November 2011 witnessed a record number of bank robberies in 'peacetime' because what happened in the last week of December 2007 doesn't fall within the definition of the current Pakistani version of peacetime. But this was inevitable given the way security arrangements were diluted steadily over the years.
If the past administrations, civilian as well as military, did a fair job of maintaining a balance between the rise in population and the strength and capabilities of the law enforcers, the blame would lie squarely with the law enforcers. But facts speak loudly against this perception. The state ignored fulfilling this key obligation.
Effective law enforcement capability implies fulfilling a basic condition: a realistic relationship must be maintained between the number of citizens and the size of the police force (ie its numbers out on the streets and in police stations) to ensure observance of the law, and catching and charge law-breakers.
That this fundamental principle was ignored by every regime, civilian or military, throughout the past 64 years, is manifested by near stagnation in the strength of the police force although Karachi's population increased from 0.5 million in 1947 to over 20 million by 2011.
According to the statistics I obtained from Sindh Police back in December 2009 (for writing a series of articles in these columns) the sanctioned frontline police force (inspector to foot constable ranks) was 33,972 whereas the actual force was 32,735. The sanctioned strength as on May 1, 2011 stands at 35,102.
For Karachi with a population of over 20 million, police strength was never sufficient even if you assumed that the entire 'sanctioned' frontline strength was on duty. Currently, the ratio of policemen versus civilians works out to 570 citizens per frontline policeman, which is horrible.
Compared to Karachi's citizen-policeman ratio, in November 2009, the ratio in London city was 155 citizens per policeman despite the fact that literacy ratio and peoples' commitment to respect for law in London remains exemplary in the world despite recent incidents of street violence.
The number of the law enforcers compared to Karachi's population conveys the impression that it has a law conversant and law abiding population; that isn't true although compared to all other cities in Pakistan, Karachi has the highest proportion of literate citizens.
Neglect of the crucial security aspect led to creation of 'private' security agencies - a reflection of this neglect. But even in this context, the state failed in ensuring that these private agencies were created by those who knew the job, trained the guards properly and equipped the agency networks with modern gadgetry.
Of all the institutions, banks shouldn't have opted relying on private security agencies because, until the 1990s, banks' own security staff had proved that they were, without any doubt, the most reliable guarantee of security, given the fact that their future was linked to the banks they worked in.
However, the madness injected into the system by the pursuit of profit blinded bank management's into contracting out as many services as possible, but outsourcing security was a blunder, as being proved by the recent tragedies. What made it worse were the standards used for hiring security agencies.
In recent instances of bank dacoity, what surfaced was a worrying reality - guards supplied by private security agencies hardly knew what they were supposed to deliver in terms of bank security; many of them didn't even know how to use the arms they were carrying, and some were openly in league with the robbers.
Outsourcing security to outfits that were supplying such guards was obviously not an accident; surely, heads of the security departments in banks knew what arrangements they were making because believing that they didn't have the capacity to assess the capabilities of security agency is twice as worrying.
This state of bank security reflects very oddly on bank management's particularly because, while the whole world acknowledges that Pakistan confronts the worst internal security scenario, they seem to see things differently. This shouldn't be the attitude of the trustees of people's savings.
As a matter of fact, this threat, that mounts everyday given the huge gap created by the state over the years between security needs and arrangements to assure it, banks should have become twice as concerned about security. Ironically, according to the police department, terrorist organisations are now robbing banks.
While this state of affairs reflects a casual attitude of the banking sector, it reflects the same on the part of the insurance companies. The assumption that merely increasing insurance premium can undo the risks involved (especially the sort pervasive in Pakistan) is, at best, a bad joke.
Isn't it odd that, at least publicly, neither the banking sector nor the insurance sector pressed successive governments to expand the internal security arrangements and upgrade them in line with the changed requirements; what they opted for were visibly inadequate and flawed compensatory arrangements.
But above all, this state of bank security reflects on the importance the financial sector regulators assign to security. Merely issuing circulars about improving security without tough audit of the security arrangements amounts to passing the buck, not complying solemnly with institutional obligations.
We all keep repeating that Pakistan's biggest problem is weak governance of the state; it implies the quality of governance in state offices, which includes regulators because in free markets it is these institutions that keep in check the recklessness compromises in risk-taking for the sake of profit.
It is worth asking whether in the past two decades, when private security agencies were handed over banks' security, the SBP or the SECP auditors discovered weaknesses in security arrangements in banks, punished some banks for these weaknesses, and forced them to implement the required changes.
The current state of bank security may erode saver confidence. In an environment of slow growth in savings, fears among savers about the security of their savings could create serious worries for banks; this should worry the regulators because banks, especially the smaller ones, can't afford that loss of confidence.
Why law enforcement - key factor influencing lawful behaviour on the part of citizens - grows weaker by the day? Can we pass the responsibility therefore on to the law enforcers despite laws that allow citizens to possess and carry arms? Isn't the blatant violation of these laws fuelling crime?
Finally, believing that grossly underpaid private security agency guards or policemen won't commit crimes is self-delusion; like the rest of us, they too are not angles, but won't sell their conscience as easily as they do now if they get enough from their employers (security agencies and the state) to support a reasonable lifestyle.