EDITORIAL: Saudi Aramco’s warning that global markets have already lost nearly one billion barrels of oil supply over the past two months should have settled any lingering illusion that the widening Middle East war can remain economically contained.

The more troubling signal, however, came in the same breath: even if disrupted flows resume, energy markets will still take considerable time to stabilise. In other words, the damage has already moved beyond temporary disruption and into structural stress.

That reality carries particular weight after reports that hopes for a negotiated end to the war have weakened following Washington’s rejection of Tehran’s latest peace proposal. With diplomacy once again stalling and military escalation continuing, the prospect of higher oil prices no longer looks like a speculative risk. It is fast becoming the market’s base assumption.

The question Iran posed at the beginning of the conflict now hangs heavily over the global economy: are countries prepared for oil at USD 200 a barrel? At the time, the warning was dismissed in many western circles as rhetorical brinkmanship. Yet the Strait of Hormuz remains disrupted, shipping costs continue rising and one of the world’s most critical energy corridors is operating under persistent geopolitical threat.

The implications for Pakistan are severe. The economy has only recently begun emerging from an inflationary shock that devastated purchasing power and forced interest rates to punishing levels. The State Bank has already resumed tightening amid renewed inflation concerns linked to energy costs. Another sustained oil surge would feed directly into transport, electricity, food prices and industrial production costs, reopening pressures that the economy is still struggling to escape.

Nor is Pakistan alone. Energy-importing economies across Asia, Africa, and Europe are once again confronting the prospect of imported inflation driven by a conflict they neither initiated nor controlled. The irony is difficult to ignore. Much of the world now faces economic pain because of a war whose strategic objectives remain increasingly unclear even to many of its traditional supporters.

The longer the conflict drags on, the more difficult it becomes to separate military logic from political calculation. Israel continues pressing for deeper American involvement while expanding the regional theatre of confrontation. This has inevitably strengthened the widespread perception that Benjamin Netanyahu’s political survival is now closely tied to the continuation of conflict. His long-running corruption trial and domestic political troubles have hardly disappeared; they have merely been overshadowed by war.

That perception matters because wars driven by open-ended political incentives rarely remain limited. They expand gradually, absorb allies more deeply and create economic consequences far beyond the battlefield itself. The latest disruption in global energy markets is already demonstrating how quickly regional conflict translates into global instability.

For the United States, the contradiction is becoming increasingly stark. Donald Trump campaigned heavily on ending endless wars and reducing America’s foreign entanglements. Yet Washington now finds itself moving further into another Middle Eastern conflict with growing economic consequences for allies and adversaries alike. Rejecting diplomatic openings while regional tensions continue escalates risks, locking all sides into a cycle that becomes progressively harder to contain.

Saudi Aramco’s remarks also expose a longer-term vulnerability. Years of underinvestment and low inventories mean the global oil market no longer possesses the same buffer capacity it once did. Supply disruptions therefore produce sharper and more prolonged reactions. Markets may calm temporarily when headlines improve, but underlying fragility remains.

This is the new calculus confronting policymakers across the world. Every additional escalation pushes energy markets further into uncertainty, raises inflationary risks and weakens already weak economic recoveries. Countries like Pakistan, heavily dependent on imported fuel and already operating under fiscal strain, have very little room to absorb another prolonged oil shock.

The tragedy is that this outcome was avoidable. Diplomatic channels existed before the war expanded. They still exist now, though under far greater strain. Continuing on this path risks turning an already dangerous regional conflict into a sustained global economic crisis.

The world has already paid a heavy price for this war. The deeper question now is how much more damage governments are prepared to absorb before recognising that military escalation is producing diminishing strategic returns and mounting economic costs for nearly everyone else.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026