Action against Lal Masjid-Jamia Hafsa complex tends to cast a shadow lengthier than expected, or warranted, on the overall political scene in the country. Given that the government assembled a massive assault force, fully buttressed by instant top-level administrative advice and aversion of local populace to the antics of the complex occupants, the operation to shut down this outfit should not have lasted more than a day or two.
But that has not happened. On day five of the siege, that is on Saturday, the besieged militants appeared as defiant as on day one and their leader, Maulana Abdur Rashid Ghazi, in a bold shift from his earlier confused and shaky stand, appeared to be determined to stand up and embrace martyrdom. Over the last day or so a surge of sympathetic understanding of the Lal Masjid militants' stand appears to be buffeting the public opinion.
Appeals are being made from various quarters, including from those who had earlier cold-shouldered the Lal Masjid hierarchy, that the government review its 'unconditional surrender' stance. But, far more relevant to the Lal Masjid siege is the violent reaction, the series of attacks on law-enforcing agencies' personnel in various parts of the NWFP and tribal areas.
What may be the climax to this wave of violence has come in the form of an attack on President Musharraf's lead aircraft as it flew over Rawalpindi on way to Turbat for inspection of flood-affected areas of Balochistan on Friday morning. A television network reported that militants in the besieged mosque have claimed that the attack on the presidential aircraft was an expression of solidarity with their cause.
Has the operation against militants in the Lal Masjid backfired and if so why? One may not like to use a definitive expression as backfire but the fact is that the result of the operation is not likely to be as spectacular as expected. One thing is now clear that the endgame would be either a retreat by the government force from the scene, which is not very likely, or a bloody battle on the grounds of the Lal Masjid complex. Casualties, undoubtedly, would be very high and most of them would be innocent students held hostage by the militants. Of course, it would be a Pyrrhic victory for the government.
If getting vacated the Lal Masjid was such a huge strategic requirement why was action not taken against the 'Maulana Brothers' all these years? But, more importantly, one may ask as to why other options like intercession by non-official entities or a way out of this deadlock other than insisting on unconditional surrender were not taken into consideration. There is the whole history of government-Lal Masjid administration collaboration stretching back to the early days of the Afghan Jihad, which should have been revisited by the government side.
Even if the purpose to take over the Lal Masjid complex was genuine and the government had to enforce its writ in the heart of the capital, not much seems to have been done to ensure that the conduct of the operation did not offend public sensitivities.
Firstly, it is not an operation against an enemy country where one doesn't have to bother much about the treatment meted out to the vanquished. Then, it is an operation being conducted within a compound that houses a mosque, a Madressa and two residential areas. In the complex there are also hostels packed with male and female students, of all ages.
Will you shoot in a crowd to catch a pick-pocket? The humiliation inflicted upon Maulana Abdul Aziz, Khateeb of Lal Masjid, by depicting him as a vanquished adversary held in custody, forced to don the burqa that he used to flee, amounts to stooping too low. It was in bad taste, reminiscent of the treatment meted out to prisoners in Iraq's infamous Abu-Ghuraib prison.
Had he escaped detection and was not caught, chances of a peaceful resolution of this imbroglio would have been much brighter. It would be naïve to believe that a man of his age would try to run away to save his life leaving behind his 11 years old daughter, 22 years old son, his wife, mother, brother and all other members of family. The only other member of his family who was caught escaping was his young daughter who has been sent to jail. If all other females who surrendered have been allowed to go home, why not she?
One will not hesitate to conclude that at the end of the day the man who would have suffered the most from this ill-planned clumsily conducted operation would be President Pervez Musharraf. The move to invade Lal Masjid complex is turning out to be as counter-productive as was the filing of reference against the Chief Justice of Pakistan.
Is it something new for an operation like this that the militants have used kids as shield? Why was this aspect not taken into consideration when the operation was planned? Added to this, are the embarrassing congratulatory messages from foreign governments who tend to seek vicarious satisfaction in a matter, which is exclusively domestic in nature. This is election year for President Pervez Musharraf and the parliamentarians, such developments are bound to impact election results.