Multi-warhead Ababeel

In early 1965, when it became evident that India's nuclear programme is war-oriented, Pakistan was left with no choice but to go nuclear. It was then that Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto declared "If India makes an atom bomb, then we will also do so, even if we have to eat grass ... an atom bomb can only be answered by an atom bomb". In 1974, when India conducted its atomic test at Pokhran, codenamed "Smiling Buddha," Pakistan seriously set about acquiring its nuclear option. And in 1998 when India tested a series of nuclear weapons Pakistan followed suit by carrying out seven nuclear explosions at Chaghi in Balochistan. It was India which introduced the nuclear genie to South Asia, inevitably forcing Pakistan to match up with it and acquire at least minimum credible nuclear deterrence. That race is still on. Last year, India tested what it called "locally designed" ballistic missile defence (BMD) shield, and, that acquired, introduced the Cold Start doctrine. Pakistan responded by inducting field-specific tactical nuclear weapons. As for India's BMD shield, there is Pakistan's surface-to-surface ballistic missile, Ababeel, which was successfully tested on Tuesday. It has the range of 2,200 kms and is capable of delivering multiple warheads, including nuclear ones. More importantly, it is a kind of stealth weapon. It is equipped with multiple independently targeted re-entry (MIRV) technology and is thus capable of neutralizing India's BMD capability. Earlier this month, when India tried to violate Pakistan's territorial waters, Pakistan test-fired indigenously developed the submarine-launched cruise missile Babur III with a range of 450 kms. If the history of nuclearized South Asia is any guide, it is always India that would try stealing a march over Pakistan by tilting the nuclear balance in its favour - but to be always confronted with a matching response by Pakistan. Consequently, by now Pakistan has not only acquired second-strike capability but also the MIRV-equipped missiles which not only defeat India's anti-ballistic missile defence but also expose its major population centres to precise nuclear hits by Pakistan.
With the end of the Cold War nuclear capability as a weapon of choice seems to taking the back seat. But not in South Asia; here two otherwise underdeveloped and backward countries are engaged in a fierce nuclear race. And that race is on because the otherwise preponderant conventional weapon state, India, has set about acquiring regional leadership status by excelling in the nuclear field also. It is this one-upmanship on India's part which forces Pakistan to join this race. It was not Buddha who would smile at India's acquiring the potential to destroy humanity; it was the Indian leaders as far back as the 1960s who "sought to win for their country all the prestige, status and economic benefits associated with being a nuclear power, including the option of building the bomb," if necessary. And they were not off the track: When "Buddha Smiled" US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger hypocritically argued that it was "futile to fight the fait accompli". And if he was apologetic, President George W. Bush was not. He agreed to stitch up the so-called civil nuclear agreement in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and thus helped India to divert its fissile material stocks for bomb-making. Washington is now assiduously working to secure for India membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, even when the move is fiercely resisted by some other members of the group. The fact is that but for India's hell-bent approach to become a top-level nuclear power Pakistan would have stayed out of the race. But no more when India is talking of Cold Start and "limited war" and has acquired nuclear-shield capability. Pakistan is in the nuclear race not by choice but by compulsion - and it has adhered to the nuclear constraints dictated by the United Nations and its relevant agencies. Its export control regime is at par with international standards and its control lists encompass the items and technologies controlled by MTCR. Then there is also in place a robust command-and-control system, an effective and comprehensive export control regime as well as steps to improve physical security at all levels. All in all, then, Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state and will not let India disturb the security equilibrium in the region by developing a missile defence system or inter-continental ballistic missiles. The test-firing of the multi-role Ababeel ballistic missile is one such step in that direction.