EDITORIAL: The federal government, reportedly, has asked the provinces to submit their wheat requirements in writing and the provinces have demanded 2.2 million metric tons. As price soars to Rs 150 per kg, there is no option but to resort to import of wheat. As an agrarian economy, Pakistan should not be discussing wheat shortages, possible imports and soaring flour price barely four months after harvesting one of its largest crops.
Yet, that is precisely where government policy has brought the country. Even after producing almost 30 million tonnes of wheat this season, Punjab and Sindh are now scrambling for emergency supplies, prices are climbing steadily, and policymakers are once again planning imports. It is difficult to imagine a more damning indictment of official policy.
The crisis did not emerge because Pakistan suddenly ran out of wheat. Official estimates indicate that available stocks are, at least on paper, broadly sufficient to meet national requirements. The problem lies elsewhere. Poor procurement decisions, weak stock management, policy uncertainty and the apparent inability of governments to anticipate entirely predictable market behaviour have once again combined to produce an avoidable crisis. Wheat has become yet another example of administrative failure masquerading as market dynamics.
The sequence of events is particularly troubling. Farmers sold much of their crop immediately after harvest because they lacked storage facilities, needed liquidity to repay loans and had little confidence that holding onto their produce would prove worthwhile.
Governments, meanwhile, chose not to undertake procurement on the scale previously considered necessary to stabilise the market. Predictably, private stockholding increased, supplies tightened and prices began moving upwards. Consumers now face rising flour prices while growers, having sold at depressed harvest prices, receive none of the benefit. It is difficult to design a system that serves both producers and consumers more poorly.
The figures illustrate the scale of the failure. Punjab reportedly procured only around 480,000 tonnes of wheat against an intended target of roughly three million tonnes, while officials also acknowledge that millions of tonnes of this commodity believed to be in private hands remain unaccounted for. Both Punjab and Sindh are now seeking wheat from federal stocks, even as discussions have begun over the possibility of importing additional supplies later this year. This is unfolding despite official claims of a record harvest.
That contradiction demands an explanation as governments cannot simultaneously celebrate bumper production and plead shortages within a few months without inviting serious questions about policy competence. If production genuinely exceeded last year’s level, why were procurement, storage and market management unable to prevent today’s shortages? If adequate stocks existed, why has the market become so vulnerable to hoarding and speculation? These are not unforeseeable developments. They are precisely the scenarios food security policy is supposed to anticipate.
Unfortunately, the current episode fits an increasingly familiar pattern. Time after time, governments respond to predictable economic challenges only after they have evolved into crises. Markets are allowed to drift, policy signals remain inconsistent and enforcement arrives long after distortions have taken hold. Officials then resort to emergency meetings, ad hoc interventions and import discussions that could often have been avoided through timely planning. Over time, crisis management has gradually replaced competent administration.
Let’s not forget that wheat flour remains the single most important food item for millions of households. Even modest increases in wheat prices quickly translate into higher living costs, particularly for lower-income families already struggling with persistent inflation. Farmers fare little better. They absorb losses at harvest while intermediaries benefit from subsequent price increases created largely by policy failures rather than genuine shortages.
This recurring cycle has become both economically damaging and institutionally corrosive. Pakistan possesses experienced farmers, adequate productive capacity and the administrative machinery required to manage strategic food supplies. What repeatedly undermines those strengths is weak governance. Procurement decisions lack consistency, stock management lacks transparency and implementation lacks urgency. It’s no surprise, then, that hoarding flourishes where policy leaves room for manipulation.
Another wheat crisis should never have been allowed to develop so soon after harvest. The fact that it has is not a failure of agriculture. It is a failure of governance. Until governments begin treating food security as a matter requiring competent planning rather than periodic firefighting, Pakistan will continue producing enough wheat on paper while repeatedly finding itself short where it matters most: in the marketplace.
Copyright Business Recorder, 2026