EDITORIAL: On the 7 August with the eyes of the world focused on Makkah the heads of government of the three largest Sunni countries; notably, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey formally signed a defence pact with a clause similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Article 5 clause that stipulates that an attack against one member may be treated as an attack against all other members obligating each to assist the attacked member with whatever action any member country may deem necessary.
The NATO clause leaves the final decision on how to act or merely to condemn to each member country; however, as the Makkah Accord has not yet been shared with the media, it is not quite clear as to what is the exact obligation of each member country in case one member is attacked.
Speculation has reached a fever pitch with some arguing that the Accord is directed at Iran subsequent to its retaliatory strikes against US and Israel that severely damaged US bases in the Gulf countries as well as their civilian infrastructure while others point their finger at Israel, based on America’s unquestioning support for even patently illegal Israeli actions in the region, including against US allies (an example being the 9 September 2025 attack on Doha). This prompted Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar to clarify that it is a defensive pact and not targeted against any country.
Two observations are critical. First, the Makkah Accord is reminiscent of the 1980s US thinking that was supportive of NATO-style multilateral collective defence pacts in Asia, including the Middle East (as successors to SEATO and CENTO that collapsed in the 1970s) but was abandoned in favour of direct US military ties, arms sales, and access agreement that post-28 February compromised due to Iranian strikes.
And, secondly, Turkiye’s President Erdogan has offered membership to other countries in the region with the objective of strengthening ties between Muslim nations and, as per some analysts, to provide a religious context to irritants posed by non-Muslim nations against their Muslim minorities. It is relevant to note that on 5 August 2026, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), on occasions hesitant to take bold decisions against India, issued a statement marking the seventh anniversary of Azad Jammu and Kashmir’s special status and called for India’s reversal of its unilateral measures, urging respect for Kashmiri self-determination.
The three countries bring much to the table. Pakistan, of course, brings a battle-hardened military as well as its nuclear arsenal - the only Muslim nuclear country to-date courtesy the launch of the programme by Z A Bhutto followed by Nawaz Sharif’s decision to proceed with the Chaghi tests in spite of considerable US pressure at the time.
Turkiye, a NATO member, possesses a formidable defence industrial base; chiefly, Baykar’s drone ecosystem and the KAAN fighter programme. And, Saudi Arabia has the capital depth to fund large-scale defence localization, and has already engaged in joint military protocols with Pakistan. Thus, it stands to reason that the three countries can benefit considerably from this accord and one would hope that Pakistan’s defence industry is subsequently upgraded that would make the country less reliant on expensive foreign defence imports.
However, as matters stand today, out of the three member countries Pakistan’s economy remains fragile, which is a source of serious concern. Last month, Mohammad Aurangzeb, the Federal Finance Minister, formally requested the US for a 10 billion-dollar bilateral exchange stabilisation support facility, which provides dollars, swaps or guarantees to support reserves or steady currencies, for five years aimed to boost reserves, stabilise the rupee and reduce reliance on the IMF.
While this may be construed as borrowing from Paul to pay off Peter, thereby seriously compromising the spirit of the pledge by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif that the ongoing IMF loan would be the last in the country’s history, yet the economy remains burdened with not only negative geopolitical factors associated with the Middle East conflict but is also hostage to heavy reliance on borrowing to fund a current expenditure that has little positive impact on the growth rate or unemployment levels.
There is, therefore, an urgent need to slash current expenditure by at least 2 to 3 trillion rupees, that would allow for a less contractionary fiscal policy, thereby jumpstarting industrial growth and, any investment that maybe forthcoming as a consequence of the Makkah Accord, to channel it into high value-adding industries with an export potential rather than continuing to rely on exporting what is surplus to our domestic needs.
Copyright Business Recorder, 2026