From seeds to financial systems: who is shaping Pakistan's economic future?

Pakistan has never been short of international partners willing to offer assistance, expertise and technology. What remains less certain is whether successive governments have developed the institutional capacity to negotiate such partnerships on terms that adequately protect the country’s long-term economic interests.

The question has acquired fresh relevance following Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s meeting with Bill Gates in New York on September 23, during which both sides discussed expanding cooperation in agriculture, improved seeds, livestock genetics, digital innovation and other development priorities. The meeting reflected an interest in broadening an established development relationship. It also raised a larger policy question: how carefully does Pakistan assess its own capabilities before looking abroad for solutions?

International cooperation is neither unusual nor undesirable. Pakistan needs investment, technological advancement and access to global expertise. Its agricultural productivity remains below potential, while substantial sections of the economy continue to operate outside formal financial channels. Yet the terms on which such cooperation is pursued matter just as much as the opportunities themselves. Agriculture offers an instructive example.

Pakistan is not a country without agricultural scientists, research institutions or experience in developing improved crop varieties. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, through its agricultural and biotechnology institutes, reports having developed 150 crop varieties, including 39 cotton, 28 wheat and 23 rice varieties.

Institutions such as the Nuclear Institute for Agriculture and Biology, the Nuclear Institute for Food and Agriculture, and the National Institute for Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering have spent decades working on crop improvement, biotechnology, disease resistance and agricultural productivity.

These are not insignificant achievements for a country that frequently presents itself as dependent on external technological assistance.

Yet the existence of scientific capability has not translated consistently into agricultural competitiveness. Farmers continue to face difficulties obtaining quality seed, extension services remain inadequate, and the commercialisation of locally developed research has often been disappointing. Weak coordination between research institutions, seed producers and agricultural markets has further restricted progress.

This is where government policy deserves examination.

Before seeking additional foreign assistance in seed development, should Pakistan not first establish why its existing institutions have struggled to translate research into widespread commercial success? Are these institutions adequately financed? Do they have access to modern laboratories, seed multiplication facilities and commercial partnerships? Have their achievements been independently evaluated against farmers’ actual requirements?

The answers may reveal that Pakistan needs better implementation and institutional coordination as much as it needs additional technology.

Improved seeds are essential for raising agricultural productivity, particularly as climate change places increasing pressure on water availability, crop yields and farming incomes. International collaboration can provide valuable research, technology and investment. But seed development also involves intellectual property, licensing arrangements, access to breeding material and the long-term affordability of agricultural inputs.

Any future arrangement must therefore protect the ability of Pakistani researchers to continue developing locally adapted varieties and ensure that farmers are not unnecessarily exposed to restrictive licensing conditions or recurring costs.

The objective should be technology transfer, joint research, domestic seed multiplication and commercial capacity-building, rather than dependence on external suppliers.

The financial sector presents an equally important, although less visible, dimension of this debate.

Pakistan’s transition towards digital payments has already benefited from international technical and financial assistance. The Raast instant-payment system represents an important development in modernising financial transactions, improving efficiency and extending access to banking services.

Through Karandaaz Pakistan, the Gates Foundation has supported financial inclusion and digital public infrastructure. The relationship has developed beyond payment adoption into areas involving government financial administration, social protection and the wider digital economy.

In March 2024, the Federal Board of Revenue signed an agreement with Karandaaz to develop a strategy for digitising tax administration. In December 2024, the Benazir Income Support Program signed an agreement with Karandaaz to facilitate assistance payments through Raast in selected districts and support financial literacy.

The Foundation’s published grant records also demonstrate the scale of its continuing involvement. A December 2025 commitment of approximately USD 13.7 million to Karandaaz was directed towards strengthening Raast governance, wider adoption and payment connectivity with six Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Another USD 3 million commitment in May 2026 supported improvements in digital government systems and public financial administration.

These are substantial development initiatives, with potentially important economic benefits. Faster payments, more transparent welfare disbursements, efficient revenue collection and cheaper cross-border transactions can contribute meaningfully to Pakistan’s economic modernisation.

But as financial systems become increasingly digital, another question emerges: who ultimately determines the technological architecture on which the country’s financial activities depend?

Financial sovereignty today extends beyond the ownership of banks and the regulation of currency. It increasingly involves payment networks, digital identities, information-sharing arrangements, software systems and the infrastructure connecting citizens, businesses and government institutions.

A country can retain formal ownership of its financial infrastructure while becoming operationally dependent on external technology providers, specialised contractors or proprietary systems. That possibility does not establish that any existing arrangement has compromised Pakistan’s sovereignty. It does, however, underline why institutional safeguards must be established before such dependencies can arise.

Who owns the software developed under externally supported programs? Where is sensitive financial information stored? Who controls access to it? Can Pakistani institutions independently maintain, audit and upgrade the systems once international funding or technical assistance concludes?

Equally important is whether the State Bank of Pakistan and other relevant authorities retain full control over regulatory standards, payment infrastructure and decisions affecting the domestic financial system.

These questions should not be interpreted as resistance to digitalisation. On the contrary, a modern financial system requires stronger governance precisely because its underlying technology is becoming more complex.

Pakistan should welcome expertise while ensuring that data protection, cybersecurity, procurement transparency and operational independence remain central to every agreement.

The broader concern is the manner in which the government approaches strategic partnerships.

Pakistan possesses public universities, agricultural research centres, financial regulators, software companies and experienced professionals capable of contributing to national development. Their limitations are real, but they should not automatically become grounds for seeking external substitutes.

A more disciplined policy would begin with an independent assessment of domestic capabilities. Where local expertise exists, it should be strengthened and integrated into international projects. Where technological gaps remain, external cooperation should be negotiated against clearly defined objectives, including knowledge transfer, professional training, local participation and long-term sustainability.

The government must also distinguish between grants, commercial investments, technical assistance and agreements that create continuing financial obligations. Each carries different implications for public accountability and institutional independence.

Parliamentary oversight, transparent procurement and independent evaluation should not be treated as obstacles to development. They are essential safeguards when projects involve strategic infrastructure or significant public responsibilities.

Above all, success should be measured by outcomes rather than announcements. How many farmers obtain better-performing seeds at affordable prices? How much agricultural productivity improves? How much do digital transactions reduce costs? How many previously excluded citizens gain meaningful access to financial services? And how much additional capability remains within Pakistani institutions when international assistance ends?

These are more useful measures of progress than the number of agreements signed or the prominence of international partners attending official meetings.

Pakistan’s persistent economic difficulties cannot be attributed simply to a shortage of foreign investment or modern technology. They also reflect weaknesses in policy continuity, institutional coordination, implementation and accountability.

International partnerships can help overcome these weaknesses, but they cannot substitute for the government’s responsibility to address them.

The country does not need to choose between international cooperation and national self-reliance. It needs a framework in which the former strengthens the latter.

Whether the subject is agricultural seeds or financial systems, the principle should remain the same: Pakistan must enter partnerships knowing what it needs, what it already possesses, what it is prepared to negotiate and what must remain under national control.

The real test of economic leadership is not how many international partners a government attracts, but whether those partnerships leave the country more capable, more competitive and less dependent than before.