The Constitution (Twenty-seventh Amendment) Bill 2025 [“the Bill”], introduced in the Senate of Pakistan, was passed on November 10, 2025 by a two-thirds majority, securing 64 votes.
The Bill, subsequently adopted by the National Assembly two days later, is expected to become an Act of Parliament soon after getting the President’s ascent. The amendment seeking to establish a Federal Constitutional Court and to restructure the constitutional and judicial framework of Pakistan, marks one of the most significant constitutional developments in recent years.
The Constitution’s framework shows that Article 239 governs the amendment process. It empowers either House of Parliament to introduce a constitutional amendment bill, which must be approved by a two-thirds majority in both Houses. The provision explicitly bars courts from questioning any constitutional amendment, reflecting the framers’ intent that Parliament’s amending power must be absolute.
The first major rupture came in 1954 when the Governor-General, Ghulam Muhammad, dissolved the Constituent Assembly just as it was preparing to table the first constitutional framework. The Chief Court of Sindh restored the Assembly, but the Federal Court under then Chief Justice Munir overturned that verdict, legitimizing executive overreach. The judgment not only inspired the executive but also created a precedent where judicial endorsement became the protector of extra constitutional measures.
The second Constituent Assembly did manage to enact Pakistan’s first Constitution in 1956, introducing a parliamentary system with the Prime Minister as chief executive. The arrangement proved temporary and in 1958, President Iskander Mirza abrogated the Constitution declaring Martial Law and paving the way for General Ayub Khan to assume control. The judiciary again validated this unconstitutional takeover in the Dosso case, confirming a recurring pattern of judicial collaboration in political instability in the country.
During Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s tenure, the parliament introduced the current Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1973 [“the Constitution”] as an attempt to restore balance of power. It clearly separated powers between the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary and established a parliamentary federation with strong provincial autonomy. Despite its clarity, the political culture of constitutional instability persisted.
Instead of protecting the Constitution from arbitrary interventions, the judiciary often collaborated with the abrogators and provided them protection. While Prime Minister Bhutto’s execution remains widely regarded as a judicial miscarriage of justice, later removals of elected prime ministers on vague grounds reinforced perceptions of judicial overreach.
Yousaf Raza Gillani’s removal for refusing to write a letter to a foreign government and of Nawaz Sharif for an undeclared “receivable” salary reflected a broader judicial tendency to promote the political agenda.
The Superior Courts often issued contradictory rulings, reversing earlier precedents and deepening uncertainty in both governance and justice. Their arbitrary interpretation of constitutional provisions has undermined consistency and confidence in the rule of law.
Constitution has undergone twenty-six amendments since 1973 and until 1977, seven amendments were enacted, followed by three to four amendments per decade thereafter. Some of these were procedural, whereas others transformed the constitutional structure itself. The Eighteenth Amendment, for example, redesigned the federation’s architecture by devolving wide powers to the provinces.
The Twenty-sixth Amendment, on the contrary, has restructured the composition and functioning of the judiciary by changing the process for selecting the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the composition of the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (JCP). It has replaced the automatic elevation of the senior judge with a parliamentary nomination process, introducing members of Parliament and a non-Muslim or woman representative to the JCP.
The judiciary, having consolidated appointment power through the Al-Jihad Trust case, had itself turned selective, often handpicking judges irrespective of seniority, a practice that eroded merit and public confidence. The 26th Amendment was thus a political response to judicial dominance, an attempt to reintroduce parliamentary oversight.
The recent political discourse around “likeminded judges” further complicated the perception of judicial neutrality with composition of benches increasingly appearing to predict outcomes, thus undermining the legitimacy of judicial decisions. Parliament, in turn, sought to “reclaim” its role through legislative assertion, culminating in the passage of the 27th Constitutional Amendment.
The statement of objects and reasons associated with the amendment cites the growing number of constitutional petitions before the Supreme Court as justification for establishing a Federal Constitutional Court (FCC).
The ground to constitute FCC is that the Supreme Court’s increasing engagement with constitutional matters has shifted focus away from its appellate responsibilities, resulting in delays in the resolution of routine civil and criminal cases. The proposed FCC is therefore presented as a specialised body designed to adjudicate constitutional questions, leaving the Supreme Court to focus on appeals.
The amendment introduces various structural changes. It inserts a new Chapter 1A into the Constitution (Articles 175B to 175L), formally creating the Federal Constitutional Court of Pakistan. The new court will exercise original, appellate, advisory, and review jurisdiction over constitutional matters. It will consist of judges appointed through a process like the existing Judicial Commission, though with distinct eligibility criteria.
The Chief Justice of FCC will serve a three-year term, whereas the judges will retire at sixty-eight years of age. The seat of the court will be in Islamabad, and the President empowered to determine the number of judges.
The amendment also revises Article 175A, which governs the appointment of judges. The Judicial Commission is restructured to include the Chief Justices of both the Supreme Court and the Federal Constitutional Court, additional judges, and a technocrat member.
The expanded body will recommend appointments to the President, introducing a dual judicial leadership model. It further adds a transitional clause that allows the first Chief Justice and initial judges of the new court to be appointed directly, ensuring the court’s operational functioning.
The 27th Amendment also makes consequential changes throughout the Constitution, replacing references to the Supreme Court with the Federal Constitutional Court in several articles. These textual substitutions correspond to existing constitutional provisions with the new judicial structure.
The amendment modifies Article 243 to abolish the Chairman’s office, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, effective 27 November 2025, and introduces a Commander of the National Strategic Command to oversee defence matters. It also refines the appointment process for service chiefs introducing procedural safeguards regarding transfers and retirements within the higher judiciary.
The fiscal and administrative implications of these changes are significant. Creation of an additional apex court will require new budgetary allocations, infrastructure, and staff. The Supreme Court will retain its appellate function, but its workload distribution and registry systems will need substantial reorganization.
The amendment may enhance judicial efficiency and restore balance between constitutional and appellate jurisdictions. However, opposition, on the other hand criticizes it, arguing that it will risk jurisdictional conflict and institutional fragmentation, as both courts will inevitably encounter overlapping questions of law and authority.
The amendment also revives the broader debate on judicial accountability. Inclusion of a technocrat and the enhanced role of Parliament in the Judicial Commission are viewed by some as corrective measures. However, on the contrary, it is being viewed as an encroachment on judicial independence, potentially allowing political influence over judicial nominations. The challenge, as always, lies in achieving balance between transparency and autonomy.
Parliament’s passage of the 27th Amendment reflects a familiar pattern, constitutional redesign without institutional reform. Despite twenty-seven amendments, Pakistan has failed to achieve stability, credibility, or public trust. The people no longer believe in the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, or law enforcement agencies. The reason is simple as the government has never tried to strengthen institutions, it has only amended the Constitution to manage political crises.
Judiciary’s history of validating extra-constitutional measures and the legislature’s reluctance to hold them accountable show that no lesson has been learned. Each time the Parliament chooses an easier way of amending the constitution rather than enforcing accountability. This cycle has undermined institutions and turned constitutional reform into a political custom.
From the perspective of ‘constitutional political economy’, a discipline little understood in Pakistan, the amendment represents a misalignment between constitutional design and political incentives. Institutions cannot serve the public when they are constantly reshaped to protect power rather than distribute it. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment, like those before it, promises reform but delivers control. Therefore, until Pakistan’s leadership invests in institutional integrity instead of textual innovation, no new court or amendment will restore faith in governance or justice.
Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
The writer is a lawyer and author, is an Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), member Advisory Board and Senior Visiting Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE)
The writer, an Advocate Supreme Court, Adjunct Faculty at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), member Advisory Board and Visiting Senior Fellow of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), holds LLD in tax laws
The writer is a corporate lawyer based in the US with extensive expertise in financial regulations, including Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs), corporate governance, and global economic policies. He holds an LLM from Washington University in St. Louis and has completed the Management Development Program at the Wharton School. He has developed regulatory frameworks for North American and South American Financial Institutions and has consulted and trained bureaucrats of different regions. He can be reached at [email protected]
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