Three-Mile Island, Chernobyl and now Fukushima in the wake of Tsunami and earthquake? The world is concerned. Even the meticulous Japanese failed, who are reputed to live for working than otherwise. Safety reviews have been ordered almost every where, except India and Pakistan.
There is even talk of doing away with nuclear power in many countries, reversing earlier decisions to the contrary in the wake of climate change issues, which gave a new life and legitimacy to nuclear power. We also have a significant nuclear programme, military and civil both. How does this affect us and what should we be doing? What are our options and constraints? Are we doing enough in terms of safety and what more can we do? These are the issues that we would attempt to examine here.
Much has been written on Fukushima. The new nuclear reactor design approaches have become far safer and reliable, which unfortunately do not benefit the existing large number of nuclear reactors. The most important are the passive safety systems. Fukushima's safety systems failed because of the older active approaches.
For nuclear weapon countries (the five plus two of India and Pakistan), there is no choice of retraction. They have assumed and accepted higher risks of nuclear weapons. Besides, the weapon and military sectors have synergy, cost-savings and scale economy issues, putting the nuclear issue in quite a different perspective and context than the non-nuclear weapon countries, some of which may certainly withdraw from nuclear power after this third incident.
As it appears, nuclear power appears to be the only contention free source in Pakistan's domestic politics. Hydro power and dams are opposed by lower Riparian Sindh. Although the opposition seems to be limited to Kalabagh dam, no one knows when the guns would be raised against other projects. The arguments against Kalabagh, also apply on most other Hydro power projects. Similarly the Thar coal continues to suffer from low progress and lingering provincial autonomy syndrome, which sometimes is stretched beyond reasonableness and abused by the provincial bureaucracy for power monopolisation.
The problems of nuclear power are external and by extension of finance. Although, it is one of the cheapest sources, its capital cost is the highest. Four billion USD for a plant of 1000 MW, while in the same investment, more than two of coal power plants can be acquired. Although higher nuclear capital cost is recouped over a life time of 40 years of cheap energy supplies, the up-front costs and financing remains a major bottleneck. That is why Indian nuclear programme despite all fanfare to the contrary, has not been able to install much of nuclear power generation capacity due to finance and technology reasons. Perhaps the recent Indo-US nuclear deal may be able to solve these problems for India.
Would Chinese be able to offer all of the 8800 MW of nuclear power projects, as required by us in the next two decades? This would be only 8% or lesser of the total power demand by 2030.Even if Chinese are able to provide the external financing, which may almost be impossible, would others let them have all of it. Many spoilers would be waiting in the wings. Another round of nuclear explosions initiated by India and of necessity reciprocated by Pakistan would provide a large enough of spanner in the hands of our detractors. Or any successful attack on Pakistan's nuclear facilities by the terrorists may be equally damaging scaring the nuclear birds of suppliers and financiers away. Nothing is simple or free in this mortal world?
Coming to the core issue of today, the nuclear safety, apparently all is well in Pakistan. Pakistan is a party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, from the very beginning and has been following its edicts since 1994, when it came into being. We have Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), of which the readers may not have heard much, except the big advertisements in case of licensing of X-ray machines. PNRA has opted to be a silent worker. Despite its chairman reporting to the prime minister, it works in the shadow of the PAEC whom it is supposed to regulate. Like elsewhere in the country, operational agencies are usually more powerful and have to deliver the vital services. But nuclear power or weapons are different, for the impact of error or failure, systemic or otherwise, are catastrophic. PNRA has to be less co-operative than its counterparts in other spheres of our national life.
I would invite, rather encourage, the readers and our atomic energy establishment people as well to please visit the web-site of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the US, and see for themselves, how a regulatory agency operates and how is the public informed, involved and reassured. There is an event reporting system, that records every incident relevant to safety, in a formal and structured process, and the same is made available on the internet, for the access of the public, even from a terrorism-prone areas like Pakistan and others. And there are many other aspects to the safety regulatory function that seem to be invisible in Pakistan and make an informed person wary of claims and assertions. The whole idea of public involvement in safety issue is to make sure that things are not swept under the carpet, and that controllers and the controlled do not have a cozy and "co-operative" relationship. Fortunately no nuclear accident has ever occurred in Pakistan, and less significant events may not have been reported, although, it is well-nigh impossible that no event having relevance with nuclear safety at any of the installations has ever occurred.
In our case, PNRA website contains operational data only on activities that are related to hospital X-ray machines and Industrial applications which have very insignificant amounts but public dealing is involved. It gives them control on the life and businesses of the people. As far as their own activities are concerned, except for the posting of rules and regulations, no detail is available as to how these rules are being applied. An ordinary citizen has no data or reassurance that there is no radiation leak around KANUPP, so that he can peacefully enjoy the Paradise Point beach. The courageous and God-believing people of Pakistan, who are unnecessarily firm believers in fatalism and the inevitability of Taqdir, do go to the Paradise Point and do so at their own cost and risk. One would not be comfortable with a puritanical and cocky statement from our nuclear establishment that in the last forty years, never has any radiation leaked into the sea or air, and that no event occurred that qualified for an entry into an open or confidential event register or database.
For the reasons cited above, it is only the public participation and oversight that is going to give the PNRA the required muscle and effectiveness. PNRA maintains quite a good web-site, listing all the regulations, but not much on its actions and performance. It is more open to IAEA submitting reports than its own public, unfortunately quite a number of which have turned into terrorists, adding to the rationale on secrecy and lack of openness. PNRA actions should be motivated more by the genuine realisation of the need for its regulatory function, than a simple perfunctory implementation of regulations. A good role model for it in terms of functioning and public participation is of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the USA. No country in the world faces more security and terrorist threats than the US. And look at their openness and public participation. GOP would be well advised to nominate members of civil society and business community on the board of PNRA.
More specifically, there is a strong case for serious consideration that Kanupp which has completed more than its safe design life, should be decommissioned, as soon as the load-shedding period eases. It has been operating under an interim license of questionable validity. Its output has been miniscule and erratic for many years and has been recently refurbished reportedly. In a more aware and informed society such extension and refurbishment would not have been permitted. Even here, had an EIA been allowed, the same would not have been possible. The risk and cost is too high than the benefits. It is right in the middle of the population and the brave and the less knowledgeable go to the Paradise Point to bathe and swim and enjoy. No further nuclear project or expansion should be permitted on this site, contrary to what one keeps hearing of expansion projects. Provincial and local governments and civil society should be watchful and vigilant and must oppose any continuation or expansion there.
Only nuclear reactors appear to be covered under the domain of PNRA, whatever its shortcomings. Another issue is the domain of other parts of nuclear activities, mining and siting of the military and as well as civilian activities. Many incidences of populations reporting health problems in Uranium mining areas have been reported on and off by this newspaper itself. No EIA of any sort, public or confidential, has been observed. That our public, especially the poor, are used to giving sacrifices for national interests, should not be taken as a license for relaxed practices. That no significant nuclear safety incident has occurred should not be a solace and ground for not having credible safety reviews.
(The writer has been a research fellow at Harvard University and has several publications to his credit on the subject.)