NPT and its future

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) comprising 11 articles, basically has three components the pillars as they are generally known: Non-proliferation, Disarmament and the right of the non-nuclear states to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
In the domain of nuclear non-proliferation, the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) have undertaken not to transfer to any recipient, nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to assist a non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or acquire such weapons. The Non-nuclear states have pledged not to receive from any source, nuclear weapons or other explosive devices and not to manufacture or acquire such weapons or devices and not to receive any assistance in their manufacture.
In regards to disarmament, the signatories to the treaty have affirmed the desire to ease international tensions and strengthen international trust so as to create someday the conditions for a halt to the production of nuclear weapons, and treaty in general and complete disarmament that liquidates, in particular, nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles from the national arsenal.
The third pillar of the NPT recognises the right of the non-nuclear states to the acquisition of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under the incisive glare of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), provided they can prove verifiably that they are not engaged in developing nuclear weapons.
Ostensibly all these objectives of the NPT are beyond any reproach. But the reality is that the NPT during its 42 years existence has failed to stop nuclear proliferation or in evolving a credible mechanism for disarmament. According to the former IAEA chief Mohamed AlBradie there are thirty five to forty states who possess the knowledge to develop nuclear weapons in addition to 13 others who have installed facilities for enrichment of weapon-grade uranium. Israel beyond doubt is an undeclared nuclear power. North Korea, Iran, Iraq, South Africa and Libya have been pursuing nuclear weapons programme, though South Africa and Libya have abandoned them under international pressure. India and Pakistan, the two countries who have not signed NPT have also become nuclear weapon states with credible justifications of their own.
The failure of NPT to prevent nuclear proliferation and achieve its objective of disarmament is mainly attributable to the breach of the treaty provisions by the NWS and some intrinsic inadequacies in the treaty itself. The NWS under the treaty committed not to provide nuclear technology or weapons to any other state or use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state. But in violation of this commitment the US has provided nearly 180 B61 nuclear bombs to Belgium, Italy, Germany, Netherlands and Turkey for use. The US also targeted its nuclear warheads at North Korea, a non-NWS from 1959 until 1991. Former Secretary of Defence UK, Geoff Hoon explicitly invoked the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in response to a non-conventional attack by "rogue states". In January 2006 President Jacques Chirac of France indicated that an incident of state-sponsored terrorism on France could trigger a small-scale nuclear retaliation aimed at destroying the "rogue state's" power centres.
In the domain of disarmament also the failure of the NSW to bring about a major reduction in their nuclear arsenal, to halt the production of nuclear weapons and the inability to hammer out a treaty on general and complete disarmament and their reluctance to agree on a complete disarmament within a prescribed timeframe has also contributed to lack of progress in this regard. This has angered many non-nuclear states and also provided justification to many of them to develop nuclear programmes of their own.
The dilemma with the third pillar of NPT is that the commercially popular light water reactor nuclear power station uses enriched uranium fuel, which either has to be enriched by those countries themselves or purchased from the international market. The countries concerned can easily switch to nuclear weapons programme if they so desire. Mohamed AlBaradei has called the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities the "Achilles' heel" of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. That perhaps explains why in 2004 US declared the prevention of further spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium as a major pillar of its non-proliferation policy and why it has been pressurising a number of countries, including Pakistan, to sign Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Ever since the NPT came into force, a significant issue for the disarmament and arms control community has been the continued production of fissile materials - the key ingredient for production of nuclear weapons - and hence the endeavours to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material.
But the issue still remains unresolved and even the process to negotiate has not taken off-the-ground. The sticking point is that while the US, the UK and Japan favour a treaty, which limits future production of fissile materials, other states, including Pakistan, believe that the treaty should also address fissile materials already produced and stockpiled. Pakistan believes, and rightly so, that a fissile material treaty, which does not address existing stockpiles will "freeze existing asymmetries" that threaten its security and therefore is unacceptable. This undoubtedly is a manifestation of its concern regarding regional rival India who possesses much larger stockpiles of fissile material. It maintained the same principled position in the first committee meeting of the CD in 2009 and 2010, as a result of which a deadlock still persists. The US, Japan, Australia and several other countries announced that they would support moving negotiations for a fissile materials treaty to another forum if the deadlock in the CD continued.
The apprehensions expressed by Pakistan have proved true. The US has violated the NPT by entering into agreement with India - a non-signatory state to NPT - for the transfer of civilian nuclear technology to prop it as a counterbalance to China and to exploit its lucrative market. UK and France also are following suit. India has agreed to accept IAEA supervision for only 14 nuclear reactors out of 22. Pakistan views it as a discriminatory act and has a considered opinion that India will utilise this to enhance its nuclear capability and that might lead to a nuclear arms race in the region.
In view of the foregoing facts, no person in his right mind can expect that the NPT will succeed in preventing nuclear proliferation and achieving its other objectives. It actually has no future unless the NWS abandon their discriminatory and self-serving policies and learn to abide by their international commitments.