There are some strong similarities between Pakistan and Yemen. Both are Islamic republics; both are suffering from varying degrees of political turmoil; both have political culture and infrastructure in place; both the countries see a strong participation and influence of tribal culture in their respective social milieu and political set-up; both have suffered from long bouts of dictatorship; both are facing a constant decline in gas and water resources and an increase in the number of challenges posed by growing populations.
Most importantly, the people of both the countries have been witnessing stepped up drone attacks by the US these days because both are accused by the US and its allies of providing safe havens to the operatives of al Qaeda.
All these similarities notwithstanding, there are substantial differences between the situations of these two countries: the plight of Yemen is indeed far more profound than that of Pakistan. As this country on the Arabian Peninsula descends into further chaos, the US has stepped up attacks on suspected militants not only with drones but also with fighter jets. The New York Times has recently quoted US officials as saying that they see the strikes as one of a few options to keep militants from consolidating power after Yemeni troops battling militants linked to al Qaeda have been redeployed to Sanaa. In the capital, supporters of injured Saleh, who is nursing injuries in Saudi capital Riyadh, on June 9 fired shots into the air to celebrate the reports that he would soon return to Yemen. On the other hand, anti-Saleh forces have threatened to install a provisional presidential council if the transition of power is delayed any further.
The Russia TV RT's Crosstalk host, Peter Levelle, in a telecast on June 1, 2011, sought perspectives from two leading (arguably, the most well-informed) experts on Yemen - Daniel Pipes, the director of Middle East Forum and Edmund Hull, the former US ambassador to Yemen - on a variety of issues in relation to Yemen's crisis. The discussion was a Yemen- or region-focused talk, it was nevertheless interesting, if not instructive, for those seeking to identify some similarities between Pakistan and Yemen.
Does it look like a civil war?
Ambassador Hull argues that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was a threat before this current revolution in Yemen and it has become more of a threat since it started simply because its operating space in the country has expanded.
"But I doubt that President Saleh is intentionally exacerbating that threat. He may take a tactical advantage from it, but I don't think he has an interest in opening the door to al Qaeda. In any case, I don't think he's taking any benefit from it; and in any case the challenge remains to get beyond the current impasse and to deal with this threat in the long-term."
The US is picking its allies in the region?
Pipes responds by saying that he would be little less strong in his terminology 'than a very strong US ally'. "He [Saleh] is someone we could work with; who was on again and off again; not the greatest ally actually...part of that is that many elements don't want the US to have a role, they don't want to be fighting al Qaeda. And he's not that strong. Yemen is a very difficult country to rule and the central government's writ doesn't go very far. So he never was great shakes from the American point of view, and now he's even less useful."
But Pipes joins the ambassador in doubting that Saleh actually is complicit with al Qaeda or benefiting from al Qaeda. He, however, refers to the widely-circulated accusation from his opponents that Saleh had allowed the two towns - Taiz and Zinjibar - to fall into the hands of Islamists, adding that "I doubt it [the veracity of accusation]. That is nonetheless an important accusation in Yemen these days."
Is Saleh worthy of US protection now?
According to Hull, anti-terrorism co-operation with Yemen has always extended beyond President Saleh. "He was an important part of it, but not an essential part."
Mr ambassador you already said 'was'. You're implying that he's in the 'was', he's in the 'past tense' category now?
Hull categorically states that Saleh "is part of Yemen's past, not its future".
Is there a likelihood of another Libya scenario where the country becomes partitioned not just in two parts, but in more parts?
Pipes argues that rather than expect partition he would see anarchy. He would see that no central government has control over the country. "It's very hard to see that Ali Abdullah Saleh will remain in power."
Given President Obama's 'nuance approach', may be the best procedure is stand back for a while?
"No," Hull says emphatically. According to him, that would be a serious mistake. First of all, he emphasises, it is much more than the US interests at stake in Yemen. "There are very significant regional interests. First and foremost Saudi Arabia. And you have seen that because the GCC has been engaged in trying to work a solution to this. But beyond that there are international interests."
He argues that what we see here is in some ways reminiscent of the situation that was developing in Afghanistan pre-9/11 where the international community as a whole, according to him, was threatened by increasing safe havens for al Qaeda.
"Now what we do about it is another matter. But, I think we have to be active and take the initiative. And I would suggest you've got three forces at play here. You've got forces within Yemen and they are significant. Not only the protesters in the street, but General Ali Mohsin [who defected Saleh in March] and the leaders of the tribes. So they are very strong forces inside Yemen moving towards the change. You have the regional forces - the Gulf Co-operation Council - which has a great deal of influence. And then I think the international community needs to step forward and needs to move forward in a much more purposeful way than it has up till now."
The Saudis would be emboldened to pick a side and to be even actively involved on the ground.
Pipes: "Well, the Saudis have been involved. There's a healthy rebellion which has been going on. Particularly two years ago - in August 2009 - the Saudis sent forces into Yemen. Back in the 1960s, they did... .Yes, there's a history of Saudi involvement in Yemen, particularly military history. So far the final GCC offer was turned down by Saleh on 22nd of May, just over a week ago. And it doesn't look like the diplomacy is going very much further. And by the way, it didn't look like that was going to solve very much because...."
Hull: "Yemen is not Bahrain... .Any Arab country, generally any Arab country that has tried to enter Yemen militarily has lived to regret it; certainly the Egyptians did [in the 1960s]. And the Saudi intervention vis-à-vis the Houtis [in 2009] was on the side of Saleh; it was not against Saleh. According to him, Saudi Arabia has considerable influence in certain areas where a great deal of its resources flow into Yemen and there are recent indications that the Saudis are using that as a significant lever.
"I'm a little bit more positive on the GCC initiative also than Mr Pipes. I think it was a well-designed effort. I think it got far."
He points out that Saleh got cold feet by political developments in the region, particularly the exit of Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. He was also "motivated in seeing the developments in places like Syria and Libya where dictators have held on to power through military force. So it's a larger regional phenomenon".
Which way could it go? We know that al Qaeda is already there, which is an established fact.
Pipes: "I would take as an assumption that Ali Abdullah Saleh will not be the head of state in Yemen for much longer; I think he's finished; I would put him in the past case. There are different sorts of Islamists. In particular, there's the Islaah movement which has become a political movement; and then there's what we talked about the Houti rebellion, which is Shiite, and then there is al Qaeda, which is Sunni."
According to him, all of them with a different ideology and with a different perspective are competing in ways and co-operating in other ways. "But there are serious forces in Yemen. They wish to see a cut-off of Yemen from the West, not cooperate with the West, not be part of the international system, but rather as an Afghanistan a decade ago create an Islamic emirate..."
With intervention in Libya in mind, is intervention off the table now?
Hull: "An armed intervention in Yemen would be a terrible mistake. It would be even more problematic than Libya. So that is not the way to go in my opinion. However, I think what you need to do is construct some positive exits from this current impasse. It can't be all negative, it can't be all sanctions, and it certainly can't be passivity watching the country just spiral down in a death spiral. But Yemen does have a political culture. Surprisingly positive, they have had several elections that have been deemed generally free and fair by the international community... .It has a political infrastructure that includes functioning parties, including an Islamic party that is more reminiscent of Turkish Islamic party than a radical one. So you have material to work with. In my opinion what the international community should do, perhaps in the United Nations, is to come up with some kind of an exit strategy from the impasse that may involve some strict sanctions but also involve some carrots, building upon Yemen's tradition of politics, traditions of elections with a more robust regional and international involvement in that to make that path forward more credible."
How do we get rid of Saleh? That has to happen if your scenario is to work out.
According to Hull, "I think you start working more on what comes after Saleh. You don't focus all of your attention on just getting rid of Saleh." In this respect, Hull also suggests that "beyond that what you do you continue to narrow that base of support. It's already narrow very dramatically, most dramatically when General Ali Mohsin left him. And I think you have to create a situation where his current supporters have to choose. They have to choose between him in the past and the future Yemen as it is evolving..."
If he were suddenly to disappear is the civil society or political society strong enough to sit down, initiate a dialogue and have elections?
Pipes: "No, I'm more pessimistic than Mr Hull on two points. First, I think that there is no basis for common vision beyond getting rid of the current regime. Everybody agrees on that; a lot of people agree on that but they don't know what comes next. There're competing visions and I don't see any serious chance they can come together and work on a combined, on a joint future. Secondly, I don't think we in the West have any substantial friends in Yemen. Mr Hull referred to a Turkish-styled Islamist party. They are no friends of ours. They have turned into a quite hostile element. I don't think we have a base there... I think it is probably wiser to pre-empt and say 'that is a state whose population is hostile and therefore we should put it on notice...'."
Saleh was basically called a friend by the US, may be not the best friend, but a friend...
Pipes: "Probably that wasn't a wise thing to do. He was someone we could work with. No more than Mubarak was an ally. We have no shared values or visions with him. The Saudis the same thing...My view would be more negative. Let's put the Yemeni leadership whatever it might be in future on notice that if we get any hostilities from there we will make it painful for them. If there are no hostilities then we will work with them.
"By the way," Pipes adds, Yemen is a country which is at the point of near collapse. According to him, "putting money is not going to solve. I think we need to protect ourselves against potential dangers...Yemen is part of the problem today."
Hull: "First of all, pessimism is not the policy. It's pretty easy, specially with Yemen, to wring our hands and say `downsides are greater than upsides'. But for us it's still imperative to develop an approach, and I would argue an approach with the international community. The second thing is shared visions and values are great if you can get them. I mean it's wonderful having Great Britain. But the fact of the matter is in my experience as a diplomat what you really work upon are shared interests. Thankfully, al Qaeda does provide us a shared interest not only with Yemen but many of the states of the Middle East and al Qaeda will continue to provide us a shared interest in that regard and we just have to be adept enough diplomatically to build on that shared interest either bilaterally with Yemen and talking about Saleh's Yemen or a post-Saleh Yemen and internationally with the Russians, the Chinese, the Europeans and more broadly this is our basis."
The assumption is the US and its Western allies would support any leader in Yemen who can take on al Qaeda in a 'serious' way. Is it good idea or will it backfire?
Hull: "I don't think that that's true. I don't think anyone gets our support. I think we can be more demanding of that. Listen, the Yemenis going against al Qaeda is not a favour to us. al Qaeda is threatening Yemen; it's a shared interest that we have. So it's not a something that they can use to blackmail us. But our interest in Yemen should be much broader than just al Qaeda: it should be Yemen's development; it should be the political stability there. If we have a narrow approach I think we are doomed to failure. And I think you can go back historically and that's what I do in my book..."
Let's be optimistic, super-optimistic right now. Yemen ultimately gets some kinds of reforms. Wouldn't Saudi Arabia be really upset about that, the contagion going Bahrain?
Pipes: "Well, of course, it depends on what it is going to look like. But I would say, no, the Saudis will be content if Yemen goes back to its usual quiet: what the actual arrangements are in Yemen, what role the Zaidis, what role the Shaafis have, the south and the north, those various tribal configurations...that really is not having importance to the Saudis. If it were quiet, the Saudis will probably be quite happy."
Hull: "I think It would be short-sighted on the Saudis part if they just had a low goal of stability... because it's not sustainable in the long run: the economic pressures, the decreasing water supplies, the decreasing gas and oil, the growing populations mean for long-term political instability on the Arabian Peninsula. You need a Yemen that is more integrated with the rest of the Arabian Peninsula. And I don't mean integrated politically because the GCC is a club of monarchs and they are not going to accept a republic. But I mean economically, you've got to address the economic needs of Yemen, not with charity, but with things like finding work opportunities in a labour-starved Gulf for a labour-rich Yemen. And you've got to look at those natural complimentaries between Yemen and its neighbours and build something positive on those complimentaries."