The Privatisation Commission and prospective buyers, including foreign investors, are converging on a model to deregulate Pakistan’s electricity market and privatise distribution. It borrows from international experience and is, by local standards, refreshingly out of the box.

It will face resistance from politicians, bureaucrats and the many interests that profit from the existing arrangement. But the proposal deserves serious consideration. Pakistan cannot afford another three decades of power-sector reform that changes institutions without changing incentives.

The premise is simple: the state must retreat from businesses it has repeatedly failed to run efficiently. The unbundling of Wapda, the creation of Nepra and successive attempts to establish a competitive electricity market have occupied policymakers for nearly three decades. Yet the state remains the dominant purchaser and retailer of electricity, and the costs of its failures continue to land on taxpayers and consumers.

The new model seeks to separate the wires business from electricity supply. Private operators would manage distribution networks, while competing suppliers would purchase electricity and sell it to consumers. The Central Power Purchasing Agency would retain its existing contracts with generators but allocate corresponding capacity obligations and customer portfolios to private suppliers. The network operator would also act as the supplier of last resort, ensuring that consumers remain connected when a competitive supplier fails.

The attraction is considerable. Pakistan has contracted generating capacity far in excess of average grid demand. Much of the capacity cost is recovered over a shrinking or stagnant base of electricity sales. High tariffs encourage consumers to conserve electricity, install solar systems or leave the grid where possible. Lower sales then push fixed costs onto fewer units, making grid electricity still more expensive. It is a vicious circle. Competition could begin to break it.

Consider Faisalabad Electric Supply Company (FESCO), the first distribution company expected to be privatised. It sells roughly 15 billion units annually. Under the proposed arrangement, one private operator would acquire the distribution network and earn regulated revenue from operating it. Separate competitive suppliers would receive portions of the existing customer base, together with the corresponding capacity and commercial obligations.

A supplier might, for example, acquire a portfolio representing 3 billion units of annual consumption, comprising industrial, commercial and residential customers in broadly representative proportions.

Think of a slice of pizza with all the toppings. The supplier gets paying customers, subsidised customers and capacity obligations together. It cannot simply take the cheese and leave the rest behind.

The commercial opportunity arises when suppliers begin competing for additional demand. A supplier carrying fixed capacity costs across 3 billion units could lower its average cost by expanding sales to 4 billion units, provided its additional fuel and network costs are covered. It could offer cheaper electricity to industrial consumers, secure long-term contracts or attract customers from other suppliers and regions. The existing capacity becomes more productive, and the fixed-cost burden can be spread over greater consumption.

That is the model’s central economic promise. But allocating existing demand differently does not, by itself, reduce the cost of electricity. The savings depend on additional consumption, better recoveries, lower operating losses and genuine competition among suppliers. And genuine competition requires more than several companies holding different portions of the same captive market.

The principal complication concerns the supplier of last resort. Prospective buyers of distribution networks fear that competitors will capture their most profitable customers, leaving them with consumers who are expensive to serve or less reliable in paying bills. They therefore want to participate as competitive suppliers within their own territories.

The government’s inclination is to allow network operators to compete elsewhere while restricting competition in their home territories. That would be a mistake. If the objective is to increase competition, excluding an otherwise qualified supplier makes little sense.

But the opposite extreme is equally dangerous. A company controlling the distribution network cannot be allowed to favour its own supply business through discriminatory network charges, delayed connections or preferential access to customer information. The wires are a natural monopoly. Electricity supply need not be.

The answer is to permit network owners to compete, subject to separate accounts, transparent network charges, equal access for rival suppliers and enforceable regulatory safeguards.

BR Research has spoken to several prospective bidders. Their appetite for the supply business is considerable. These are large conglomerates with interests in power generation, manufacturing and other energy-intensive businesses. They have commercial reasons to want lower industrial tariffs and better utilisation of generating capacity. Foreign investors are asking for similar opportunities.

Their interest is encouraging. But their incentives are not necessarily identical to those of consumers. The government’s task is to structure a competitive market, not merely make the transaction attractive to bidders.

The Privatisation Commission and its team deserve credit for bringing the proposal this far. Yet prospective buyers remain anxious about political interference and regulatory reversals. Their concerns are hardly misplaced.

The history of Pakistan’s privatisation programme is littered with transactions that attracted serious investors before running into resistance from within the government itself. The sale of Pakistan International Airlines illustrated how divisions within the ruling establishment can complicate even an advanced transaction.

Electricity distribution is far more politically sensitive. Almost every household and business is a consumer, and changes in tariff structures will create winners and losers. Some consumers could pay more initially, particularly as existing cross-subsidies are unwound.

The Power Division also has little institutional incentive to surrender control over procurement, tariffs and distribution. Ministries rarely volunteer to make themselves less powerful. The struggle between the reform agenda and the administrative status quo is therefore likely to intensify.

Subsidies present another obstacle. Pakistan has more than 34 million domestic electricity connections, yet fewer than three percent are on time-of-use metering. Subsidised tariffs remain heavily dependent on consumption categories rather than household incomes.

This creates opportunities for misuse. Multiple connections, incorrect consumer classifications and failures to install appropriate meters can allow relatively affluent households to benefit from concessions intended for poorer consumers. Such practices are difficult to eliminate when the same institutions control consumer records, metering and billing.

The solution is to move progressively towards targeted fiscal support for deserving households, supported by credible consumer identification. Electricity prices should increasingly reflect the cost of supply, while the state protects vulnerable consumers directly. Time-of-use pricing should remain available where it encourages more efficient consumption and reduces peak demand.

The other attraction of the proposed market is the changing profile of capacity payments. A substantial portion of generation costs relates to debt servicing, particularly for plants developed during the last decade. As those loans mature, the debt component of individual plant tariffs should decline.

Competitive suppliers could anticipate these reductions when negotiating longer-term contracts with industrial consumers. They could accept lower margins initially in expectation of improved returns later.

But the timing and magnitude of those savings must be established. New capacity obligations, exchange-rate movements, fuel costs and other charges can offset debt-related reductions elsewhere in the system. Falling debt repayments at individual plants do not automatically mean that Pakistan’s aggregate capacity bill will fall. The Privatisation Commission should therefore make the underlying cost forecasts, capacity allocations and risk-sharing arrangements transparent before bidding.

There are other questions to settle. Can customers freely switch suppliers? Who bears the losses when a competitive supplier defaults? How will protected consumers and cross-subsidies be allocated? What prevents a dominant supplier from acquiring competitors and recreating a private monopoly? And who pays when the supplier of last resort inherits a failing rival’s customers? These are not arguments against the reform. They are the conditions for making it work.

The first three distribution companies selected for privatisation, FESCO, GEPCO and IESCO, are among the relatively better-performing entities. They offer a reasonable starting point. The difficult cases will follow, where theft, weak recoveries and political interference are far more entrenched.

Some domestic investors also want foreign partners, partly to provide technical expertise and partly as protection against future regulatory reversals. That says something about the confidence investors place in the state’s promises. A foreign shareholder should not have to substitute for credible institutions.

The first transaction will therefore matter enormously. It will establish the contractual and regulatory precedent for everything that follows. Rushing to meet an arbitrary deadline would be foolish, but another round of indefinite deliberation would be worse. The commission should take the time necessary to get the structure right, then move decisively.

Pakistan does not need another elaborate reform blueprint that preserves the underlying distribution of power and privilege. It needs a government willing to surrender control, enforce competition and accept the political consequences of rational electricity pricing. The model is clever. Whether the state has the courage to implement it is another matter.

Separating electricity distribution from retail supply could unlock competition and reduce industrial tariffs. But success depends on genuine consumer choice, fair network access and political willingness to dismantle entrenched privileges.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

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Ali Khizar

Ali Khizar is the Director of Research at Business Recorder. His Twitter handle is @AliKhizar