It has been found easier to blame LBOD for adding to the misery and disaster in Sindh. Whether it was the aftermath of cyclones of 1999 or the floods of 2003 or the rains 2011, LBOD is blamed for the ills that have taken toll in the deltaic region, Kotri basin and the LBOD catchment areas, including districts of Benazirabad, Sanghar, Mirpurkhas, Tando Mohammed Khan and Badin.
Some have even demanded decommissioning of LBOD. Some better informed people advocate for a more intelligent and sensible approach for correcting the design and capacity of LBOD. The Speaker National Assembly and MNA from Badin has called for resorting to this latter approach. Ironically, no details as to what went wrong have surfaced. The LBOD blame is only a part of the ailment: at best a fragmented approach. In a wholesome prismatic approach, we find more reasons than admitted .The pertinent questions are:
---- Was the rain so devastating that nothing could have been done? The damage and the magnitude?
---- Are there factors, which have catalysed the devastation? Is LBOD the only culprit?
---- What were the interventions, whether natural or manmade to lessen the damage? Were they protected, operational and maintained?
---- Is the direction and vision focused after such a colossal loss OR the blur continues?
---- What must be the immediate, short term and long-term resolutions?
The answer to the first question is supported by official count and other data. September 2011 rains; playing havoc with life in Sindh caused an estimated loss of more than four hundred human lives, over one lakh cattle heads, an estimated 7 million acres of land, one-third of which had standing crops or under preparation crops for early Rabi. The government of Sindh and international agencies put the figures of affected persons close to nine million, approximately 24% of population of Sindh and 51% population of rural Sindh.
Roughly, two to three million labour force engaged in agriculture, is deprived of not only the livelihood and bread-earning source from Kharif 2011 crops but faces an imminent danger and a sure possibility of losing cropping for Rabi 2012, and in certain cases, beyond Rabi 2012 if the remnants and ailments of the devastation are not addressed at war-footing. The Sindh government places the estimate of damage to Rs 457 billion, probably an off-hand government figure to suggest that the damage equals 2011-12 Sindh budget.
The damage to life, property, lands, infrastructure, including irrigation systems from canals to minors and onto water courses, roads, buildings, health, cost of fighting disease, epidemics, and particularly waterborne diseases, cost of lost labour hours factored in and the rehabilitation cost also included, the loss would be a colossal figure, much beyond Rs 457 billion. And if (the 'if' having a very strong possibility and probability), the diminishing hope of losing Rabi 2012 cultivation - partially or wholly - comes true, the inflation cost, hunger, physiological and psychological loss would be irreparable. The continuous closure of schools and loss to education not factored in yet.
The September 2011 rains in Sindh almost devastated 13 out of 23 district of Sindh and the volume of water translated from the rain gauges was in the range of 10-12 MAF, The same official source further explained that Tarbela dam had 10 MAF designed storage capacity reduced to 7 MAF mainly due to silting. This in effect means that the water was enough to fill Tarbela a little less than twice.
It doesn't need a political economist to calculate that the loss of over one lakh cattle head, 5 to 6 lakh houses, 400-500 human lives, 2.3 million acres of standing crops and the rehabilitation or compensation thereof would outshoot the estimated loss. No loss and rehabilitation cost of LBOD, including the now non-existent Cholri weir and the tidal link, the drain systems in the worst hit districts of Badin, Thatta, Mirpurkhas, Sanghar and Umerkot, SCARP's non-operational 2000 tube wells (now with Irrigation Department of Sindh) have been either factored in or even estimated by relevant quarters. The estimates of Government of Sindh are undoubtedly much on the lower side. The Suparco satellite monitoring report shows 660,000 houses damaged in 6,945 settlements ie four times more damage to housing than admitted by the Sindh government. The same report shows 8,000-km roads damaged and 127-km railway track damaged. The figures are a week old. The wear would be more.
---- Examining the other questions together would give a clearer picture. The questions being;
---- Are there factors, which have catalysed the devastation? Is LBOD the only culprit?
---- What were the interventions, whether natural or manmade to lessen the damage? Were they protected, operational and maintained?
The worst devastated districts in the September rains are by and large within the catchment and command areas of canal system of Nara, Naseer, Phuleli, Pinjyari Nasrat, Rohri, Mithrao, Jamrao, Thar, and lined channel. Neither the cyclone of 1999 nor the floods of 2003 had affected number of these districts. Some of which are also not within the LBOD catchment. Hence to draw a conclusion and blame LBOD for the devastation is not only erroneous but also go further to close our eyes to the malaise. The Sindh drainage, particularly the lower basin has been endowed with:
(i) Two natural drains; the Hakra bed-down from Khipro running for over hundreds of kilometres taking along the excess rain and flood water into the desert. The second being the old Puran bed which terminates at the Shakoor Dhand (lake) where the Hakra used to drain the excess water of districts of khirpur, Naushehroferoze, Umerkot, Mirpurkhas, Benazirabad, Sanghar and barrage areas of Tharparker to the desert, the Old Puran bed used to take along the excess water of Tando Allahyar, Tando Mohammad, Badin, Mirpurkhas and Barrage area of district Tharparker to lakes known as Shakoor Dhand, Saianri Dhand and Kandri Dhand which were at one point in time a very fine ecological balancing outreach hosting migratory birds and irrigating the desert.
Unfortunately, however, both these natural outlets have been encroached upon and ransacked by neglect and greed of the influentials and politicians of the area. An ample proof is that the old Puran started flowing though slowly, but only after the Rangers removed some illegal bunds down Jhudo and Naukot. Similarly, the Hakra bed flow started only after the directives of the President of Pakistan. The Irrigation Department and the local administration were silent spectators and accomplices.
(ii) The LBOD's redesigning could have been discussed only when the Cholri weir washed away in 1999 would have been restored from a mud enclosed drain fill taking the shape of a lake to a more solid structure instead of abandoning the same despite recommendations of experts. Perhaps, the needs of people of Badin and the adjoining areas had no priority with government of that time. Coupled with this the washing out of the tidal link added to the misery.
The 210-km spinal drain catering to vast tract of Benazirabad, Sanghar, Tando Allahyar, Tando Adam, Mirpurkhas and the hundred kilometers Kadhan-Pateji out drain fall and Dhoro Paran out drain fall catering to spinal drain and District Badin and Tando Mohammed khan lost utility on account of non-existent Cholri weir and the tidal link rendering the whole system of drainage of LBOD dysfunctional.
(iii) The SCARP projects had installed some 7500 tube wells from Ghotki to the then Tharparker district with the dual purpose of, bringing down the water table and augmenting water supply to agricultural lands where feasible. Approximately 2000 of these tube wells are in the catchment area of the 13 worst hit districts. Unfortunately, none is operational. Had these tube wells been operational and the water table lowered, the soil would have absorbed more water. Not only this, the constant operation of the system would have catered for continuous maintenance of drain systems ands embankments.
The SCARP operations, undeniably an auxiliary and complimentary effort to the whole of which LBOD latter became an adjunct arm was mercilessly put to the closet lays by our engineers and decision makers since the day it was handed over to Sindh Irrigation Department in 2003 or so. Later on, the same was given to SIDA which neither had the capacity nor competence to handle the network.
Unfortunately, however, during the same period a huge amount of money was wasted on projects. Like lining of watercourses (a World Bank loan of 38 billion) and clean drinking water worth 6 billion. Only time proved that these linings in major part were rendered ineffective and the clean drinking water project remained as elusive as was on day one.
What is not being appreciated is that all this will be catalysed by hunger, poverty, agrarian societal shift to urban areas creating more slums, increase in the have-nots, social turmoil and drain on the economy with a major downslide in Sindh's agricultural economy. Evidence and data amply support that, the failings and neglect are not on the part of PPP government. The neglect has its cause in the decisions made in 1999 and 2003 - the Nawaz Sharif and Musharraf eras. What keeps the present regime from admitting the wrong doings of past which is not even theirs. Apparently, the vision is not clear. The focus is on non-issues. The blur continues. It is not "the ration bags" that are needed. It is the repair to the systems that is required. The most of all, good, efficient, competent and non-partisan administrative machinery required to face the gigantic task of rehabilitation and system correction.
As an immediate measure, it would be wise to allow remission to the rain-hit districts across the board (the total revenue receipts of GoS from land taxes is 460 millions, a mere 0.01% of the budgetary outlay of 457 billions), subsidise agriculture inputs, give interest-free long-term loans for house building and defer past agricultural loans repayment for a few years. The relief operations have brought question marks to the fairness of distributive mechanism, which is accused of being fraught with loopholes, discriminations, politicising, inept attitudes and inefficiency. It would be appropriate to use official channels rather than having supervisory committees smacking of political interference. As to the midterm and long term measures, the correction of ills referred earlier is the only solution.
(The writer is a retired civil servant. He was formerly secretary to GoS in different departments including information, agriculture and local government)