP and CIDA to identify and evaluate female entrepreneurs for financing feasible income-generating projects.
16. Under the UN's medium variant, Pakistan's population is projected to reach 309.6 million by 2050, at an average annual growth rate of 1.44 percent. Detailed explanation of projection assumptions for different variants is presented in the document titled "Methodology of the UN Population Estimates and Projections," available at https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/. The UN Population Division estimates Pakistan's existing population at 188.9 million in 2015, which is presented in its document titled "World Population Prospects 2015". However, the Economic Survey 2015-16 estimates the population of Pakistan at 195.4 million for the year 2016.
17. The Planning Commission's Vision 2025 document aptly observes: "Every year Pakistan adds the equivalent of a New Zealand to its population".
18. Source: Prospects for Economic Growth in Sindh under Alternative Demographic Scenarios: The Case for a Rapid Fertility Decline, Policy Brief September 2015, Population Council.
19. Source: United Nations Population Division.
20. The last available Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey (2012-13) estimated the TFR for urban areas at 3.2, against 4.2 for rural areas.
21. Source: Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 2012-13.
22. According to the World Bank, from 1960 to 2014, Pakistan's crude birth rate (ie the number of live births per 1,000 persons) declined from 44 to 29, while its crude death rate went down from 21 to just 7 per 1,000 persons.
23. Source: "Capturing the Demographic Dividend in Pakistan," by Zeba A. Sathar, Rabbi Royan, and John Bongaarts et al.
24. In fact, Bloom and Williamson (1997) attribute between 25 to 40 percent of East Asia's "economic miracle" to the demographic transition experienced by regional countries at the time (source: Bloom E. David and Williamson G. Jeffrey, "Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia", NBER Working Paper Series, No 6268, November 1997).
25. Source: Prospects for Economic Growth in Sindh under Alternative Demographic Scenarios: The Case for a Rapid Fertility Decline, Policy Brief September 2015, Population Council.
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