"[B]ashar should learn from the examples provided by Jordan, Turkey, and even Morocco, in which Islamist parties were integrated into the system through elections, turning out to be much more pragmatic than many had anticipated. He should also avoid the Algerian example...This will not be easy, for he was primarily brought in as his father's successor first and foremost to maintain Alawite supremacy in the governing structures of the state, particularly in the military-security apparatus. In other words, true democratic reform would inevitably lead to the dissipation of Alawite control and status. But this is where Bashar and many of the leading Alawite figures must look around them and understand and digest evolving historical trends...."
The above excerpt is from The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria by David W Lesch. This account of contemporary Syria and its leader came in 2005. In this book, the author argued, inter alia, that "minority-rule is becoming anachronistic, and it more often than not comes to a violent end". In this respect, he gave examples of Lebanon where it took a 15-year civil war to bring the political stranglehold of Maronite Christians to an end. "[I]n Iraq, it took a US-led invasion to forcibly remove the minority Sunni regime of Saddam Hussein. Alawite hegemony in Syria will end. But will it end relatively peacefully or with a sudden bang? Bashar needs to see this and emerge above and beyond the constraints of Alawite manipulation...."
Little did perhaps Lesch know that he would be finding an answer to his question hardly six years later as no one had anticipated that the entire region would be in the throes of popular revolts by 2011: Alawite political stranglehold is not going to end peacefully as more than 3500 have died in months of anti-government protests in Syria.
Unlike what happened in the cases of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, both sides-Asad regime and the protesters-have demonstrated remarkable resilience since pro-democracy protests broke out in Syria eight months ago. An impressive display of dour determination and dogged resistance by Syrian opposition must have come as a rude shock to all those who still have memories of Hama where Hafez al-Asad regime brutally crushed in 1982 a serious rebellion led by the Muslim Brotherhood, killing thousands of people, mainly the activists and sympathisers of the MB.
The fact that Bashar is still in power despite profound enormity of domestic and foreign policy challenges facing his regime can be attributed to a variety of reasons in the complex case of Syria-perhaps the most complex of the entire Arab region where popular revolts have already claimed the regimes of three dictators-Zine al-Abedin ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak and Moammar Qadhafi. While the rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen is on the brink as the revolution in this Arab country continues to play out, though in slow motion, the other Arab regimes, particularly Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and the UAE seem to have insulated themselves against the spread of this contagion with varying degrees of success. But the Sabahs of Kuwait faced the storming of parliament by anti-government protesters demanding the removal of prime minister on Wednesday. Syria's neighbour Jordan where its Hashemite king has become the first Arab ruler to publicly ask Bashar to step down is also increasingly wary of historic developments taking place across North Africa and the Middle East.
The first and perhaps the most important reason behind Bashar's continuing hold on power is his respect that he enjoys in the Syrian society. Unlike the ousted dictators of Tunisia, Egypt and more recently Libya, he is considered a genuinely popular Arab leader among masses and fresh sets of international sanctions have only emboldened his supporters to lend more support to his fledgling government.
That Bashar is very popular in Syria despite growing challenges to his rule is a fact famously acknowledged by no other than the prime minister of Turkey, Tayyip Erdogan. It was the fidelity and dynamism of the Turkey's ruling party that made Erdogan tell the world the whole truth about Bashar while he was also expressing Ankara's strong sense of frustration over Damascus' inability to implement political reforms without any further loss of time.
Secondly, unlike Libya, Syria is said to be a part of a wider and effective regional alliance that comprises Iran, parts of the Iraqi regime, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In the case of Iraq-one of the three countries that did not support the Arab League vote on Syria suspending its membership (Yemen and Lebanon voted against the resolution while Iraq abstained)-in particular, not only do pro-Iran and pro-Bashar Iraqi Shias, a great number of Iraqi Sunnis also hold him in high esteem. A large number of Baathist Sunni bureaucrats and others from the same sect, including even those who had been politically marginalized by Saddam, crossed into Syria and Jordan after they fled Iraq to escape occupier US forces' action, massive Shia reprisals unleashed by the Mahdi's Army and the havoc wreaked by the Sunni insurgents led by al Qaeda's Abu Musab Zarqawi.
Correctly anticipating that the toppling of Bashar would amount to weakening Iran, the ayatollahs in Tehran are said to have evolved a strategy to safeguard the Islamic state's geo-political interests in the region. An ex-CIA official, for example, has alleged that the Iranian spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has purportedly written a letter to an embattled Bashar, assuring him that any foreign military intervention in Syria would invite a befitting response from Iran. In that case, according to that "letter", Turkey, a Nato member, is going to be Iran's first target.
Following the release of the International Atomic Energy Agency's report, Israel is said to be contemplating an attack on Iran's nuclear installations. Likelihood of such an eventuality has gained credence following a kind of consensus that emerged in the Israeli establishment where Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak are the most strongest voices in favour of a strike on the Islamic state. Moreover, although Nato has excluded any military intervention in Syria, rules can change if events change on the ground.
It was last month that China and Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning Syria over its crackdown on anti-government protesters, although the European-drafted resolution had been watered down with a view to avoiding the vetoes, dropping a direct reference to sanctions against Damascus, according to news reports.
But the Arab League vote against Syria, one of its founding members, has been received by the Syrian opposition as a game-changer. The opposition believes that now both Russia and China would be repeating their roles that they played in the Libya crisis-they abstained from a Security Council vote on Libya as these two SC members were opposed to Nato intervention, but they later recognised, albeit reluctantly, Transitional National Council (NTC).
A highly significant development took place earlier this week. Ahead of his talks with the opposition (Syrian National Council) delegation, which arrived in Moscow on Tuesday at Russian authorities' invitation, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reportedly said Moscow wanted Syria to escape the fate of Libya.
Although, Syria's opposition has begun to move towards attaining a measure of legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of international community, including Russia, and its insistence that it is the representative of 80 percent opposition forces-classical, political and revolutionary-- and that the legitimacy of its representativeness has manifested in a variety of ways during the eight-month-long protests, it has not really developed into a very cohesive opposition that has coalesced around the very specific needs and demands of Syrian people. These perspectives on the Syrian opposition emerged at a recent talk entitled "Getting Syrious" on RT TV network.
Rick Francona and Samer Araabi, experts on the Middle East, who have also expressed a sense of bewilderment over the resilience of both Asad regime and the opposition, argue that unlike Libya's Transitional National Council which quickly got united, the Syrian opposition hasn't reached that stage as yet. Moreover, the Libyan opposition was essentially based in eastern town of Libya, Benghazi, the unrest in Syria is diverse taking place all across the country. Libya's NTC also comprised the Libyans in exile but it was essentially a local outfit. The SNC, however, is criticised for its composition, which is said to be mainly expat-based.
Professor Francona points out that a large number of casualties in the Syrian military indicate that both sides are using lethal weapons and that violence in Syria will ultimately evolve into a civil war if it does not stop now, although SNC's Yaser Tabbara contends that army personnel who have defected the Bashar army are known as the Free Syria Army and that they are providing "defence to defenceless civilians" by acting under their mandate, ie, to provide security to unarmed civilians.
to be continued
(The writer is News Editor of this newspaper)