Asia-Middle East: the new power equation

As New Delhi hosts the BRICS summit this week, the gathering itself offers a striking snapshot of the world that is emerging: China, India, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE sitting around the same table. The old geopolitical order is giving way to a fluid contest for influence across Asia and the Middle East—and smaller states must learn to navigate it without becoming captive to any one power.

The 18th BRICS Summit, scheduled for September 12–13, comes at a consequential moment. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first visit to India since 2019 will place relations between Asia’s two largest powers at the centre of the summit.

China and India remain strategic competitors, but both recognise that sustained confrontation carries significant economic costs. Their relationship is increasingly characterised by managed competition and competitive coexistence.

BRICS is also evolving. Its 11 members span Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, representing almost half of the world’s population and approximately 40 per cent of global GDP. India is seeking to focus the grouping on trade, investment, technology, food and energy security, resilient supply chains and reform of global governance.

The grouping now brings together major Asian powers, Gulf economies and countries spanning Africa and Eurasia, while discussions increasingly extend beyond politics into trade, finance, technology, supply chains and connectivity. This is not only the emergence of a “New Asian Order”; it is, in fact, the formation of an interconnected Asia-Middle East power equation, driven as much by capital, markets and technology as by military power.

China’s economic reach has transformed its relationship with Asia and the Middle East. India’s economic and strategic ambitions are expanding beyond South Asia. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are deploying their financial strength globally, becoming investors, infrastructure partners and strategic players rather than merely energy suppliers.

For smaller and medium-sized countries, this changing landscape presents both opportunity and risk. They cannot compete with major powers, but neither should they become dependent on any single one. Their strategy must be diversification with strategic flexibility.

Economic relationships must therefore become instruments of national strength. Trade, investment, energy, technology and connectivity can give smaller states greater room for manoeuvre—but only if their domestic economies are competitive and their institutions credible

Pakistan has a particularly valuable geographical position at the intersection of South Asia, China, Central Asia and the Middle East. Its relationship with China remains important, while deeper engagement with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states creates additional economic and strategic possibilities.

But geography by itself does not create influence.

While Pakistan has secured for itself an influence in Middle East through recently concluded Makkah accord, which brings together Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey and more are likely to join in, India is looking at bigger picture through economic influence in the evolving Asian and Middle East order. Often economic supremacy overrides diplomatic and military supremacy.

There are significant synergies to escalate the Makkah alliance towards economic relationships strengthening trade, investment, energy, technology and connectivity.

Other countries can pursue similar strategies. Bangladesh can leverage its manufacturing strength and location between South and Southeast Asia. Sri Lanka can exploit its position astride major Indian Ocean shipping routes while maintaining strategic balance. Nepal can benefit from its position between two Asian giants. Central Asian states can diversify traditional trade routes by expanding links with China, South Asia, Türkiye and the Gulf.

The Middle East is becoming increasingly central to this equation. Gulf sovereign wealth is moving beyond hydrocarbons into infrastructure, logistics, technology, renewable energy, food security and industrial investment. Its economic relationship with Asia is consequently becoming structural rather than transactional.

The new geopolitical competition will therefore be fought not only through alliances and military capability, but through capital, markets, supply chains, technology and connectivity. The coming Asian century may not be dominated by one power. It could instead be defined by competing centres of influence linked through trade, capital and technology.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026