The recently-signed defence agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye has generated more speculation than information. In the absence of its details, it is tempting to describe it as a Sunni, anti-Israel, anti-India or anti-Iran alliance.
Yet the emerging geopolitical reality suggests something more consequential: an attempt by three strategically important Muslim countries to carve out an autonomous space in a Middle East undergoing a fundamental redistribution of power.
The three partners are one among equals - each putting on table the value it is brings. They have divergent defence, economic and political priorities and each has a free space to pursue that. They are convergent on a one-point agenda of securing their footprints in the Middle East. This all makes the alliance sustainable and workable.
The defence agreement signed by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye-widely referred to as the Makkah Accord—has created an unusual degree of speculation.
Consequently, the accord has variously been described as a ‘Sunni alliance’, an ‘anti-Israel arrangement’, an ‘anti-India pact’, an ‘anti-Iran coalition’, and even a ‘new military bloc’. None of these descriptions, however, adequately explains the strategic logic and sense behind it.
The first point is that the agreement should not be viewed through the narrow prism of sectarianism or hostility towards any particular country. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye have sufficiently divergent geopolitical, economic and security interests to make the creation of a conventional military alliance against a named adversary both impractical and strategically counterproductive.
The more convincing explanation lies in the changing balance of power in the Middle East.
For decades, the United States has maintained a dominant military, political and economic presence in the region. But Washington has long sought to reduce the cost of its direct military footprint while retaining its strategic interests.
Its attention has increasingly shifted towards the Indo-Pacific and competition with China. The objective has therefore been not withdrawal from the Middle East but a less expensive form of engagement in which regional partners assume greater responsibility for regional security.
The Abraham Accords represented one manifestation of this strategy. Israel, together with selected Arab states, was emerging as the principal American-supported architecture for a new regional order.
The underlying logic was straightforward: contain Iran, integrate Israel into the Arab strategic and economic system, secure energy and trade routes and allow Washington to maintain influence without carrying the entire burden of regional security.
But the war involving Israel and Iran has fundamentally disturbed that equation.
The Middle East today is therefore no longer simply a contest between America and Iran, with Israel acting as Washington’s principal regional partner.
Three broad strategic axes are beginning to emerge: the Iran-centred axis, the Israel-centred axis, and what may increasingly become the Makkah Accord axis, comprising Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.
The latter is particularly interesting because all three countries maintain relationships with the major global powers.
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye remain firmly embedded in the Western economic and security architecture, while simultaneously maintaining substantial strategic and economic relations with China and, to varying degrees, Russia.
Iran, meanwhile, has its own deep strategic relationship with China and Russia and has consistently opposed any excessive American military presence in the region.
This creates an interesting paradox. The Makkah Accord may not necessarily be an anti-American arrangement. Indeed, its participants have strong reasons to remain on workable terms with Washington. Nor is it necessarily anti-Iranian. A stronger regional security architecture can actually provide a mechanism for dialogue and deterrence rather than confrontation.
Most importantly, it may represent an attempt to prevent the Middle East from becoming permanently divided between two opposing camps.
The phrase reportedly associated with the agreement—“all for one and one for all”—should also be interpreted carefully. It sounds like a collective-defence commitment, but its practical application is unlikely to be automatic. The three countries have different threat perceptions and different economic and geopolitical priorities.
Saudi Arabia’s overriding concerns are regional stability, protection of its economic transformation under its Vision 2030, energy security and the security of the Gulf. Türkiye’s strategic interests extend across the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and Ankara has its own independent relationship with Russia, NATO and the Arab world. Pakistan’s primary security concerns remain its eastern and western borders, economic stability and its strategic relationship with China.
It is therefore unrealistic to assume that all three would automatically enter a war simply because one of them faced a regional confrontation.
Collective defence becomes far more credible when an existential threat emerges—particularly an attempt to physically destroy or eliminate the sovereignty of one of the members. Short of such a contingency, each country is likely to retain considerable freedom in determining how far it wishes to become involved in a particular conflict.
This is not a weakness. It may actually be the accord’s greatest strength.
The emerging regional order will not be defined by rigid alliances alone. It will increasingly be characterised by strategic autonomy, overlapping partnerships and flexible coalitions. Countries will cooperate with Washington on one issue, Beijing on another, Moscow on a third and with regional powers on yet another.
Seen in this context, the Makkah Accord is less a declaration of war against anyone than a declaration of strategic space.
Its ultimate success, however, will depend not on the rhetoric of collective defence but on whether Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye can convert their political understanding into practical cooperation—intelligence sharing, defence production, counterterrorism, maritime security, technology, economic integration and coordinated diplomacy.
If they succeed, the Makkah Accord could become one of the most consequential developments in the post-Iran-war Middle East.
The region is entering an era in which no single external power may be able to dictate its security architecture indefinitely. The vacuum created by the gradual reduction of direct American involvement is already attracting competing regional and extra-regional powers.
The real significance of the Makkah Accord may therefore lie not in whom it opposes, but in who it empowers.
And that, ultimately, could make it the most consequential of the emerging three axes in the new Middle Eastern power equation.
Copyright Business Recorder, 2026
The writer is a former President OICCI; Global Business Leader and Strategic Affairs Analyst
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