It is rather interesting that the day the Quaid-i-Azam enunciated in his famous Constituent Assembly address the fundamental doctrine of equal citizenship for one and all without any discrimination whatsoever, the same afternoon, Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister-designate, reaffirmed in unambiguous terms that political equality of all citizens was a cardinal principle with Pakistan - a principle which could by no means be compromised on any account. This he did while moving a resolution for approval by the House of the design of Pakistan's national flag.
His address on the occasion not only ranks among his masterpieces in terms of vision, clarity of thought and eloquence; it also sets out the seminal principles which the new state was to be based on and built upon. Since for some reason or another, it has not received the measure of fulsome attention it eminently deserves, and since it quintessentially represents the thoughts and vision of the second-in-command at the time of Pakistan's birth, it would be extremely rewarding to hark back to it.
Among other things, Liaquat had said: "Now, the flag ... is not the flag of any one political party or any one community. The flag is the Flag of the Pakistan Nation, of the Pakistan State ... the Flag of every nation [he reminded] is not merely a piece of cloth... this Flag which I had the honour to present to this House, will stand for freedom, liberty and equality... This Flag will protect the legitimate rights of every citizen. This Flag will protect and defend the integrity of the State. This Flag ... will gain the respect of all the nations of the world, because... once we get an opportunity of working out the destiny of seventy million of people, we will be able to show to the world at large that although we are a new State, yet we are a state worthy of the seventy million of Pakistan; this Flag will be an emblem of peace to help in maintaining peace throughout the world.
"Now, ... as I visualise the State of Pakistan, it will be a state where there will be no special privileges, no special rights for any one particular interest. It will be a State where every citizen will have equal rights and equal opportunities. It will be a State where people will have equal privileges and those who demand equal privileges will have to share equally all the obligations of law as the citizens of the State. Therefore, . . . as I said, it is not really the piece of cloth of the Flag that matters. It is not its colouring that matters. But it is what the Flag stands for, and I can assure the Honourable House that as constituted, as I visualise the future constitution of Pakistan State and for the integrity and independence of the Pakistan Federation."
And by these principles, Liaquat had stood to the end of his all-too-brief tenure. For instance, during the debate on the Objectives Resolution (1949), when Sris Chandra Chattopadia, the leader of the Congress Party in the (first) Constituent Assembly, remarked that Pakistani nationals are only Hindus or Muslims, Liaquat shot back, saying, "I say we are both. I do not see any contradiction in this statement. You can be the nationals of a State, with equal rights, equal privileges and equal responsibilities and yet remain Muslims and Hindus."
In Pakistan's chequered constitutional history that Resolution holds a landmark status, its prime significance being that it served as a bulwark against the proliferation of sectarianism and the rise of theocracy in Pakistan's troubled formative years while simultaneously attempting a progressive interpretation of Islam. An interpretation which was acceptable even to the foremost spokesman of the Left in Pakistan's formative years - Mian Iftikharuddin. Those who cavil at the sovereignty clause in the Objectives Resolution would do well to have a look at the actual wording and the context. It says, "Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the state of Pakistan through the people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust..."
Whether or not the members of the Constituent Assembly were clear on some issues, they were quite explicit in resolving that if Pakistan were to become an "Islamic democracy", it should be by the choice of its citizens. This explains why the Resolution recognises the people - all the people, and not the followers of any particular faith - as the vehicle of the authority delegated by God to the state of Pakistan.
No wonder, the Resolution speaks of or refers to "the people" in four other clauses and lays emphasis on the rights of the people, the representation of the people, the prosperity of the people, their place in the comity of nations, and the exercise of power and authority by the chosen representatives of the people. Thus, the Resolution tends to be people-oriented. But this salient feature has generally lain ignored in most recent discussions on the Resolution.
As in latter day discussions, the main objection to the Resolution raised by the Congress Party members relates to the statement "that power is derived from God", which they characterised as a "theocratic" approach.
Now which religion and which people in the world do not affirm the sovereignty of God Almighty/Ultimate Reality over the entire universe? - as some of the participants in the debate on the Objectives Resolution had asked. What, however, is more important is that, as Liaquat argued, "all authority is a trust, entrusted to us by God for the purpose of being exercised in the service of man, so that it does not become an agency for tyranny and selfishness." Moreover, "that authority has been delegated to the people and none else, and it is for the people to decide who will exercise that authority."
Furthermore, the Resolution affirms that "the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people". "This", argued Liaquat, "is the very essence of democracy, because the people have been recognised as the recipients of all authority and it is in them that the power to wield it has been vested."
And when all power and authority are vested in the people, the question of the establishment of a theocracy does not arise. For, as Liaquat argued, "... in a technical sense, theocracy has come to mean a government by ordained priests, who wield authority as being specifically appointed by those who claim to derive their rights from their sacerdotal position... such an idea is absolutely foreign to Islam. Islam does not recognise either priesthood or any sacerdotal authority, and, therefore, the question of a theocracy simply does not arise in Islam..."
And on this theocracy issue, Liaquat was stolidity supported by Allama Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, the doyen of the ulema at the time. "... an Islamic state", he asserted, "does not mean the government of the Ordained Priests. How could Islam countenance the false idea, which the Quran so emphatically repudiated in the following words, "They, the Jews and the Christians, took their priests and their authorities to be their lords in derogation to God." (Surah Tauba X:5). In this context, a perusal of what Mian Iftikharuddin said on the occasion is both enlightening and rewarding. He said:
"Sir, I assure the members of the Congress Party that the wording of the Preamble does not in any way make this Objectives Resolution any the more theocratic, any the more religious than the Resolution or the statement of fundamental principles of some of the modern countries of the world. We know, Sir, that the constitutions of many countries start, if not with exactly the same, at least by somewhat similar, words. Ireland is not the only country that I know of, the constitution of which starts with somewhat similar words about God. Practically every country of British Empire derives its authority through the agency of the King from God. It is always mentioned, the King Emperor, by the Grace of God, and, so on. The members of the Congress Party need feel no more nervous than do the subjects of British Empire or the citizens of the Irish Free State on the wording of the Resolution."
The more important thing, however, is that in the ideological controversy engulfing the new state, Liaquat opted for a sane, balanced and constructive approach, an approach that induced a broad consensus. And much to the consternation of the extremists, he opted for democracy as against theocracy.
To quote Professor Grunebaum, "on the theoretical level at least, as good an integration of traditional and Western ideas has been reached in this document as one might reasonably expect". To him, "the attempted bridging of the gap between the Muslim tradition and the Western idea of the nation-state deserves the greatest attention" (Modern Islam). Likewise, the renowned Professor Wilfred Canwell Smith has commented favourably and extensively on the Objectives Resolution in his Islam in Modern History (1957).
And those who indulge in an outpouring of wild rhetoric on the "Islamic state" issue without rhyme or reason, day in and day out, may as well study closely the Resolution and the entire debate on it, to see for themselves the parameters and the taxonomy of the "Islamic democracy" that had been sought to be delineated in the Resolution by the independence leaders, and the wisdom and the foresight they had brought to its formulation. It doesn't call for the establishment of an Islamic democracy from above, through a fiat, as it has happened in some Muslim countries. Instead, it chooses the democratic path of building the sort of state Pakistanis desire from below. Indeed, it opts for the evolutionary approach and makes the establishment of an "Islamic democracy" contingent upon the people's choice. That's why Professor Smith calls Pakistan a singular case of being Islamic via the democratic route.
Finally, what Liaquat aspired to accomplish was succinctly spelled out in his address: ... "we want to build up a truly liberal government where the greatest amount of freedom will be given to all its members. Everyone will be equal before the law, but this does not mean that his personal law will not be protected. We believe in the equality of status and justice..." And it was because of the ethos of liberal Islam promoted by Liaquat's policies and the timely thwarting of the rise of a theocratic streak in Pakistan's body politic that enabled even the religious-oriented Khwaja Nazimuddin to withstand the mounting pressure of the religious extremist fringe to dismiss Sir Zafarullah Khan from the cabinet in 1953, despite the backing of a heavyweight from the Punjab.