Lahore Resolution and question of provincial autonomy

The Lahore Resolution was passed on March 23-24, 1940. It became the basis for the demand for Pakistan, and Pakistan itself was established on August 14-15, 1947. For almost two decades there was little confusion or controversy about the wording of the resolution, but since the middle 1960s there has been. And it is raised off and on.
The operative part of the Lahore Resolution envisaged "that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India, should be grouped to constitute Independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign".
The controversy about the Resolution stems from two points: (i) the Muslim majority areas "should be grouped to constitute Independent States"; and (ii) "the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign". Since both these points are directly related to the drafting of the resolution, the initial questions to be tackled are: who drafted it, and how did it come to be drafted?
Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan has claimed that it was drafted in his house - that is, at Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan's residence. On March 11, 1941, Sir Sikandar told the Punjab Assembly "that the resolution which I drafted was radically amended by the Working Committee, and there is a wide divergence in the resolution I drafted and the one that was finally passed. The main difference between the two resolutions is that the latter part of my resolution which related to the centre and co-ordination of the activities of the various units, was eliminated."
Commenting on Sir Sikandar's version, Khalid B. Sayeed says, "It seems that the Working Committee removed the federal elements from the resolution and made the Muslim zones in the north-west and in the North-East 'Independent States', which had no federal relationship with an Indian Federation. This probably explains the origin of the term 'Independent States'."
This seems a valid explanation in the light of what Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman records about the February 4 meeting of the Muslim League Working Committee, which had laid down the points upon which the resolution was to be based.
However, the key phrase in the original Lahore Resolution, "should be grouped to constitute", suggests that what was envisaged was a union of the two "Independent States of the North-Western and Eastern zones".
More important: the resolution adopted by the Madras session in April 1941 inserted the word "together", after the word, "grouped". It said that "the areas in which the Mussalmans are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, shall be grouped together to constitute Independent States as Muslim Free National Homelands in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign".
Since the Lahore resolution was not incorporated as the supreme objective of the All India Muslim League (AIML) in its constitution till after the adoption of its revised draft at the Madras session, the Madras version (and not the original Lahore Resolution) must hold good as the basic document for the AIML's demand for Pakistan.
(As a rule, resolutions were not incorporated among the AIML objectives till one year after their passage.)Furthermore, the statements and speeches of the League leaders on the one hand and the comments and criticism evoked by the "Pakistan" resolution among the British and the non-Muslim circles on the other during 1940-47 indicate a basic assumption that Pakistan would be a single state.
The position was further clarified in Jinnah's letter to Gandhi dated September 17, 1944, wherein he said that the two zones would form "units of Pakistan".
This, however, could by no means be termed an afterthought. For Jinnah seems to be clear from the very beginning that, despite the lacuna in the Lahore Resolution, what was envisaged was a single federation. For instance, while talking about the Indian states in the proposed Pakistan areas, he said on April 1, 1940 - ie, barely a week after the passage of the Resolution -, "If these States willingly agree to come into the federation of the Muslim Homeland, we shall be glad to come to a reasonable and honourable settlement with them".
This gives credence to Jinnah's explanation in reply to Abul Hashim's query at the League Legislators' Convention in April 1946 (see below) that "the word 'States' was a mistake and had cropped up probably as a result of a typographical error" (as reported by M.A.H. Ispahani in his Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah As I knew him).
During the election campaign of 1945-46 as well, the speeches of not only of the Quaid-i-Azam, but also of other League leaders, including those of Bengal, envisaged a single Pakistan. The position was further clarified and buttressed by the resolution, moved by Suhrawardy and passed by the League Legislators' Convention on April 9, 1946, which said, inter alia,
"That the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the North-East and the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Balochistan in the North-West of India, namely, Pakistan zones, where the Muslims are in a dominant majority, be constituted into a sovereign independent State..."
In view of the above, the controversy whether the Lahore Resolution envisaged one or two Pakistanis becomes redundant. Even otherwise the original resolution, generally speaking, must need be interpreted in the light of the Madras resolution, the interpretations offered by Jinnah, the League's election manifesto, the League leaders' election speeches, and the League Legislators' Convention resolution.
Also: above all, the last pronouncement overrides everything else, since it represented the general consensus of the newly elected Muslim representatives in the central and provincial assemblies during 1945-46, with a fresh mandate to strive, struggle and establish Pakistan.
Now about the constituent units being envisaged as "autonomous and sovereign". One could understand these units being autonomous, but not "sovereign". This, again, should be put down to poor drafting. Or, did the drafters take the cue from American history, or from the USSR's Constitution of 1936 which stipulates that "The sovereignty of the constituent republics shall be restricted only within the limits set forth in Article 14 of the constitution of the USSR"?
In respect of the constituent units being sovereign, Dr B.R. Ambedkar, who did the first serious study on Pakistan (Thoughts on Pakistan, 1941), argues that "The use of the term 'constituent units' indicates that what is contemplated is a Federation" and that "Federation of units and sovereignty of units are contradictions".
Another constitutional authority, Professor Reginald Coupland, the Oxford don, who did a monumental study (entitled, The Constitutional Problem in India, 1944), says, "It could scarcely mean that the constituent units of the independent States were to be really 'sovereign' but it did mean that the States were to be really independent....".
This attempt by the present writer is, however, not the first time that the controversy and confusion engendered by the poor drafting or deliberate vagueness of the Lahore Resolution has sought to be cleared. The most tragic tendency in Pakistan is that controversies, once they get started, tend to be endemic, with the protagonists never being in a mood to resolve them through debate and discussion, and reiterating their viewpoint(s) ad nauseum even after their propositions had been demolished through unassailable configuration of facts and authoritative pronouncements, through debate and discussion.
As indicated above, after the Madras (1941) resolution and more particularly the League Legislators Convention resolution (1946), the original Lahore Resolution (1940) has no locus standi as the foundation document in the constitutional plane, and in the constitutional context. At best that Resolution represents the basic idea behind Pakistan's emergence, or more accurately the initial demand for partition only in the sense as the Magna Carta (1215) launched the long-winding devolution of power process from the omnipotent sovereign to the nobility, which process, evolving through a series of creatively calibrated stages, finally blossomed into what has come to be known as parliamentary democracy in Great Britain.
In sharp contrast, the basic document behind Pakistan's emergence on August 14-15, 1947, and, moreover, the shape in which it emerged, is the June 3 Partition Plan, supplemented by the Indian Independence Act of July 1947.
However, for the sake of argument, if the Lahore Resolution is still given that status, then what it presumably envisaged was two "Independent States" in the "North-Western and Eastern zones of India". And with the hoisting of East Pakistan as Bangladesh on the world's map in 1971, the two "Independent States" concept has been materially translated on the ground, however much we had mourned that traumatic development at the time. Hence the controversy must and should end once and for all, after December 16, 1971.
Apropos the status of the constituent units, they could be autonomous but certainly not sovereign. As both Ambedkar and Coupland have pointed out, the Lahore Resolution meant the States to be independent but the constituent units could, by no mean, be "really sovereign" - for the simple reason that the constituent unit status (ie, a federation of the units) and sovereignty of units do not and cannot go together under any constitutional framework.
This, however, does not mean that the constituent or federated units are bereft of a juridical personality. They, indeed, do have. And as Jinnah told the APA in an interview in 1945, they are entitled to "all the autonomy you will find in the constitutions of the United States of America, Canada, and Australia".
In actual fact as well, throughout the past six decades, the provinces in Pakistan have had much greater autonomy than in most other states in the Third World countries. For a comparative study, the Indian Constitution, of course, comes in handy. The thrust in that constitution has been towards the centre as against the thrust towards the provinces in the Pakistan Constitution.
Thus, residuary powers under the Indian Constitution have been vested in the centre; in Pakistan they were assigned to the Provinces under both the 1956 and 1973 constitutions, (as against the one-man presidential constitution of 1962), which were evolved by national consensus. That explains Suhrawardy's bold but almost factual assertion in 1957 that ninety-eight percent of (regional) autonomy had been conceded in the 1956 constitution. The 1973 Constitution contains some thirty items on the concurrent list, and it's almost on the threshold of being done away with.
This is not to say that the centre-province relations have not been bedevilled by controversies galore over the decades, as in several post-war new states. Even otherwise, throughout the world, there has been an endemic tendency to strengthen the federal/central government (eg, in the US), and Pakistani rulers, if only because of certain secessionist tendencies in some regions and because of Kabul's strident irredentist claims, have been prone to strengthen the centre, often at the expense of the provinces. Part of the problem is that while established democracies (eg, the US) have devised mechanisms to cope with the problem of split mandates between the executive and the legislative bodies and/or the federation and the federating units, nascent or nominal democracies have not.
At the centre of the problem is the accommodation of regional elites in the national power structure. The classic case is that of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who, though hailing from a smaller province, yet inexplicably sought to augment the powers of the federal government at the expense of the provinces, even going to the extent of naming chief ministers and appointing IGPs and chief secretaries.
And in the process of thwarting the consequences of a split mandate in the two western provinces (NWFP and Balochistan) and augmenting the federal government's clout, he dismissed the Balochistan government, mounted army action in that province, manoeuvred to instal a PPP government in the Frontier, and later banned the National Awami Party (NAP) in the wake of Hayat Khan Sherpao's assassination.
If a political opponent's murder is a credible justification for banning a political party, Bhutto ought to have first banned or disbanded the PPP itself, at least in the Punjab, on the murder of Khwaja Rafiq in 1972.
Another endemic trend in Pakistan is that once out of power, regional elites tend to put on a righteous posture in the name of provincial autonomy. When in opposition, Suhrawardy, for instance, had talked of regional autonomy and provincial rights, but once accommodated in the national power structure, he defended the 1956 constitution.
Likewise, the ANP had not raised the question of provincial autonomy when it was in the power structure during 1988-89, 1990-93, 1997-98, or a partner with a mainstream political party during the intervening years; but, later, discomfited in getting the NWFP named as Pakhtoonkhawa, it has started once again talking in provincial-autonomy strains.
Thus, at the centre of federation-province relations is the problem of accommodating regional elites in the power structure and inducting/enticing the regional parties into mainstream politics. Such accommodation however, does not lead to disintegration but to greater integration.
For instance, all through the 1950s the DMK in Tamil Nadu was burning the Indian flag and the Indian Constitution. In 1957, however, when its successor, AIDMK, secured 25 percent and in 1962 a majority of seats in the State Assembly, it was duly accommodated in the power structure. This healthy development led it to a paradigmatic shift.
Despite being a regionalist party, the AIDMK assumed the role of an integrationist party, and this to a point that when its leader, Annadurai, died in February 1969, the Indian President, Zakir Hussain, called him "a pillar of Indian unity".
As against this Indian experience, what was Pakistan's? The East Pakistani (vocal) political elite was not adequately accommodated during the 1950s and was almost totally excluded during the Ayub decade (1958-69). And what was the result? The disintegration and dismemberment of Pakistan!
Actually, since the NAP was accommodated in the oppositionist UDF alliance in March 1973, and the NAP's successor, the NDP, in the PNA in January 1977, and its later successor, ANP, first (1988-89) in the PPP governmental power structure and later (1989-90) in the COP, and, still later (1990-98), in the PML power structure, its centrifugalist tendencies and ethonocentricism had abated considerably.
Indeed, the only antidote to curb such tendencies is to get the regional and inward-looking parties into the political mainstream and to accommodate them both in the national and regional power structures.
Instead of raking up old controversies, a serious attempt should have been and should be initiated to build bridges of cooperation between the various regional oriented parties and between the regional and national parties. Such an approach was and is bound to lead to an abatement of a sense of alienation, while developing a sense of belonging, and strengthening national integration.
Simultaneously, a process should have been initiated methodically to devolve power not only to the provinces, but to local bodies as well. Without strengthening local bodies and developing democracy at the grass-root level, democracy cannot possibly be firmly established at the national and provincial levels.
Benazir Bhutto had pledged democracy-at-the-doorstep during her 1993 election campaign, but reneged when she came to power. Some attribute her renegation to her reluctance to hand over power to the MQM in Karachi and Hyderabad. Despite a plethora of shortcomings, the Local Government system under the present regime seems to be gaining strength and putting down roots.
Not only has it exceedingly helped development at the local level, more important in terms of mass politics, it has provided space for "political participation" at the grass root level. Like the BD system in the 1960s, which provided "on the job" training and apprenticeship for the provincial and national leaders of the 1970s, such as Mustafa Jatoi, Mumtaz Bhutto, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, Hanif Ramay, and Mustafa Khar.
The present Local Government system bids fair to spawn future leaders. Whether this system would be accommodated in the "new" order which seems to be in the offing and on the cards is, however, a moot point. But its role as a veritable nursery of future leaders must need be recognised, and it should be retained whatever the complexion at the Centre.
And when a final PML (N)-ANP break came in February 1998, consistent efforts should have been made not to exacerbate the situation, but to heal the gaping wounds and mend the fences. In this context, Nawaz Sharif showed a high measure of statesmanship in restraining his party men from indulging in a wordy duel and in making a courtesy visit to Shahi Bagh, in March 1998, to pay respects to the ANP Rahbar, Abdul Wali Khan, despite the extremely provocative and acerbic pronouncements from the other side.
In any case, it is time that Pakistanis came to terms with the harsh facts of political life. One such prime fact is the ethnicization of politics since the early 1970s (eg, one language formula, language riots, and urban-rural quota in Sindh, Bhutto's reneging on his earlier pledge to get 300,000 stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh repatriated, the dismissal of the Mengal government and the army action in Balochistan and the banning of the NAP, imposition of the minority PPP governments in Balochistan and the Frontier, banning of the NAP-oriented, Yusuf Lodhi's Frontier Post (Peshawar) (1974), among others).
And by talking of the prime ministers of Larkana and Lahore during 1996-97, Benazir Bhutto, although the acknowledged leaderene of one of the two mainstream parties, had unwittingly revealed her ethnic face and given PPP a regional complexion. Fortuitously though, it was good that Nawaz Sharif did not fall for the bait.
All said and done, therefore, unless the accommodation of regional parties and regional elites is institutionalised in the national power structure and they are inducted into mainstream politics, confidence is not bound to be built up, nor a propitious political climate created - a climate conducive to resolving federal-provincial disputes and put their relations on an even keel. Pakistan's future, it needs to be emphasised, lies in accommodation, not confrontation.
And it calls for aggregation of disparate regional demands and interests, for processing them in the prism of overall national priorities, and, above all, for integrating the processed demands in the complex of strategic national interests and objectives.
It also calls for a modus vivendi between the mainstream and regional parties, for constructive bargaining, for patience, tolerance, a spirit of give and take, and, above all, for the Bismarckian sense of "the art of possible". The crucial question is: Would the mainstream political parties heed that call?
For the past seven years or more, the two erstwhile mainstream parties are unfortunately wallowing in political wilderness while none can really predict the fate and future of the newly clobbered PML (Q) at the next elections, due this year.
Most probably, the deal with the PPP, which has been in the offing for a year or more, may still be struck before the upcoming elections. Despite both the PML (Q) and the PPP claims, such a deal is not only very much on the cards, but also bids fair to accelerate the march towards democracy.
Whether in or out of power, all the three main parties - the MMA, despite its present electoral strength and the clout to pull mammoth crowds is excluded here, if only because of its weird, extremist and unpredictable politics - would do well to heed, process and incorporate the regional demands in their respective manifestoes. For the moment, Balochistan presents the greatest challenge, and its grievances and demands call for accommodation by all the three parties.
(The writer was Founder-Director of the Quaid-i-Azam Academy (1976-89), and authored Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation (1981), the only work to qualify for the President's Award for Best Books on Quaid-i-Azam).