‘Mineral Corridor’: The new energy vulnerability—IV

This is Part IV of the multipart ‘The Mineral Corridor’ series, examining the growing interdependence between energy security and critical minerals, and how disruptions in energy supplies can constrain mineral production.

For decades, energy security has been measured in barrels of oil, volumes of gas, the safety of shipping routes and the stability of fuel prices. Disruptions in the Middle East have shown how quickly supply shocks can raise costs across transport, industry, and households. But the energy transition is adding a further vulnerability: the minerals and industrial inputs needed to generate, transmit and store energy.

The recent disruption around the Strait of Hormuz revealed how these systems are connected. According to the IEA’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026, the Middle East supplies around one-quarter of global sulphur, while roughly half of seaborne sulphur trade passes through the Strait.

Sulphur is used to produce sulphuric acid, essential for fertilisers and for processing metals such as copper, nickel and cobalt. Disruption to these supplies raised costs for mineral producers, in some cases making acid more expensive than energy itself. This episode shows that energy security now depends not only on fuel flows, but also on reliable mineral supply chains.

Also read: ‘Mineral Corridor’: from mines to manufacturing—I

The reverse connection is equally important. Solar panels, wind turbines, electric vehicles, batteries and electricity networks depend on mineral inputs. Copper carries electricity through grids; lithium and graphite serve battery technologies; nickel and cobalt feature in some battery chemistries; and rare-earth elements are used in certain high-performance permanent magnets.

The IEA reported that global battery demand exceeded 1.5 terawatt-hours in 2025, growing by more than 35 per cent in a single year. The energy sector accounted for around three-quarters of demand growth across key energy minerals. The transition is changing not only how the world produces energy, but also the materials on which its infrastructure depends.

Yet minerals do not arrive ready for use. They must be mined, crushed, ground, concentrated and transported, and often smelted, separated or refined. These processes consume electricity and fuels, alongside water, chemicals, and other industrial inputs.

Their energy requirements vary by deposit and processing route, but the commercial implication is straightforward: a mineral resource is not an industrial asset unless it can be produced and processed at a viable cost. Expensive or unreliable power can undermine a project even where the geology looks promising.

The quality of the ore matters, too. As richer deposits are depleted or become harder to access, producers may have to process more rock to recover the same quantity of metal. The IEA’s analysis of copper production in Chile illustrates the cost of this change.

Also read: ‘Mineral corridor’: new geopolitics of critical minerals—II

Average copper ore grades fell by around 30 percent over 15 years, while fuel consumption per unit of mined copper rose by 130 percent and electricity consumption by 32 percent between 2001 and 2017. These figures reflect a particular mining context, not a universal rule, but they demonstrate why mineral supply cannot be assessed by reserves alone. Declining ore quality can increase energy use, costs, waste, and emissions.

This is where the relationship becomes more complicated than a simple contest for resources. Oil and gas are consumed continuously, so a sudden shortage can quickly affect transport, power generation and household budgets. Many minerals, by contrast, become embedded in equipment that remains in service for years.

A mineral shortage may show up as a factory slowdown, a delayed electricity project, higher equipment prices or difficulty replacing components. Its effects depend on inventories, alternative materials and where the bottleneck occurs. The disruption may be less visible at first than an oil-price spike, but it can still constrain the expansion and maintenance of energy systems.

Processing adds another layer of vulnerability. The IEA’s 2026 outlook found that, excluding rare earths, the leading refining country accounted for an average 72 percent of refined supply across the minerals assessed in 2025. The point is not to repeat the familiar debate about geopolitical competition.

It is to recognise that opening new mines does not necessarily secure the materials needed by manufacturers. If refining, specialised chemicals or processing equipment remain difficult to obtain, additional ore may do little to ease the bottleneck. Mineral security depends on the chain that turns deposits into usable products.

Also read: ‘Mineral Corridor’: Positioning Pakistan in the era of resource diplomacy—III

The energy transition also faces a production dilemma. The world needs more materials for grids, storage and electrification, yet producing those materials can itself be energy-intensive and carbon-emitting. Cleaner electricity, efficient processing and improved metal recovery can reduce this burden, though no single solution fits every mine or mineral.

Governments and companies need to consider energy requirements at the project-design stage, rather than treating power supply as an issue to resolve after production plans have been made. Energy planning and mineral planning belong in the same conversation.

Nor can recycling remove the problem overnight. Metals can remain in vehicles, batteries, and infrastructure for years before they become available for recovery. Recycling will reduce pressure on primary supply as more equipment reaches the end of its useful life, while substitution and better material efficiency can reduce dependence on particular minerals. But these measures must complement new production, not be treated as an immediate replacement for it. The practical task is to identify where shortages would have the greatest consequences and combine efficient production, alternative supplies and sensible contingency measures accordingly.

The lesson for governments is not to pursue self-sufficiency in every mineral. That would be expensive and often unrealistic. It is to understand the connections that make both energy and mineral systems vulnerable.

Resource-producing countries need dependable power and viable processing to bring deposits into production. Energy-consuming economies need reliable access to materials and the industrial inputs behind them. Trade remains essential, but resilient trade depends on functioning production systems, not simply on contracts for raw materials.

Oil shocks will continue to shape global energy security. The transition will not make fuel supplies, shipping routes or reliable electricity any less important; it adds another dimension to the challenge. A disruption may begin in an oil or gas market, a chemical feedstock, a mine, or a refinery, yet its effects can travel across all of them.

The countries best prepared for the transition will be those that understand this interdependence and plan accordingly. Energy security now requires attention not only to the fuels that power economies, but also to the minerals — and the energy needed to produce them —that will build the systems of tomorrow.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026