Pakistan’s transition towards cleaner mobility is both necessary and inevitable. The country spends billions of dollars importing petroleum products, while worsening air pollution and growing energy challenges make electrification a sensible long-term objective. Governments across the world have used tax incentives to accelerate the adoption of electric vehicles, and Pakistan should not isolate itself from that global trend. The objective is therefore sound. The difficulty lies in the way the incentives have been structured.

Public policy should reward the broad adoption of cleaner technology rather than subsidising luxury consumption. If the overwhelming benefit of tax concessions accrues to buyers who can comfortably afford vehicles worth Rs10 million or more, the environmental objective risks becoming secondary to an inequitable fiscal outcome. Incentives linked to affordability, localisation and domestic value-addition would spread the benefits far more widely while also supporting the country’s manufacturing base.

That concern extends beyond consumers. Pakistan’s automobile industry has invested heavily over several decades in assembly plants, localisation and the development of a domestic vendor network that supports thousands of jobs. A taxation framework that unintentionally disadvantages locally assembled entry-level vehicles while making imported or premium alternatives comparatively more attractive inevitably raises legitimate questions about industrial policy. Environmental progress and industrial development should reinforce one another rather than pull in opposite directions.

The broader problem, however, reaches well beyond the automobile sector. Pakistan’s tax structure has long carried an uncomfortable bias against the documented, salaried middle class. Every budget brings fresh burdens for those whose incomes are already fully visible to the tax authorities, while vast segments of wealth continue to remain lightly taxed or outside the effective tax net altogether. Salaried employees have little opportunity to avoid deductions at source. By contrast, large sections of the informal economy, undertaxed assets and privileged sources of income continue to escape meaningful contribution. That imbalance steadily erodes public confidence in the tax system itself.

A fair tax system is measured not simply by how much revenue it collects but by how equitably it distributes the burden. Citizens are generally willing to contribute when they believe similar economic capacity attracts similar tax treatment. Confidence begins to weaken when those purchasing modest family vehicles pay proportionately more than buyers of luxury alternatives, or when the working middle class repeatedly finds itself financing a system that struggles to broaden its own tax base.

The government therefore has an opportunity to refine its policy before these distortions become entrenched. Environmental incentives should remain, but they should be redesigned to encourage affordable electric mobility, domestic manufacturing and higher localisation. Tax concessions could be linked to vehicle price bands, local value-addition or domestic production rather than being concentrated at the premium end of the market. Such an approach would better align environmental objectives with industrial development and social fairness.

Pakistan requires both fiscal reform and cleaner transport. Neither objective should come at the expense of tax equity. The country’s tax system already asks disproportionately more of those least able to negotiate exemptions or avoid documentation. Extending that imbalance into the automobile market would simply reinforce a broader perception that has become increasingly difficult to dispel: when it comes to taxation, the greatest concessions too often flow towards those who need them the least.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

Kiln owners who violate the law should face clear and proportionate legal consequences. At the same time, enforcement must not be limited to occasional raids or inspections. The proposed system for registering workers and their children, verifying their ages and maintaining accurate records is particularly important. Reliable records can help labour officials identify children at risk and prevent employers from concealing underage workers. Regular inspections by labour inspectors should therefore become a routine and transparent process. Labour inspectors should also be provided with adequate resources, training and institutional support so they can investigate complaints promptly and take action against violations. A clear procedure for legal proceedings will further strengthen enforcement and reduce the possibility of cases being delayed or ignored. The authorities should also establish an effective mechanism for receiving complaints from workers and local communities while ensuring that those who report violations are protected from retaliation.

However, the government must also address the economic circumstances that often push entire families towards bonded labour. Simply removing children from brick kilns without providing alternatives can leave poor families in even greater hardship. Children rescued from labour should be enrolled in schools and, where necessary, provided with educational, nutritional and rehabilitation support. Their parents should also be linked with social protection programmes to reduce their dependence on advance payment system, known as peshgi. This is particularly important because the peshgi system— in which workers take small cash advances from kiln owners to meet emergencies, such as medical expenses or wedding costs— can leave families trapped in debt and forced labour. Breaking this cycle of indebtedness is essential if efforts to eliminate child labour are to produce lasting results. Otherwise, children may simply return to hazardous work because of financial pressures at home.

The success of the proposed rules, however, will depend on consistent and transparent enforcement, institutional coordination and sustained support for affected families. The provincial government needs to ensure that the new rules do not remain merely another set of regulations on paper. It must also ensure that every child removed from a brick kiln has a genuine opportunity to return to school, grow up safely and build a better future. The real measure of success will be whether the policy breaks the cycle of poverty, debt bondage, and child labour rather than simply shifting children from one form of hardship to another.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

The country’s top civilian and military leadership is proactively engaged in mediating between Iran and the US, implementing mitigating measures to deal with the negative climate change effect on our economy as well as engaging with US counterparts to reduce applicable tariffs on Pakistani exports.

However, the report did note a major internal factor that could contribute to a failure to meet the projected rise in economic activity: delays in implementation of the structural reform agenda, currently being rigidly monitored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under the ongoing programme loan, that could “further weaken exports, slow productivity gains and reduce the economy’s capacity to sustain higher growth without generating excessive inflationary and current account pressures.”

Persistent claim by the SBP based on its surveys that economic activity has been picking up in recent years can at best be described as selective two counts.

First, these surveys on which this assessment is based have a distinct element of an experimenter bias or, in other words, the companies which are part of the survey provide a more optimistic outlook to the SBP than they actually feel. This view is strengthened by the fact that surveys carried out by independent media reveal a different picture.

And, secondly, unemployment has been rising but with inventories depleting, especially in the auto sector, the more obvious conclusion is that output has not increased though sales have and that too with increased imports.

Economic theory suggests that the IMF supported contractionary fiscal (higher taxes) and monetary policy (higher policy rate) is anti-growth; however, the Fund has insisted on these measures, with particular reference to ending the elite capture of the economy on taxes and credit that is naturally opposed by these pressure groups. What is fairly evident by now, with the country on the brink of engaging on the fourth quarter SLA review, is that the tax structure has not changed, the reliance on indirect taxes, whose incidence on the poor is greater than on the rich, continues (currently indirect taxes account for almost 80 percent of all FBR collections – including under the head of direct taxes given that around 70 to 75 percent of these are imposed as withholding taxes on goods—which are defined as a sales tax passed on in their entirety to consumers). In this instance even the audit achievements cited often by Chairman FBR are mainly at the factory gate, which has translated into higher prices, for example, in the case of sugar.

With respect to the monetary policy, the current rate is 11.5 percent, quite low by recent Pakistani standards as it reached a high of 22 percent, but more than the double what is prevailing in regional competing countries. That has yet again prompted calls for its reduction.

Reports of misuse of the recently approved export subsidy and incentive scheme, including export refinance scheme totaling 88 billion rupees, have surfaced and it is unclear whether the government got approval from the Fund for this scheme or whether this would become a sticking point in the forthcoming SLA.

While conventional wisdom in Pakistan supports the export sector as an engine of growth—despite the raw material and semi-finished imports it requires that widen the current account deficit, or the fact that remittance inflows have overtaken export revenue—monetary and fiscal incentives for exporters remain a policy thrust that has not yet been abandoned. There is, therefore, a need to undertake a careful cost-benefit analysis of the contribution of each export subsector to revenue generation and foreign exchange earnings.

The persistent optimism of an expected uptick in economic activity does no favours to anyone, including the reputation of the economic managers. A better and honest grasp of the situation would enable informed timely decisions, which is a far better approach.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

Once a person is detained, responsibility for his or her safety, health and dignity rests entirely with the authorities. Their deaths, therefore, cannot be dismissed as an unfortunate incident or explained away through unverified claims. The state bears an undeniable obligation to account for what transpired while the women were in its custody.

Senior police officials have denied allegations of torture, maintaining that the women were chronic drug users and may have died from an overdose. These claims, however, remain to be established through a transparent inquiry supported by postmortem findings and forensic evidence. Reports that the women were assaulted by local residents before being handed over to the police also warrant close scrutiny.

It must be established whether they received a medical examination upon arrival at the police station, whether their condition was properly monitored during detention, and whether established procedures governing the treatment of detainees were followed. These are matters that require clear and credible answers rather than speculation. The incident is especially disturbing because it comes at a time when public confidence in the police has already been shaken by allegations of the rape of a mentally challenged girl inside another police station in Lahore. While the two cases are unrelated, together they reinforce concerns about weak institutional safeguards and inadequate oversight within police stations.

Every custodial death demands a prompt, independent and impartial investigation. This is not only a legal obligation but also a test of institutional credibility. Any inquiry must be insulated from interference by officials who may have been involved, and its findings should be made public. If negligence, abuse or criminal misconduct is established, those responsible must face prosecution rather than routine transfers or internal disciplinary measures. At the same time, this tragedy underscores the urgent need for systemic reforms, including mandatory medical screening of detainees, continuous CCTV monitoring in police stations, stronger independent oversight, and strict adherence to arrest and detention protocols.

The true measure of a justice system lies in how it treats those who are most vulnerable. The two women had not been convicted of any offence; they were merely suspects accused of stealing a relatively small amount of cash and jewelry. Their guilt or innocence was for a court of law to determine. Instead, they died while in state custody. Unless the facts are established through an impartial investigation and accountability follows where warranted, such incidents will continue to undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system and reinforce the perception that meaningful police reform remains an unfulfilled promise.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

According to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS), the deficit widened 25.17 percent year-on-year in July to $3.948 billion as imports jumped 18 percent to $6.887 billion.

Exports did rise, by 9.54 percent to $2.939 billion, but nowhere near fast enough to keep pace with imports. The imbalance, rather than any fall in exports during the month, is the real source of concern.

That distinction matters because Pakistan remains chronically dependent on foreign exchange generated outside its productive economy. Remittances have repeatedly provided the cushion that prevents external imbalances from becoming outright crises, while borrowed dollars and deposits from friendly countries have filled the remaining gaps.

Such support can stabilise the balance of payments, but it cannot substitute indefinitely for an export sector capable of paying the country’s way in the world. The latest trade numbers show once again how far Pakistan remains from that objective.

Perhaps the most damning feature of this failure is that even the rupee’s historic depreciation over the past decade has failed to produce the export transformation that textbook economics might have suggested. A cheaper currency should, other things being equal, make exports more competitive internationally.

Pakistan discovered instead that exchange-rate adjustment cannot compensate for expensive energy, weak productivity, poor logistics, inconsistent taxation, regulatory uncertainty and the absence of a coherent export strategy. Depreciation raised the cost of imported inputs while structural weaknesses continued suppressing competitiveness.

The deeper problem is that Pakistan has never developed an export policy commensurate with the seriousness of its foreign-exchange constraint.

The country largely continues selling abroad what established industries already produce rather than systematically identifying global demand, studying emerging supply chains and developing products in which competitive advantage can be created.

Comparative advantage is not always something countries simply inherit. Successful exporting economies invest in skills, technology, infrastructure, and market intelligence to manufacture it.

Pakistan has attempted pieces of that exercise at different times, but rarely with continuity. The export push during the Musharraf period demonstrated what sustained government attention to markets, trade facilitation and commercial diplomacy could achieve, yet subsequent governments failed to build a durable institutional framework around it.

Export policy became another collection of targets and incentive packages, regularly revised but rarely anchored in a serious long-term strategy for moving into new products and markets. The result is an economy that still depends overwhelmingly on a narrow export base while repeatedly rediscovering its balance-of-payments problem.

The contrast with the government’s continuing search for external financing is uncomfortable. Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb recently used his Washington visit to seek a proposed $10 billion US exchange-stabilisation facility, alongside wider financing and investment support.

Such arrangements may provide valuable breathing space, particularly during periods of geopolitical stress, and refusing available financing would serve no purpose. But every fresh request for an external backstop should reinforce the urgency of creating an economy that eventually requires fewer of them. Liquidity buys time.

Export competitiveness determines what the country does with that time.

The July figures therefore deserve to be treated as an early warning rather than another monthly statistical fluctuation. Imports will naturally increase when economic activity strengthens, and suppressing productive imports merely to improve the trade balance would be self-defeating.

The answer lies in expanding exports quickly enough to finance a growing economy without repeatedly exhausting foreign-exchange reserves. That requires a genuine export strategy built around global demand, productivity, diversification and competitiveness, with measurable targets and institutional accountability.

Pakistan has become remarkably proficient at arranging the dollars required to survive the next external financing squeeze. It now needs to become equally proficient at earning them.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

The latest dispute is particularly revealing because Hamas had accepted the broad framework for phased disarmament alongside Israeli withdrawal, only for Netanyahu to insist that Hamas surrender its weapons completely before Israeli forces begin pulling back. A plan Trump only recently described as a major breakthrough has therefore run directly into Israeli resistance.

The disagreement over sequencing is fundamental. The 15-point proposal envisages Hamas relinquishing its weapons through a verified process while Israeli forces withdraw in stages. Netanyahu has effectively reversed that bargain by demanding complete disarmament first, while Israel continues to control most of Gaza.

Such a condition strips the Palestinian side of its principal leverage before Israel fulfils the corresponding part of the arrangement. Unsurprisingly, it also makes implementation far more difficult and gives those opposed to ending the conflict another opportunity to run down the clock.

That appears particularly convenient as Israel approaches its October election. Netanyahu faces strong pressure from far-right political forces that oppose significant concessions and have repeatedly argued against withdrawal from Gaza. His own political survival is therefore increasingly intertwined with maintaining their support.

Compounding matters is his continuing corruption trial. Losing political power would not automatically send him to prison, but a conviction could ultimately carry that consequence, making the stakes surrounding his political future unusually personal as well as political. But why should any of this determine the fate of Gaza?

An entire population cannot remain trapped between bombardment, displacement and destroyed infrastructure because the Israeli prime minister finds compromise electorally inconvenient.

Close to three years of conflict have devastated Gaza’s healthcare and education systems, obstructed reconstruction and left civilians dependent upon restricted humanitarian assistance. A peace framework cannot remain hostage to coalition arithmetic in Jerusalem indefinitely.

The more troubling question concerns Washington. Trump has repeatedly demonstrated that he is willing to exert enormous pressure on allies and adversaries alike when he believes American interests require it. Yet Netanyahu has enjoyed an extraordinary degree of latitude even when Israeli actions have complicated US diplomatic initiatives. That imbalance has encouraged precisely the behaviour now threatening the Gaza plan. If every Israeli objection results in Washington modifying its own position, Netanyahu has little incentive to compromise.

The United States possesses considerable leverage and should finally be prepared to use it.

Military assistance, diplomatic protection and the depth of the bilateral relationship give Washington influence that no other outside power possesses.

Exercising that influence does not require abandoning Israel. It requires insisting that an agreement promoted by the American president cannot be repeatedly rewritten whenever the Israeli government finds one of its obligations politically inconvenient.

There is also a wider regional interest at stake. The Middle East is already absorbing the consequences of the renewed US-Iran war, instability in Lebanon and disruption to trade and energy routes. Allowing Gaza to remain another permanent theatre of conflict increases the risk that these crises begin feeding into one another.

Pakistan and other states that have consistently supported a negotiated Palestinian settlement have every reason to urge Washington to prevent yet another diplomatic opportunity from being squandered.

Trump now faces a test of his own authority. He can allow Netanyahu to keep shifting the conditions until the Gaza plan becomes meaningless, or he can insist that Israeli commitments carry the same weight as those demanded of the Palestinians.

Peace requires concessions from all parties, and no agreement can survive if one participant is permitted to rewrite it unilaterally.

For all Trump’s boasts about deal-making, Gaza has produced a simpler question: who exactly is setting the terms?

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

The interior minister’s remarks that the governance system had effectively collapsed were serious enough to trigger political controversy on their own. His subsequent clarification, his insistence that the present government would complete its term, the resistance from coalition partners and cabinet colleagues, and the wider speculation about possible constitutional restructuring have only added fresh layers of ambiguity. Business leaders have already acknowledged that the resulting uncertainty is making them more cautious at a time when investment is badly needed and foreign direct investment has already fallen sharply.

That is the part of this debate policymakers appear to be underestimating, whatever the merits or demerits of honourable interior minister’s argument.

Investors do not require permanent political harmony. Few economies enjoy that luxury. They do, however, require a reasonable sense of the rules under which they are expected to operate. Capital expenditure decisions, hiring plans, expansion projects and foreign investment commitments all depend upon assumptions about political continuity, taxation, regulation and institutional stability. When those assumptions become fluid, money waits. Projects are postponed. Risk premiums rise. Implementation slows.

Pakistan can scarcely afford that outcome now.

The economy is already dealing with uncertainty generated by the continuing Gulf war, volatile energy prices and disruption across important regional markets. Businesses have cited higher fuel costs, weaker access to Gulf markets and the wider regional conflict as factors depressing both domestic and foreign investment. Overlaying that with an unresolved domestic debate about restructuring the federation, while speculation simultaneously intensifies about the government’s political longevity, is an unnecessary additional burden.

The latest tensions with the Pakistan People’s Party have made matters worse. Political rhetoric surrounding the Azad Jammu and Kashmir elections has revived talk of a countdown to the federal government’s exit, even though similar predictions have repeatedly surfaced and expired since the coalition took office. The constant resetting of these political clocks may provide material for print and electronic media newsrooms but businesses cannot build investment plans around rumours that change every few weeks.

This does not mean questions about governance reform should be suppressed. If the existing administrative structure requires restructuring, the issue deserves a serious national debate. New provinces may ultimately form part of that discussion. But constitutional reform of such magnitude cannot proceed through hints, speeches and competing interpretations. Altering provincial boundaries requires formidable constitutional majorities and broad political consensus. That alone should encourage sobriety rather than speculation.

The government therefore owes the country clarity. If there is a formal proposal for new administrative units, it should be presented transparently, with its constitutional route, economic rationale and likely timetable clearly stated. If there is no such proposal, senior officials should stop allowing speculation to fill the vacuum. The same principle applies to questions about the government’s tenure. Coalition disagreements are part of democratic politics, but persistent suggestions of imminent collapse inevitably carry an economic cost.

Markets can price higher taxes, weaker growth and even political setbacks. They cannot efficiently price a constantly shifting political horizon.

Pakistan’s economy has enough genuine problems without manufacturing additional uncertainty through careless political signalling. Whatever reforms are ultimately considered, the machinery of government and the economy must continue functioning with predictability. Political change, constitutional debate and administrative reform can all be managed. What cannot be managed indefinitely is an environment in which nobody knows what comes next.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

The answer remains difficult to reconcile with the spirit of August 11. For many religious minorities, the most urgent concern is not symbolic recognition but security of life, faith and dignity. Reports and allegations surrounding forced conversions, particularly involving vulnerable minority communities’ girls and women, continue to generate fear and distrust. When families feel powerless to protect their daughters, when questions of consent are clouded by social and institutional pressures, and when victims struggle to obtain justice, the promise of equal citizenship becomes painfully distant from the lived reality. This year’s minority rights march at the Quaid’s mausoleum, with its 11 demands, therefore, deserves more than ceremonial attention. Its calls for protection against forced conversions, removal of hate speech and discriminatory material from textbooks, socio-economic and educational rights, implementation of the five per cent employment quota, and security, and legal protection for places of worship point to serious structural problems rather than isolated grievances.

Significantly, the organisers also called for constitutional amendments to remove the religious qualification for the offices of president and prime minister, currently restricted to Muslims. This demand need not be viewed as a challenge to Pakistan’s constitutional identity as an Islamic republic. Whether or not such an amendment is desirable is ultimately a matter for democratic constitutional debate, but the demand itself underscores the sense of political exclusion felt by sections of the minority population.

The nation cannot meaningfully honour the Founder by quoting his vision once a year while ignoring the anxieties of citizens whose communities remain vulnerable and live in a perpetual state of fear. The test of a democratic state is not the eloquence of its declarations but the safety, dignity and equality enjoyed by those most at risk. Rather than treated as a ceremonial occasion August 11 should be time for an annual audit of the state’s commitment to equal citizenship. The government must ensure that allegations of forced conversion are investigated transparently, victims receive protection and access to justice, and places of worship and minority communities are effectively safeguarded. No less important, educational curricula must reject narratives that foster prejudice rather than citizenship.

The August 11 vision laid out by the father of the nation must not become a decorative passage in Pakistan’s history. The continuing gap between that promise and the reality faced by minorities, therefore, is not something merely to be commemorated; it is something to be confronted. Until every Pakistani can practice their faith without fear and claim equal protection without pleading for it, the promise of August 11 will remain unfulfilled.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

After decades of operating through two vertically integrated public utilities, separating transmission, distribution and gas trading could finally create the institutional architecture needed for a more competitive, transparent and financially sustainable gas market.

There is, interestingly, a certain historical logic to the proposal. Pakistan’s gas infrastructure did not begin with today’s vertically integrated Sui utilities. The discovery of substantial gas reserves at Sui in 1952 was followed by the establishment of the Sui Gas Transmission Company in 1954 to transport the newly discovered resource.

The transmission function subsequently evolved alongside regional distribution companies, eventually culminating in the creation of SSGC in 1989 through the merger of Sui Gas Transmission Company, Karachi Gas Company and Indus Gas Company. SNGPL similarly evolved into a vertically integrated transmission and distribution utility serving the northern parts of the country.

The structure that once made sense for expanding a nascent gas network is now increasingly ill-suited to a market that must contend with declining indigenous gas supplies, imported LNG, competing suppliers, chronic financial imbalances and the need for private investment.

In that sense, therefore, the proposed separation of transmission, distribution and trading is less a radical departure than an attempt to redesign the sector for a fundamentally different energy environment.

The idea itself is not new. Earlier attempts to restructure the Sui companies were shelved amid concerns over financial and technical viability, as well as the absence of adequate consultation with provinces and other stakeholders. That history is important.

The latest reform effort therefore deserves support, but it also warrants considerably more care than simply approving a new organisational chart.

At its core, the problem is straightforward. Pakistan’s gas sector has accumulated deep structural distortions over the years.

Below-cost pricing for some consumer categories, cross-subsidisation, unaccounted-for gas, delayed payments, legacy LNG obligations and accumulated liabilities have together created a system in which the commercial health of one segment is often used to sustain another. The resulting financial imbalances have contributed to the broader energy sector’s circular debt problem.

The proposed framework attempts to address precisely these weaknesses. The introduction of a multi-year tariff regime based on a regulatory asset base and weighted average cost of capital could provide utilities with greater predictability while linking allowed returns to the capital actually employed.

Separating transmission from trading and distribution could also allow each business to be evaluated on its own economics rather than allowing inefficiencies to remain buried within vertically integrated entities.

Most importantly, the proposed transition towards competitive gas sales deserves attention.

Allowing commercial and industrial consumers to increasingly procure gas through competitive channels, supported by third-party access to the transmission network, could gradually introduce the discipline that an administratively managed market has struggled to deliver.

The proposed Gas Market Release Programme, under which a portion of gas volumes would be progressively made available to private participants, could provide the initial catalyst.

But the success of this reform will depend less on the elegance of its design than on its execution.

Breaking two companies into five or more entities does not, by itself, create competition. Nor does changing their names and balance sheets eliminate the underlying financial problems.

There is a genuine risk that Pakistan could end up with a larger number of state-owned entities carrying the same inefficiencies under a different organisational structure. The reform must therefore be driven by economic function rather than administrative convenience.

This is particularly important for the proposed transmission company. A common transmission network operating on a transparent third-party-access basis could be an important step towards an open gas market. But its governance will be critical.

Access must be non-discriminatory, wheeling charges transparent and investment decisions commercially rational. The transmission company must not become another vertically protected public monopoly.

The same caution applies to the distribution companies. The existing disparities in system losses across provinces demonstrate why simply dividing networks geographically will not be sufficient.

The proposed entities must have clear performance benchmarks, independent management and incentives to reduce UFG and improve collections. Cross-subsidies should not simply migrate from one balance sheet to another.

Pricing reform will be even more politically sensitive. The roadmap’s recognition that untargeted subsidies must eventually give way to targeted support is directionally correct.

Keeping gas prices artificially low for broad consumer categories may appear socially convenient, but the cost does not disappear. It is ultimately transferred to other consumers, taxpayers, the gas companies or the circular debt stock.

That does not mean that vulnerable households should suddenly be exposed to full cost-reflective prices. Quite the opposite. A carefully designed targeted subsidy mechanism should protect those who genuinely need support while allowing the underlying market to become increasingly transparent.

The transition must be gradual enough to avoid a disruptive price shock, but credible enough that investors and market participants can see where the system is headed.

There is also a constitutional dimension that cannot be brushed aside. Gas is not merely another commercial commodity in Pakistan’s political economy. Provincial interests, particularly around gas-producing regions, have historically made its allocation and pricing contentious.

Any major restructuring will therefore require genuine engagement with the provinces and, where necessary, the Council of Common Interests. Consensus-building may slow the process, but attempting to bypass it could ultimately slow the reform much more.

The proposed holding company for legacy receivables and liabilities is another sensible idea in principle. New operating entities should ideally begin life with clean and transparent balance sheets rather than inheriting decades of accumulated financial baggage.

But this cannot become an exercise in merely transferring liabilities from one government entity to another. The legacy stock must eventually have a credible resolution mechanism and a clearly identified fiscal cost.

Equally important will be the strengthening of OGRA. A deregulated or semi-deregulated gas market does not mean the disappearance of regulation. It requires better regulation.

OGRA will need considerably stronger capacity to monitor competition, enforce third-party access, oversee market conduct, regulate natural monopoly segments and prevent the emergence of private monopolies in place of public ones.

The government should therefore resist the temptation to rush the unbundling simply to demonstrate progress. The appointment of a transaction adviser should be followed by rigorous technical, financial and legal due diligence. The proposed corporate structure, tariff methodology, treatment of legacy liabilities, provincial arrangements and sequencing of market liberalisation should all be stress-tested before implementation.

There is a strong economic case for reforming the Sui model. Pakistan cannot indefinitely sustain a gas sector in which commercial and social objectives are mixed together, costs are obscured through cross-subsidies and accumulated inefficiencies eventually surface as circular debt.

A more competitive market, transparent tariffs and private-sector participation can improve investment incentives and ultimately reduce the burden on the public exchequer.

But the objective should not be unbundling for the sake of unbundling. It should be to create a gas market in which transmission is efficiently operated, distribution companies are accountable for their performance, suppliers compete on a level playing field and vulnerable consumers receive explicit and targeted support.

This is a reform worth pursuing. The government should, however, learn from the fate of previous attempts. The gas sector has little room for another ambitious blueprint that gets trapped between institutional resistance, political disagreement and implementation delays.

Careful sequencing, provincial consensus, transparent financial arrangements and a genuinely independent regulator will be indispensable.

Done properly, the restructuring of SNGPL and SSGC could mark the beginning of the transition from the old Sui model towards a competitive gas market. Done hastily, it could merely create more companies without solving the problems that made reform necessary in the first place. The government should therefore proceed, but proceed with utmost care.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

The NATO clause leaves the final decision on how to act or merely to condemn to each member country; however, as the Makkah Accord has not yet been shared with the media, it is not quite clear as to what is the exact obligation of each member country in case one member is attacked.

Speculation has reached a fever pitch with some arguing that the Accord is directed at Iran subsequent to its retaliatory strikes against US and Israel that severely damaged US bases in the Gulf countries as well as their civilian infrastructure while others point their finger at Israel, based on America’s unquestioning support for even patently illegal Israeli actions in the region, including against US allies (an example being the 9 September 2025 attack on Doha). This prompted Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar to clarify that it is a defensive pact and not targeted against any country.

Two observations are critical. First, the Makkah Accord is reminiscent of the 1980s US thinking that was supportive of NATO-style multilateral collective defence pacts in Asia, including the Middle East (as successors to SEATO and CENTO that collapsed in the 1970s) but was abandoned in favour of direct US military ties, arms sales, and access agreement that post-28 February compromised due to Iranian strikes.

And, secondly, Turkiye’s President Erdogan has offered membership to other countries in the region with the objective of strengthening ties between Muslim nations and, as per some analysts, to provide a religious context to irritants posed by non-Muslim nations against their Muslim minorities. It is relevant to note that on 5 August 2026, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), on occasions hesitant to take bold decisions against India, issued a statement marking the seventh anniversary of Azad Jammu and Kashmir’s special status and called for India’s reversal of its unilateral measures, urging respect for Kashmiri self-determination.

The three countries bring much to the table. Pakistan, of course, brings a battle-hardened military as well as its nuclear arsenal - the only Muslim nuclear country to-date courtesy the launch of the programme by Z A Bhutto followed by Nawaz Sharif’s decision to proceed with the Chaghi tests in spite of considerable US pressure at the time.

Turkiye, a NATO member, possesses a formidable defence industrial base; chiefly, Baykar’s drone ecosystem and the KAAN fighter programme. And, Saudi Arabia has the capital depth to fund large-scale defence localization, and has already engaged in joint military protocols with Pakistan. Thus, it stands to reason that the three countries can benefit considerably from this accord and one would hope that Pakistan’s defence industry is subsequently upgraded that would make the country less reliant on expensive foreign defence imports.

However, as matters stand today, out of the three member countries Pakistan’s economy remains fragile, which is a source of serious concern. Last month, Mohammad Aurangzeb, the Federal Finance Minister, formally requested the US for a 10 billion-dollar bilateral exchange stabilisation support facility, which provides dollars, swaps or guarantees to support reserves or steady currencies, for five years aimed to boost reserves, stabilise the rupee and reduce reliance on the IMF.

While this may be construed as borrowing from Paul to pay off Peter, thereby seriously compromising the spirit of the pledge by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif that the ongoing IMF loan would be the last in the country’s history, yet the economy remains burdened with not only negative geopolitical factors associated with the Middle East conflict but is also hostage to heavy reliance on borrowing to fund a current expenditure that has little positive impact on the growth rate or unemployment levels.

There is, therefore, an urgent need to slash current expenditure by at least 2 to 3 trillion rupees, that would allow for a less contractionary fiscal policy, thereby jumpstarting industrial growth and, any investment that maybe forthcoming as a consequence of the Makkah Accord, to channel it into high value-adding industries with an export potential rather than continuing to rely on exporting what is surplus to our domestic needs.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

The prohibition of torture is a constitutional imperative and also an obligation under international human rights law. Equally important is the fact that it is central to the credibility of the criminal justice system. A state that permits torture, whether through commission or omission, undermines public confidence in its institutions.

Investigative agencies that rely on coercion rather than professional evidence-gathering compromise both justice and the integrity of the judicial process, producing unreliable confessions while discouraging proper investigation and effective policing. The concerns raised during the HRCP consultation, therefore, deserve urgent attention.

As the well-known rights activist Hina Jilani rightly observed, torture is not confined to physical violence. Psychological abuse, prolonged isolation, intimidation and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment can inflict equally lasting harm and must be recognised as such within the enforcement framework.

Equally serious is the absence of clear operational procedures for law enforcement agencies. A law criminalizing torture cannot be effectively implemented unless police officers, prison authorities and investigators are equipped with practical guidelines for preventing, documenting, investigating and responding to such violations.

The discussion also highlighted the more fundamental problem of accountability. Torture thrives where there is little or no prospect of punishment. Independent investigations into custodial abuse, prompt prosecution of offenders, and credible oversight mechanisms are indispensable if the law is to serve as a genuine deterrent.

Victims, too, must be able to report abuse without fear of reprisals, while judicial safeguards against arbitrary detention require far more rigorous enforcement.

Equally significant was the reminder that concerns highlighted by the UN Committee against Torture nearly a decade ago continue to feature in Pakistan’s latest review. Their persistence points to structural deficiencies that remain almost completely unaddressed.

The recommendations emerging from the consultation therefore merit serious consideration. Prison rules should be aligned with constitutional guarantees and international human rights standards, while the internment centres should either be abolished or brought within the civilian prison system under independent oversight.

Ratifying the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture (OPCAT) would further strengthen transparency by establishing an independent preventive mechanism with the authority to conduct regular inspections of all places of detention.

The larger challenge, therefore, is one of implementation rather than legislation. As mentioned earlier, Pakistan’s anti-torture framework is no longer lacking in legislation; it is lacking in implementation, political will and institutional accountability.

Unless these deficiencies are addressed, custodial violence will remain an enduring stain on the justice system. While the primary responsibility rests with the state, civil society, the legal profession, the media and educational institutions also have a vital role in fostering a culture that rejects torture in all its forms and demands accountability wherever it occurs.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

AI is expected to have a worldwide impact on employment, although its effects could differ across developed and developing countries. At the same time, it will create opportunities for those who take the right steps at the right time.

Companies and governments in the developed world are spending huge sums on AI, as reflected in the staggering $775 billion being invested by just five US companies. This investment will generate greater efficiencies, but it could also eliminate numerous entry-level jobs. Many fresh graduates are already struggling to find employment, and this challenge is only likely to accentuate.

This could also affect the growth of Home Remittances to Pakistan, as fewer educated and skilled workers may find employment opportunities in the West and the Middle East. Together, these regions account for the bulk of workers’ remittance inflows into Pakistan.

Over the past two decades, Pakistan has relied heavily on inward remittances to support its balance-of-payments position. Domestic economic productivity has declined relative to the rest of the world, resulting in weaker exports and growing imports in real terms. This gap has largely been filled by the continued strong growth in remittances.

With AI threatening jobs and the possibility of an economic slowdown in the Middle East due to the ongoing war, Pakistan’s external challenges are likely to increase over the medium term.

There is also a risk of job losses in the domestic market, both in export-oriented services and local businesses, as AI rapidly penetrates the economy and automated systems take over knowledge-based tasks. Pakistan’s fastest-growing export segment is IT and other business services, which have doubled to around $6 billion over the past few years.

However, much of this work consists of relatively basic tasks that Pakistan secures because of labour-cost arbitrage. AI is rapidly taking over such tasks, reducing the need for outsourcing. The cost of using AI is significantly lower than employing workers in developing countries, meaning this labour-cost advantage is diminishing. Low-end and entry-level roles are particularly vulnerable to automation.

Therefore, the growth of services exports based on low-skilled work is likely to slow. India is already bearing the brunt of this shift because of the size of its outsourcing industry. Pakistan and other developing countries may soon begin to feel the heat as well.

Meanwhile, SMEs in the domestic market are reducing headcounts and subscribing to AI tools to replace tasks previously performed by employees.

Pakistan’s authorities and technology companies must adapt to these rapidly changing global realities. They need to move up the value chain by developing expertise in more sophisticated areas and moving beyond call centres, basic coding and routine number-crunching jobs. However, this is easier said than done. According to industry experts, many of Pakistan’s large IT companies are not yet prepared to embrace this transformation.

Another opportunity is to use AI to improve the capabilities of underprepared high-school and college graduates by helping them acquire marketable skills. Instead of relying solely on lengthy degree programmes, young men and women could be selected through screening and provided with skills required by both local and international firms. AI could also be used to significantly improve the country’s healthcare and education systems, where traditional approaches have often failed.

In short, AI could offer more advantages than disadvantages to countries such as Pakistan, provided resources are deployed effectively. Otherwise, it could become a nightmare, as the country does not have sufficient buffers to withstand several years of economic and employment disruption.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

At a time when the federal government speaks of austerity, right-sizing and administrative reform, the disclosure exposes something far more troubling than bureaucratic inertia. It reveals a state machinery that appears remarkably adept at preserving itself even after the constitution has ordered otherwise.

The figures are difficult to ignore. The subjects of 17 federal ministries were devolved to the provinces under the 18th Amendment, yet the federal administrative structure remained largely intact. Of more than 50,000 employees serving these ministries, fewer than 6,700 were transferred to provincial governments, while over 43,000 remained with the federation.

Even hundreds of employees from dissolved institutions and thousands serving in the secretariats of devolved ministries continued to remain under federal control. One is therefore entitled to ask whether devolution was fully implemented or merely administratively relabelled.

That question becomes even more important in light of recent government initiatives. Only days ago, the prime minister reiterated his commitment to right-sizing government by eliminating unnecessary posts and improving efficiency.

The interior minister has meanwhile reopened the debate over creating new provinces to bring governance closer to the people. Both initiatives rest upon the assumption that government must become leaner, more responsive and administratively effective.

Yet before creating new administrative structures or promising further reform, the state should first explain why reforms mandated by the constitution itself remain only partially implemented more than a decade-and-a-half later.

The implications extend well beyond administrative tidiness. The 18th Amendment was designed to redefine the relationship between the federation and the provinces by transferring responsibilities closer to the people. Whether one supported or opposed the amendment, its constitutional intent was clear. When institutions continue operating after their functions have been devolved, duplication becomes inevitable.

So do overlapping mandates, unnecessary expenditure, blurred accountability and bureaucratic confusion. Governments cannot credibly speak of efficiency while maintaining structures whose original constitutional purpose has already been transferred elsewhere.

Equally troubling is the apparent absence of institutional ownership. The Establishment Division maintains that employee adjustments were completed and that asset transfers fell within the Cabinet Division’s responsibility. The Cabinet Division, in turn, says evaluating the success of devolution is not part of its mandate and directs inquiries towards the Council of Common Interests.

Every institution appears able to explain why responsibility belongs somewhere else. Unfortunately, governance rarely improves when accountability becomes a relay race. Pakistan seldom lacks constitutional provisions, legislation or policy announcements. The real deficiency lies in implementation. Files move, notifications are issued and commissions complete their work, yet the intended reforms often remain unfinished long after official deadlines have passed.

Institutions survive under revised names, functions overlap, expenditure persists and governments eventually begin discussing another round of reforms before completing the previous one.

That institutional culture carries an obvious fiscal cost. Maintaining duplicate administrative structures while repeatedly urging citizens to accept austerity sends precisely the wrong message.

Taxpayers cannot reasonably be expected to shoulder heavier burdens while governments themselves struggle to implement efficiencies already required by the constitution. Administrative reform begins with demonstrating that the state is prepared to reform itself.

The government should therefore publish a comprehensive review of the implementation of the 18th Amendment, identifying which ministries continue to exist, under what legal authority they operate, what functions they currently perform and why those functions remain at the federal level. If constitutional devolution has been completed, the administrative structure should reflect that reality. If it has not, the public deserves to know why.

Constitutional amendments are not intended to become symbolic exercises. They exist to change how governments function. When ministries disappear only on paper while continuing in practice, the problem is no longer constitutional design. It is administrative unwillingness to carry out what the constitution already requires.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

Pakistan has debated population growth for decades. Governments have announced policies, launched awareness campaigns, established councils and repeatedly declared family planning a national priority. Yet the country’s demographic trajectory has barely changed. Every few years another government rediscovers the problem, promises decisive action and then quietly allows the issue to drift back into the background until the next set of alarming statistics appears.

The consequences have become impossible to ignore. Pakistan is already among the world’s most populous countries, yet unlike most others at the top of that list it occupies a comparatively modest land area with finite natural resources and fragile public infrastructure. Every year, population growth places additional pressure on schools that cannot accommodate enough students, hospitals that cannot treat enough patients, cities that cannot provide enough housing, and labour markets that cannot generate enough productive employment. The debate is no longer about future risks. It is about a crisis that is already visible across almost every sector of national life.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect is that millions of Pakistani children begin life at a disadvantage they did nothing to deserve. More than 60 percent are affected by stunting or related forms of malnutrition, limiting physical development, cognitive ability and long-term productivity. That alone should have transformed population management into one of the country’s foremost national priorities. Bringing more children into circumstances where adequate nutrition, healthcare and education remain beyond the reach of many families serves neither those children nor the country’s future. Population policy cannot be separated from human development because the two are inseparable.

The minister was therefore right to emphasise parental responsibility and wider access to reproductive healthcare. Modern family planning remains underutilised, while preventable maternal health complications continue imposing heavy social and economic costs. Better awareness, stronger primary healthcare and easier access to reproductive health services are all necessary parts of the solution. They are, however, only part of it, because the larger failure lies in governance.

Population management has never received the sustained political attention reserved for other national priorities. Governments have tended to approach it through periodic campaigns rather than continuous policy. The creation of another national council may well prove useful, but Pakistan has created committees, commissions and task forces before. Their existence has rarely translated into measurable improvements because implementation has consistently lagged behind official declarations.

If the government genuinely considers population growth a national emergency, then it should treat it as one. Clear national targets should be published for contraceptive use, maternal healthcare, female education, child nutrition and population growth itself. Provincial governments should be required to report progress regularly, while independent assessments should measure whether policies are actually changing outcomes rather than simply producing official statements. Public awareness campaigns cannot substitute for measurable performance.

Pakistan’s demographic challenge is steadily becoming an economic challenge, a healthcare challenge, an education challenge and, ultimately, a governance challenge. Every year that meaningful action is postponed makes the eventual adjustment more difficult and more expensive. The warning of 400 million people by 2040 should therefore mark more than another moment of official concern. Pakistan has spent years talking about population growth as though it were tomorrow’s problem. It has already become today’s.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

The Punjab Police’s decision to suspend the entire staff of the station is an extraordinary measure, reflecting the gravity of the incident. The rationale offered by the Lahore DIG that no officer questioned why a woman had been brought to the police station in the absence of female personnel or why established procedures had not been followed underscores a troubling institutional culture in which silence and negligence appear to have displaced vigilance and professional responsibility. While such collective administrative action cannot substitute for individual criminal liability, it does acknowledge that institutional failures rarely occur in isolation.

Particularly distressing is the reported vulnerability of the victim. The state’s duty of care is greatest for those least able to protect themselves. Instead, according to the allegations, that vulnerability was exploited by someone entrusted with enforcing the law. If these allegations are proven, the crime would represent not merely the misconduct of a single official but a grave abuse of state authority.

The prompt registration of the FIR, the arrest of the accused officer, the intervention of the prosecutor general and the judicial oversight of the investigation are necessary and welcome developments. However, public confidence will depend less on these initial steps than on whether the investigation remains impartial and the prosecution is conducted with professionalism, transparency and independence. Pakistan has witnessed too many cases in which justice is delayed or diluted as public outrage subsides. This case must not be allowed to follow that familiar pattern.

The episode also raises broader questions about policing standards in Pakistan. Police stations cannot remain opaque spaces where supervisory mechanisms are weak and internal accountability is largely reactive. Compliance with existing procedures governing the handling of women, the mandatory presence of female personnel, functional surveillance systems, proper visitor registers and effective internal oversight cannot be dismissed as administrative formalities. They are essential safeguards designed to prevent abuses of authority and protect those who seek the state’s help.

Restoring public confidence will require more than securing the conviction of one accused official. It demands sustained institutional reform that strengthens oversight, enforces professional standards, and reinforces the principle that no one — especially those entrusted with enforcing the law — is above it. Justice for the victim is imperative, so too is ensuring that police stations remain places of safety rather than fear. Only then can confidence in law enforcement begin to be restored.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

The latest directive will therefore be judged less by its language than by what the government places before the public when that month expires.

The case for right-sizing is compelling. Pakistan’s federal government carries layers of departments, autonomous bodies, vacant posts, overlapping mandates and administrative structures that absorb scarce public money without delivering corresponding value.

At a time when taxpayers face repeated increases in levies and development spending remains constrained, every unnecessary position becomes harder to defend. A government that constantly asks citizens to make sacrifices cannot continue financing institutional excess merely because reform is politically or administratively inconvenient.

Some steps have already been taken. The Utility Stores Corporation, Pakistan Public Works Department and Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation have been closed, while vacant posts across ministries and departments have also reportedly been abolished.

The government also claims that these measures have reduced federal civilian expenditure as a proportion of GDP. Those developments deserve acknowledgement, but they also require proper verification. Savings announced in meetings often look different once severance costs, pension liabilities, transferred functions and replacement arrangements are fully accounted for.

The prime minister’s order for a third-party audit is therefore important. Such an audit should establish how many posts have actually been eliminated, how much recurring expenditure has been removed, what liabilities remain and whether the abolished institutions’ functions have merely shifted elsewhere.

Without this level of detail, right-sizing can easily become an accounting exercise in which departments disappear from one column while their costs reappear in another. Transparency is the only safeguard against that familiar outcome.

There is also the question of performance. Cutting posts indiscriminately can weaken institutions that are already struggling, while preserving politically protected positions would defeat the entire purpose of the exercise. The review must therefore distinguish between genuine redundancy and essential capacity.

Modern technology and better training can improve productivity, as the prime minister noted, but digital systems cannot compensate for poor design, unclear authority or unqualified appointments. Reform must examine what each institution does, whether that function remains necessary and how it can be delivered at lower cost without reducing public service quality.

The government’s record gives reason for caution, of course. Similar declarations have repeatedly promised leaner administration, better-performing state-owned enterprises and lower fiscal waste.

Follow-through has usually been partial, delayed or obscured by the absence of publicly available results. Bureaucratic resistance, political patronage and weak accountability have repeatedly diluted reform once the initial announcement faded from attention. That history is precisely why the one-month deadline should now be treated as a public commitment.

When the deadline expires, the Prime Minister’s Office should release the committee’s recommendations in full, along with a ministry-wise list of posts abolished, institutions restructured, projected annual savings and implementation dates.

The third-party audit should also be published once completed. Any exclusions should be explained rather than hidden behind vague references to administrative sensitivity.

Citizens are entitled to know whether the government has actually reduced its own cost before asking them to bear further fiscal adjustment.

Right-sizing can become a meaningful reform if it is implemented consistently and protected from political interference. It can also become another headline that produces a meeting, a committee and little else.

The prime minister has chosen the deadline himself. One month from now, transparency demands that he show exactly what has been achieved.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, it has also proved long enough for legally harvested timber worth an estimated Rs3.8 billion to remain stacked along roadsides and inside forests, steadily losing its value while successive governments failed to decide what to do with it. If ever there were a more compelling illustration of how administrative paralysis destroys public wealth, it would be difficult to find.

The facts are extraordinary. Under the Dry Wind Fall Policy, timber from dry and wind-fallen trees was legally harvested between 2008 and 2010 after a lengthy process involving official approvals, working plans, marking of trees and third-party validation.

Most of the timber was eventually sold, but around 0.55 million cubic feet was left behind when the policy expired. 16 years later, it remains where it was, exposed to rain, floods and decay, waiting for a decision that should have been taken years ago. The result is an estimated Rs3.8bn in timber steadily deteriorating while nobody in government appears willing to accept responsibility.

Let’s not forget that the loss extends beyond government finances. Under the policy, 80 percent of the proceeds from timber sales were to go to local forest owners, with the remaining 20 percent accruing to the government. Those communities have therefore watched a legitimate economic asset deteriorate year after year because official approvals never materialised.

Forest management depends upon cooperation between the state and local populations. Governments cannot expect that cooperation to endure indefinitely when bureaucratic indecision repeatedly deprives communities of income that legally belongs to them.

Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the story is the explanation reportedly offered by officials. According to a senior forest department official, the provincial government has been reluctant to authorise the sale because photographs of trucks carrying timber could trigger accusations of smuggling on social media. If that is indeed the reason for delaying disposal of legally harvested timber for well over a decade, it represents a remarkable admission of administrative weakness. Governments are elected to govern, not to suspend lawful decisions because they fear online criticism.

The argument collapses under even modest scrutiny. The timber was harvested under an approved policy. It was marked, validated and transported through official procedures. Every stage was documented. If governments genuinely believe the process was lawful, transparency provides the obvious answer. Publish inventories, disclose auction details, invite independent oversight and allow public scrutiny of the entire disposal process. Hiding behind the prospect of hostile social media commentary merely creates greater suspicion while guaranteeing continued financial loss.

Unfortunately, this episode reflects a much broader pattern in public administration.

Pakistan rarely suffers from a shortage of policies. It suffers from an inability to implement them. Strategies are announced, notifications are issued, committees are constituted and procedures are painstakingly completed. Then progress simply stops. Files remain pending, approvals are delayed indefinitely and projects gradually lose both momentum and purpose. Years later, governments confront problems that their own indecision has created.

That institutional culture carries enormous costs, of course. Assets depreciate. Investors lose confidence. Public resources are wasted. Citizens become increasingly convinced that official processes exist to delay decisions rather than facilitate them. Every such failure reinforces the perception that bureaucracy has become an obstacle to development instead of an instrument of governance.

The timber lying across Kohistan is therefore more than a forestry issue. It is a monument to administrative inertia. Every passing monsoon further reduces its value, while floods threaten to wash away what remains. Meanwhile, governments continue debating approvals that should have been routine ages ago.

The provincial cabinet should immediately authorise the transparent disposal of the remaining timber, publish every relevant record and establish clear procedures to ensure that harvested timber can never again be left to rot because officials are unwilling to make decisions. Public policy serves little purpose if implementation ends where paperwork does.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

A technology-driven monitoring system that tracks petroleum products from ports and refineries to storage depots and retail outlets promises to fundamentally alter that equation.

The rationale is straightforward. A sector handling billions of rupees worth of petroleum products every month cannot continue to be regulated through fragmented information and delayed interventions.

Real-time visibility across the supply chain offers regulators an opportunity to identify hoarding, artificial shortages, unexplained inventory movements and supply disruptions before they evolve into full-blown crises. If implemented effectively, digital oversight can improve both market discipline and consumer confidence.

Pakistan has learnt this lesson the hard way. The findings of the Oil Inquiry Commission, constituted in the wake of the 2020 petroleum crisis, exposed deep structural weaknesses in the downstream petroleum market. Weak oversight, inadequate data, poor coordination among institutions and regulatory lapses allowed market manipulation to flourish, ultimately leaving consumers to bear the consequences. Several of the commission’s recommendations centred on strengthening monitoring, improving transparency, and embracing technology to make regulatory oversight more proactive than reactive.

Progress since then has been gradual, but the latest initiative suggests that at least some of those lessons are finally being translated into policy.

Be that as it may, digitalisation should be viewed as an enabler rather than a destination. Technology can identify anomalies; it cannot substitute for sound governance. The effectiveness of any monitoring platform will ultimately depend on the regulator’s willingness to act promptly, consistently and without fear or favour. Data has little value if enforcement remains selective or delayed.

The encouraging aspect is that the initiative appears to extend beyond simple vehicle tracking. Integrating depot telemetry, tanker tracking, digital sales reporting and centralised monitoring has the potential to create an end-to-end view of the petroleum supply chain. Such systems are commonplace in mature energy markets and significantly reduce opportunities for leakages, undocumented movements and inventory manipulation.

Yet digital monitoring should form only one pillar of a broader reform agenda.

Pakistan has already taken important steps towards liberalising the downstream petroleum market, including the recent move towards daily petroleum price adjustments. That reform better aligns domestic prices with international market movements and reduces the abrupt price shocks associated with fortnightly revisions.

The logical progression is towards a fully deregulated petroleum market where competition, rather than administrative intervention, increasingly determines commercial outcomes.

Such liberalisation, however, requires stronger—not weaker—regulation. Markets function efficiently only when participants compete on equal terms. Robust digital oversight can therefore complement deregulation by ensuring compliance, preventing collusion and identifying anti-competitive behaviour without unnecessarily interfering in commercial decisions.

There is also unfinished business elsewhere in the sector. The Inland-Freight Equalisation Margin (IFEM), originally designed to ensure uniform petroleum prices across the country, has frequently attracted criticism over its administration and utilisation.

Greater transparency in its operation, supported by digital data on product movement and freight costs, would help reinforce confidence that the mechanism serves consumers rather than creating unintended distortions.

Similarly, Pakistan continues to underutilise one of its most efficient transportation assets. White oil pipelines remain significantly cheaper, safer and environmentally preferable to road transport, yet a substantial share of petroleum products continues to move by tanker.

Encouraging greater pipeline utilisation where capacity exists would lower logistics costs, reduce road congestion, improve safety and minimise carbon emissions. A digitally monitored supply chain should also provide policymakers with better information to optimise transport choices across the network.

The proposed restructuring of OGRA itself is equally important. Modern regulatory systems require specialised expertise in data analytics, digital compliance, market surveillance and competition economics alongside traditional engineering and technical skills. Building institutional capacity will determine whether technological investments translate into better regulation or merely better reporting.

The profound challenge before policymakers is to ensure that digital transformation becomes part of a comprehensive modernisation of the petroleum sector rather than another standalone initiative.

Pakistan’s energy reforms have gathered welcome momentum in recent years, from refinery upgradation to downstream liberalisation. Strengthening regulatory capability through technology should reinforce that trajectory.

Consumers ultimately care little about the sophistication of regulatory platforms. They, actually, care about uninterrupted supplies, fair prices and competitive markets free from manipulation. If digital monitoring helps deliver those outcomes, it will represent far more than a technological upgrade. It will mark another important step towards building a petroleum sector that is transparent, efficient and increasingly governed by market principles rather than administrative discretion.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

Seven years have passed since India’s unilateral decision of Aug 5, 2019 to revoke the special constitutional status of state of Jammu and Kashmir and alter the administrative structure of the disputed territory — a move Pakistan has consistently maintained was incompatible with the territory’s internationally-recognised disputed status and the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

Yet the passage of time has neither diminished the centrality of the Kashmir dispute nor eased the suffering of its people. Instead, it continues to cast a long shadow over relations between South Asia’s two nuclear-armed neighbours.

The statements issued by Pakistan’s political and military leadership on the occasion reaffirm the country’s long-standing position that the people of Jammu and Kashmir have an inalienable right to self-determination in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Such declarations underscore an important reality: despite repeated international calls for restraint and dialogue, there has been little progress towards a political settlement. The prolonged absence of meaningful engagement has only entrenched mistrust and left successive generations of Kashmiris to endure uncertainty and conflict.

Equally disturbing are the persistent concerns over the human rights situation in Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir. International human rights organisations have documented prolonged restrictions on civil liberties, arbitrary detentions, custodial torture and death, curbs on political activity, limitations on media freedom and excessive use of draconian laws. Calls by independent observers for greater transparency, accountability and unrestricted access to the territory have largely gone unanswered. Sustainable peace cannot emerge where fundamental rights remain under strain and political space continues to shrink.

The international community also bears a responsibility that extends beyond periodic expressions of concern. Strategic and economic interests should not eclipse the imperative of upholding international law and protecting human rights. The United Nations, despite the constraints imposed by geopolitical rivalries, remains the principal forum for addressing disputes of this nature. A renewed diplomatic effort aimed at encouraging dialogue, reducing tensions and creating conditions conducive to a peaceful settlement is long overdue.

The wider costs of the unresolved dispute are equally evident. South Asia remains one of the least economically integrated regions in the world despite confronting common challenges such as climate change, food insecurity, energy shortages and economic vulnerability. The persistence of hostility diverts attention and resources from these pressing priorities. Meaningful regional cooperation will remain elusive unless India demonstrates the political will to reopen channels of communication, reverse measures that have deepened alienation in the occupied territory and engage in a serious process of dialogue.

As Youm-e-Istehsal Kashmir is observed, the occasion should serve not merely as a reaffirmation of solidarity with the Kashmiri people but also as a reminder that unresolved disputes do not disappear with the passage of time. Seven years after the events of Aug 5, 2019 and nearly 79 years after Independence the Kashmir issue remains central to peace and stability in South Asia. A durable settlement can only emerge through dialogue, respect for international law and a political process that reflects the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Until then, the region will continue to bear the costs of a conflict that has remained unresolved for far too long.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

Growth improved to 3.7 percent, large-scale manufacturing returned to expansion, the fiscal deficit narrowed, reserves strengthened and average inflation remained within target. None of this is trivial after the prolonged adjustment of recent years.

The detail, however, also shows that the economy is entering FY2026-27 with the same imbalance that has cut short almost every previous recovery: imports have revived, exports have not, and remittances are once again carrying the external account.

Goods exports fell by 4.6 percent during FY2025-26, while goods imports rose by 9 percent. On a broader basis, exports of goods and services were virtually unchanged at USD 40.9 billion, against an 8.5 percent increase in imports to USD 76.4 billion. The trade deficit widened by close to USD 6 billion and the current account moved from a surplus of USD 1.84 billion to a deficit of USD 139 million. The deficit is modest; the pattern behind it is not.

Workers’ remittances increased by 8.6 percent to a record USD 41.6 billion and prevented a far larger deterioration in the external balance. That cushion is welcome, particularly with reserves now in a much stronger position, but it is difficult to describe the economy as structurally improved when labour exports continue to compensate for the weakness of merchandise exports and productive investment. Net foreign direct investment declined by nearly a third to USD 1.6 billion during the year. The Pakistani worker abroad remains a more dependable source of foreign exchange than the productive economy at home.

Rising imports are not necessarily evidence of another consumption binge. Machinery, raw materials, and intermediate goods are required to restore production and expand capacity, and the recovery in manufacturing suggests that at least part of the increase is linked to higher economic activity. That case would be more convincing if exports and investment were responding with comparable force. Instead, imports have accelerated, goods exports have contracted, and foreign investment has weakened.

This is the old growth constraint in plain sight. Demand and import requirements recover quickly once financial conditions improve, while export capacity, productivity and investment take far longer to respond. The trade gap begins to widen, pressure gradually returns to the external account, and policymakers are eventually compelled to suppress the demand they had spent the preceding years trying to restore. Stronger reserves can provide more time before that sequence becomes binding, but they do not alter its underlying arithmetic.

Services exports offer the clearest exception. Information technology and other business services recorded strong growth, with IT exports reaching USD 4.6 billion. The gains are significant and should be treated as the beginning of a wider export opportunity rather than another convenient success story. Services remain too small to offset a weak goods-export base, and the familiar constraints of energy costs, taxation, logistics, skills and regulatory uncertainty will eventually limit them as well unless policy catches up.

The PBS price review for July provides a parallel warning on the domestic side. Headline inflation eased from 11.1 percent in June to 9.2 percent, but consumer prices increased by 1.2 percent during the month after declining in June. Food prices rose by 4.16 percent and perishable food prices by 17.69 percent, while the Sensitive Price Indicator increased by 2.4 percent over the month and remained 12 percent higher than a year earlier. The national headline improved in year-on-year terms; the basket of essentials did not.

Food alone contributed 1.45 percentage points to monthly inflation, with declines in transport and housing-related costs pulling the overall increase back to 1.2 percent. This is an important distinction for an economy in which a large share of household income is spent on basic consumption. Rural inflation remained higher than urban inflation, while rural food prices increased by 3.86 percent during July. A softer CPI headline is welcome, but it does not make a four-percent monthly increase in food prices any less punitive.

Nor is this simply an interest-rate problem waiting to be handed back to SBP. The Finance Division’s own report records a 37.3 percent decline in DAP offtake during the Kharif season, attributing it to high prices, alongside below-normal rainfall and elevated water stress for major crops. These pressures sit on top of weak storage, inefficient logistics, fragmented markets and poor agricultural productivity. Monetary policy can contain the second-round effects of food inflation, but it cannot produce fertiliser, conserve water, raise yields or reduce losses between farm and market.

The Planning Division’s development update is relevant here, although not especially reassuring. More than 97 percent of the federal PSDP for FY2026-27 has been earmarked for ongoing projects, and over 60 percent of resources remain allocated to infrastructure. The decision to prioritise completion rather than add another layer of thinly funded schemes is sensible; Pakistan’s development portfolio has suffered enough from political additions, delayed implementation and repeated cost escalation. Yet a largely pre-committed programme also leaves limited room to redirect spending towards the supply constraints starkly visible in agriculture, exports, logistics, technology and human capital.

Fiscal consolidation deserves the same qualified reading. The fiscal deficit narrowed to 1.6 percent of GDP during July-May from 3.8 percent a year earlier, helped by higher revenues and lower mark-up payments. Development spending, however, also declined by 8.9 percent. Lower spending is not automatically better spending, and a smaller deficit achieved partly by compressing public investment may secure the present without doing much to change the future.

The government has set a growth target of 4 percent for FY2026-27, which is neither excessive nor particularly ambitious after years of weak per capita performance. The concern is not the target but the route taken to reach it. Growth led by domestic demand and import-intensive activity, without a matching increase in exports, investment and agricultural capacity, would merely bring the next external constraint forward.

The official monthly reports show that Pakistan begins the year with better buffers and more policy room than it had before. They also show little evidence that the structure beneath those buffers has materially changed. The test of FY2026-27 will not be whether growth touches 4 percent, but whether exports begin to move with imports, investment begins to move with demand, and food supply begins to move with household need. Otherwise, the economy will have secured another recovery on familiar terms, with the familiar ending merely deferred.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

July 2026 was the deadliest month of the year, claiming 205 lives, including 112 security personnel, while 401 terrorists were killed in counter-terrorism operations.

Before the nation could even absorb these grim statistics, another horrific tragedy unfolded in Swat on August 2, where a suicide bomber targeted a public gathering near Kabal police station, killing at least 24 people during a peaceful protest against lawlessness. These back-to-back tragedies underscore a painful reality: terrorism remains one of Pakistan’s gravest national security challenges.

The sharp rise in violence, particularly in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, points to a worrying resurgence of militant networks.

The increase in suicide bombings, vehicle-borne attacks, IED explosions, and kidnappings suggests that terrorist organisations retain both operational capability and logistical support despite years of sustained military pressure.

While the elimination of 401 terrorists in a single month demonstrates the effectiveness of security operations, it also reflects the scale and persistence of the threat confronting the state.

Success cannot be measured solely by the number of militants neutralised when the country continues to suffer such heavy losses among soldiers and civilians alike.

The sacrifice of 112 security personnel in one month deserves more than ceremonial tributes. These soldiers are defending the country under extraordinarily difficult circumstances and against an enemy that has repeatedly adapted its tactics. Their courage must be matched by a comprehensive national strategy that strengthens intelligence gathering, enhances inter-agency coordination, equips law enforcement with modern technology and ensures timely operational responses.

The deaths of civilians and peace committee members are an equally painful reminder that ordinary Pakistanis continue to bear the brunt of extremist violence.

Security experts have rightly pointed out that while militant groups continue to exploit sanctuaries across the border in Afghanistan, the success of their operations also depends on support networks, facilitators and recruitment channels inside Pakistan.

Cross-border safe havens undoubtedly remain a critical part of the problem, but disrupting domestic logistical networks and strengthening intelligence penetration are equally essential if such attacks are to be prevented rather than merely responded to.

Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy must therefore become increasingly proactive rather than reactive. Intelligence-led operations, rigorous analysis of threat assessments, tighter border management and closer coordination among military, police and civilian intelligence agencies should be the cornerstone of national security policy.

Equally important is ensuring the effective implementation of the National Action Plan and insulating counter-terrorism from political divisions that undermine institutional coherence.

Pakistan has repeatedly demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of terrorism. But resilience alone cannot defeat an enemy that continues to evolve.

The grim statistics of July and the tragedy in Swat should serve as a reminder that the fight against terrorism is entering a more complex phase. The country’s security forces have shown extraordinary resolve. It is now imperative that the state complements their sacrifices with sharper intelligence, greater institutional coordination and a strategy that stays one step ahead of those determined to spread fear and instability.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

At the same time, Nepra, the power regulator, questioned whether the reported improvement in losses reflected genuine efficiency gains or merely the shifting of losses to high-theft areas through extended load shedding. The contrast is striking, but it need not be contradictory.

There is little doubt that meaningful progress has been made. The power sector inherited structural weaknesses that had accumulated over decades, with mounting circular debt, poor recoveries, excessive losses and an unsustainable subsidy burden. Against that backdrop, improvements in DISCO finances, tighter fiscal discipline and a significant reduction in the circular debt stock over the previous fiscal year deserve recognition. Give credit where credit is due.

Be that as it may, reforms cannot be judged solely by accounting outcomes. They must ultimately translate into a more efficient electricity system, lower financial losses, improved service quality, and, over time, more affordable electricity. It is on these metrics that difficult questions continue to arise.

Nepra’s observation that reported reductions in losses may partly reflect heavier load shedding in high-loss areas rather than genuine operational improvements deserves careful consideration. If accurate, such an approach may improve financial indicators in the short run, but it cannot substitute for investments in modern networks, improved metering, stronger enforcement against theft and better governance of distribution companies. Persistent outages merely suppress demand without addressing the underlying causes of inefficiency.

Equally concerning are the regulator’s observations regarding transmission constraints. Pakistan has invested billions of dollars in expanding generation capacity, much of it based on relatively efficient technologies. Yet the inability to fully evacuate cheaper electricity from the south continues to force reliance on more expensive generation elsewhere in the system. Consumers inevitably bear the cost through periodic fuel cost adjustments, reinforcing the perception that efficiency gains at one stage of the value chain are being offset by bottlenecks at another.

The increase in circular debt also illustrates the complexity of the challenge. The Power Division attributes the deterioration primarily to a reduction in budgeted subsidies rather than weakening operational performance. If that is indeed the principal explanation, it demonstrates how dependent the sector remains on timely fiscal support even as operational indicators improve. Financial sustainability cannot rest indefinitely on budgetary allocations, particularly in an environment of constrained public finances.

This points to a broader reality. Pakistan’s power sector reforms have entered a more demanding phase. The relatively straightforward measures—tariff rationalisation, renegotiation of power purchase agreements, improved recoveries and fiscal support—have largely been undertaken. The remaining reforms are institutionally more difficult. They involve modernising transmission infrastructure, restructuring distribution companies, strengthening governance, improving operational autonomy and creating incentives that reward efficiency rather than merely limiting losses.

The profound challenge now is one of credibility. Policymakers, regulators and sector institutions must increasingly rely on a common set of transparent performance indicators that command public confidence. Conflicting narratives about whether losses are genuinely falling or merely being relocated do little to reassure consumers already grappling with some of the highest electricity tariffs in the region. Independent verification, greater transparency and timely publication of operational data would go a long way towards narrowing this trust deficit.

It also bears repeating that reform should not be viewed as an end in itself. Its ultimate purpose is to provide consumers with reliable electricity at the lowest sustainable cost while ensuring the sector remains financially viable. If tariffs continue to rise despite improvements in sector finances, consumers will inevitably question whether the promised benefits of reform are reaching them. That perception, whether entirely fair or not, cannot be ignored.

Pakistan’s power sector has undoubtedly travelled some distance over the past two years. Yet the journey is far from complete. The next chapter of reform will be judged less by reductions in headline numbers than by whether the underlying inefficiencies that continue to burden consumers are finally addressed. Only then will the sector’s progress become both measurable and broadly credible.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

The court rightly recognized that expressions intended to humiliate, intimidate, or marginalize individuals on the basis of their identity are not protected simply because they are framed as political opinion or personal expression. As the judges aptly observed, restricting abusive and insulting language can strengthen, rather than weaken, the free exchange of ideas by ensuring that vulnerable groups are not silenced through intimidation.

The judgment reinforces an important principle: freedom of expression is not an absolute right.

Every democratic society places reasonable limits on speech that incites hatred, discrimination, or violence against individuals or communities. Such limitations are essential to preserving social harmony, protecting human dignity, and ensuring that public discourse remains respectful and inclusive.

However, this commitment to combating hate speech must be applied consistently rather than selectively.

While racial abuse directed at an individual because of ethnic origin or religious identity is rightly deemed unlawful, similar standards should govern speech that deliberately insults Islam and its revered figures under the guise of artistic freedom, satire, or unrestricted expression.

Across many Western democracies, offensive remarks targeting racial or ethnic minorities increasingly attract legal and social consequences, yet deeply offensive depictions of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), desecration of the Holy Quran, and other acts that wound the religious sentiments of nearly two billion Muslims are frequently defended as exercises of free speech.

Such inconsistencies suggest that some forms of dignity deserve legal protection while others do not. For Muslims, love and reverence for the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and respect for their sacred symbols are inseparable from their faith and identity.

Deliberate insults directed at these sacred figures are not intended to foster meaningful debate; they are calculated to provoke, demean, and inflame emotions. Far from enriching democratic discourse, such provocations deepen social divisions, fuel resentment, and undermine the very values of mutual respect that pluralistic societies seek to uphold.

The challenge, therefore, is not to suppress genuine debate about religion, history, or public policy. Open discussion and respectful criticism remain indispensable to democratic life.

The issue is whether societies should permit expressions whose primary purpose is to insult religious communities and their revered personalities while simultaneously prohibiting comparable abuse on racial grounds. The Australian court’s ruling offers an opportunity for broader reflection. If, as Senator Faruqi observed, “hate speech is not free speech,” then that principle should apply universally, without distinction between race and religion.

Equal respect for all communities requires equal protection against deliberate expressions of hatred, ensuring that freedom of expression remains a force for dialogue and understanding rather than a licence for intolerance.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

Years of administrative paralysis, weak public service delivery and institutional dysfunction have left ample evidence that the existing model is failing. His accompanying proposal to create new provinces and administrative units has therefore reopened one of Pakistan’s oldest constitutional or political debates.

Yet before the country redraws provincial boundaries – if it must – it must first answer a more fundamental question: is the size of the provinces really the bigger problem, or is it the way they are governed?

There is certainly merit in debating whether Pakistan will eventually require more provinces. Smaller administrative units can, under the right circumstances, bring government closer to citizens, improve service delivery and make governance more responsive.

Many countries have reorganised their internal structures over time as populations expanded and administrative demands grew more complex. There should, therefore, be no objection to discussing the issue openly and seriously.

The difficulty begins when new provinces are presented as though they constitute the central solution to Pakistan’s governance crisis.

The country’s greatest failure since the 18th Constitutional Amendment has not just been insufficient devolution in reality from Islamabad to the provinces.

It has also been the unwillingness of provincial governments to devolve meaningful political, administrative and financial authority to local governments. That was, after all, one of the principal objectives behind removal of the concurrent list from the constitution and devolution itself: to bring decision-making as close to the citizen as possible.

Instead, provinces largely became repositories of powers that were never meaningfully passed on to the grassroots. That reluctance is hardly accidental.

Every transfer of authority to genuinely empowered local governments also transfers budgets, patronage and political influence. Few provincial administrations, regardless of political affiliation, have shown much enthusiasm for surrendering those powers.

Local government elections are delayed, financial authority remains centralised and municipal institutions continue operating with limited autonomy. It is, therefore, difficult to argue that creating additional provinces would automatically improve governance when the existing provinces have themselves resisted meaningful decentralisation.

There is an irony here that deserves acknowledgement. The period during which Pakistan arguably witnessed its strongest and most empowered local government system came under General Pervez Musharraf.

Whatever one’s views of military rule, local governments during that period exercised considerably greater administrative and financial authority than they have under successive elected governments. That uncomfortable reality raises difficult questions about the commitment of democratic governments to one of democracy’s most important foundations: governance at the grassroots.

Nor has the advocacy for more provinces sufficiently addressed the causes of today’s paralysis. Administrative inefficiency, bureaucratic red tape, political interference, weak accountability and entrenched corruption have steadily undermined governance across the federation. Those problems do not disappear simply because provincial boundaries are redrawn.

The same bureaucracy, the same administrative culture and many of the same political incentives would continue operating within smaller jurisdictions unless broader institutional reforms precede any constitutional restructuring.

Practical considerations also deserve attention. Creating new provinces would require constitutional amendments, broad political consensus, complex negotiations over assets, liabilities, civil services, revenue distribution and administrative infrastructure.

At a time when provinces themselves continue struggling with law and order, fiscal management, poorly funded education, healthcare and local administration, embarking upon such an ambitious restructuring would inevitably consume enormous political energy while offering no guarantee that the underlying governance failures would actually be resolved.

None of this means the proposal should be dismissed outright. Pakistan may well require additional provinces in the future as demographic and administrative pressures continue to grow.

But; sequencing matters. The priority today should be to complete the unfinished business of devolution by genuinely empowering local governments, strengthening administrative accountability, reforming the bureaucracy, and improving provincial governance. Only then can the country properly assess whether further constitutional restructuring remains necessary.

The interior minister is spot on insofar as his recommendation that the present system requires serious reform is concerned.

The question is whether Pakistan is confronting the real source of its dysfunction or merely proposing to redraw the map before fixing the machinery that has failed to make the existing one work.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

The objective is to enable them to produce environment-friendly Euro V-specification petroleum products, and increase the share of value-added products by minimizing furnace oil (FO) production.

Critics argue that the policy has come a little too late. Upgrading existing refineries and building new ones have been under discussion among policymakers since the early 2000s. At the time, investing in the sector made perfect economic sense.

However, the global landscape has shifted significantly over the past two decades. Numerous new refineries have come online in the Middle East and other parts of the world.

Meanwhile, global demand patterns are on the cusp of a major shift due to the growing adoption of renewables in the energy mix—particularly the transition towards electric vehicles. Thus, global supply is high, while demand is not growing in tandem. Consequently, there is a glut of refining capacity in the region.

As a result, petroleum products’ margins have become razor-thin during normal times, and the dollar savings from producing more products may not be substantial after accounting for the foreign exchange spent on importing plant and machinery.

Moreover, upgrading may not be commercially viable for some local refineries, even with the incentives.

Nevertheless, it is still a welcome move. The government realized the risks associated with import dependence during the recent US-Iran war, which compelled the authorities to seriously consider increasing domestic production and building strategic petroleum reserves. Thus, upgrading refineries has become a strategic imperative.

The delay over the past few years was mainly due to the proposed sales tax exemption on imports of plant and machinery.

The IMF (International Monetary Fund) did not agree to it, while the government failed to negotiate a solution. Years were wasted in the process. The exemption has now been granted, allowing the policy to be rolled out.

Depending on each refinery’s current configuration, the upgrades will have different impacts. Nonetheless, all refineries are expected to produce more motor gasoline (petrol) and high-speed diesel (HSD), while reducing FO production. This would improve the yield from refining crude oil, which is largely imported.

Moreover, better-quality Euro V-specification fuels will be produced. This is in line with Pakistan’s commitments under international treaties and is particularly important for a country highly vulnerable to climate change, where overall air quality is deteriorating rapidly.

Needless to say, there are challenges. Apart from the sales tax exemption, the incentives include a deemed-duty contribution—2.5 percent on HSD and 10 percent on motor spirit (MS)—to be deposited by refineries into escrow accounts. These funds can be used as equity by the refineries, covering up to 27.5 percent of the total project cost. The remainder must be arranged by the refineries through equity or debt.

Most refineries may seek debt financing of around USD3.5 billion–USD4 billion, as the total project cost is estimated at USD5 billion–USD6 billion. Domestic banks do not have the appetite or dollar liquidity to finance projects of this scale. Therefore, the debt will likely have to be raised internationally.

However, foreign lenders may have concerns about the country’s multiple risks. Thus, securing financing will not be easy.

Moreover, not every refinery has shown full interest. As of now, the country’s largest refinery, which is majority-owned by the government, has not signed off on the policy due to certain concerns raised by its foreign shareholders.

Thus, following policy’s approval, the next challenge is securing funding, which may be hindered by a lack of commercial viability. A better approach could be to focus on petrochemicals, which are the need of the hour—specifically, crude-oil-to-chemicals (COTC) refineries designed primarily to produce petrochemicals rather than fuels.

The world is moving in this direction. However, Pakistan is far behind. It was never part of the research and development race.

The optimal outcome would have been to upgrade the refineries in a timely manner, but crucial time was wasted. Nonetheless, the current petroleum ministry team deserves appreciation for finally getting the policy approved. It remains to be seen how successful it will be.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

It now sits at the intersection of climate change, economic resilience, food security and, increasingly, national security. The latest call for a comprehensive national water security policy, coupled with fresh revelations of massive cost escalations in major hydropower projects, serves as a timely reminder that the country can no longer afford to treat water policy as a collection of isolated interventions.

Pakistan’s water vulnerabilities are hardly new. Pakistan remains one of the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world despite contributing only a fraction of global greenhouse gas emissions. Glacial melt is accelerating, rainfall patterns are becoming increasingly erratic, prolonged dry spells are punctuated by devastating floods and groundwater extraction continues at an unsustainable pace. Population growth and rapid urbanisation have only intensified pressure on an already stressed resource base.

Climate change alone cannot explain Pakistan’s predicament. Years of underinvestment in water storage, ageing irrigation infrastructure, fragmented governance and delayed implementation of critical projects have compounded the country’s exposure to both floods and water scarcity. The result is a paradox that has become all too familiar: devastating floods during one part of the year and acute water shortages during another.

The escalating cost of major hydropower projects underlines the price of delay. Inflation, exchange rate depreciation, prolonged implementation timelines and repeated design revisions have dramatically increased the financial burden of projects that are indispensable for Pakistan’s long-term water and energy security. Whether it is Diamer Bhasha, Mohmand or Dasu, each year of delay makes these strategic investments considerably more expensive while postponing the benefits they are intended to deliver.

These projects should not be viewed solely through the prism of electricity generation. Hydropower infrastructure is equally an investment in water storage, flood mitigation, irrigation reliability and climate resilience. In a country where reservoir capacity remains well below international norms, expanding storage has become less a developmental aspiration than an economic necessity.

The timing of this debate is particularly significant. India’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric surrounding the Indus Waters Treaty has introduced a new strategic dimension to Pakistan’s water discourse. While the treaty remains an internationally recognised legal framework and cannot be altered unilaterally, recent developments have demonstrated that water can no longer be viewed exclusively through an environmental or engineering lens. It has become an issue with profound geopolitical implications.

That reality, however, should not distract from Pakistan’s own responsibilities. External challenges do not diminish the need for better domestic governance. On the contrary, they reinforce it. Effective implementation of the Water Apportionment Accord, stronger groundwater regulation, climate-smart agriculture, improved hydrological forecasting, digital water accounting and accelerated investment in storage infrastructure are reforms that have long been discussed. Their execution has consistently lagged behind their recognition.

The same applies to project governance. While inflation and currency depreciation explain a significant share of the recent cost escalations, they do not account for every delay. Land acquisition disputes, administrative bottlenecks, procurement challenges and implementation slippages continue to inflate costs and defer benefits. Strengthening project management and institutional accountability must therefore accompany any increase in public investment.

The profound challenge confronting policymakers is to shift from reacting to water crises to managing water strategically. Flood relief, emergency allocations and post-disaster reconstruction will always remain necessary. They cannot, however, substitute for long-term planning grounded in sound institutions and sustained investment.

Pakistan has entered an era where water security is inseparable from economic security, food security, energy security and national security. The country’s exposure to climate change and evolving regional dynamics has only heightened that reality. The encouraging aspect is that the solutions are neither unknown nor unattainable. What has been missing is the urgency to implement them before the next crisis arrives.

Water policy cannot continue to be driven by the monsoon calendar. It must become a permanent national priority. Only then can Pakistan hope to build the resilience that an increasingly uncertain climate and geopolitical environment demand.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

The scandal surrounding the leaked medical entrance examination papers is itself staggering. More than 2.3 million students competed for fewer than 130,000 seats, investing years of relentless preparation in the hope of securing a future through merit. The exposure of widespread irregularities shattered that faith, forcing a retake of the examination while leaving countless young people trapped in uncertainty. The tragic reports that at least a dozen students took their own lives underscore the immense psychological burden borne by India’s youth in an already unforgiving educational system.

Yet what transformed an examination scandal into a nationwide democratic movement was the state’s response. Instead of engaging with students’ legitimate grievances, the authorities initially downplayed complaints and the public outcry over compromised test papers and systemic failures. This only deepened public anger. The controversy was further inflamed by reported remarks from Chief Justice Surya Kant describing unemployed youth as “parasites” and “cockroaches” during court proceedings. This was widely seen as dismissive and dehumanising. The consequent emergence of the satirical “Cockroaches Janata Party” shows how young Indians transformed an insult into a powerful symbol of political resistance, exposing the widening disconnect between those who govern and an increasingly assertive younger generation.

Faced with unprecedented youth protests that shook the country, the Modi government eventually conceded one of the protesters’ principal demands by accepting the education minister’s resignation and proposing tougher penalties, including longer prison terms and heavier fines, for examination paper leaks. Yet, the most enduring legacy of the Delhi protests is political rather than legal. At a time when India’s conventional opposition appeared fragmented and ineffective in challenging Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s increasingly centralised style of governance and majoritarian political agenda, students emerged as the country’s most vibrant democratic force. Their movement was about a broader assertion of the right to fairness, dignity and accountable governance.

These protests, like some other recent examples in the region, reflect a generation unwilling to accept that corruption, arbitrariness and official indifference are inevitable features of public life. Their demand is not simply for clean examinations but for institutions that are transparent, impartial and responsive — the essential foundations of a just society where opportunity is determined by merit rather than privilege or political influence.

History repeatedly shows that societies ignore the aspirations of their young people at their own peril. India’s students have reminded the nation that democracy depends not merely on elections but on institutions that safeguard citizens’ rights, uphold merit and remain answerable to the people they serve. Their struggle resonates far beyond India’s borders, offering a timely reminder that the pursuit of justice and democratic accountability often begins with the courage of the young.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

As Pakistan entered yet another spell of heavy rainfall, the official response once again centred on managing an unfolding disaster rather than demonstrating that lessons from previous years had finally been learned.

The tragedy is no longer that the rains arrive with devastating force. It is that the country continues to prepare for them as though they remain an unexpected event.

That should concern policymakers far more than the weather itself.

Monsoon flooding is not an unforeseen emergency. It is a predictable annual occurrence. Governments know when the rains are likely to arrive, which districts face the greatest danger, where drainage systems repeatedly fail and which communities remain vulnerable to flooding, landslides and house collapses. Yet every year familiar images return: submerged roads, overflowing drains, inundated neighbourhoods, collapsed homes, prolonged power outages and families waiting for rescue after disaster has already struck.

This year has been no different. If anything, it has been worse. More than one hundred people have already lost their lives, while floodwaters continue to affect large parts of Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Entire communities remain under water days after heavy rainfall, infrastructure has suffered extensive damage and emergency services continue responding to crises that should have been anticipated well before the first storm clouds gathered.

There are, admittedly, encouraging signs.

The Punjab irrigation department’s introduction of an artificial intelligence-based reservoir monitoring system reflects a sensible response to India’s continued refusal to share upstream hydrological data. Satellite imagery and geospatial analysis can never fully replace formal treaty-based information sharing, but they at least provide authorities with better situational awareness than they previously possessed. Such innovation deserves recognition because climate adaptation increasingly demands technological solutions alongside conventional infrastructure.

Technology alone, however, cannot compensate for weak governance.

Every monsoon exposes the same institutional shortcomings. Drainage systems remain inadequately maintained. Encroachments continue blocking natural waterways. Construction proceeds in flood-prone areas with little regard for long-term risk. Relief efforts improve only after lives have already been lost. Administrative coordination often strengthens during the emergency itself rather than before it. These failures have accumulated over decades despite repeated commissions, inquiries and promises of reform.

That points towards a deeper problem. Pakistan has no shortage of disaster management plans. It suffers from an absence of legal accountability for implementing them. Government departments routinely announce preparedness measures before every monsoon season, yet there is remarkably little consequence when those preparations prove inadequate. Officials move on, committees are reconstituted and next year’s rains produce another familiar round of explanations.

That culture must change.

The country now needs comprehensive legislation that imposes clear statutory responsibilities on every department involved in flood preparedness. Drainage authorities, municipal administrations, irrigation departments, provincial disaster management authorities and local governments should all operate under legally enforceable obligations rather than discretionary administrative instructions. Deadlines for drain clearance, inspections of vulnerable infrastructure, emergency equipment readiness and floodplain management should become mandatory, independently audited and publicly reported.

Accountability must extend beyond paperwork.

Where official negligence contributes to preventable loss of life or property, responsibility should be clearly established and administrative action should follow. Preparedness cannot remain a public relations exercise measured by meetings held and directives issued. It should be evaluated by outcomes: functioning drainage systems, timely evacuations, protected infrastructure and, above all, lives saved.

Climate change will almost certainly make Pakistan’s monsoon seasons more unpredictable and more destructive in the years ahead. That reality cannot be altered. The country’s preparedness, however, remains entirely within human control.

Pakistan has spent years treating every monsoon as a temporary emergency. It is time to recognise it for what it has become: a permanent governance challenge requiring permanent institutional reform. Until that happens, the country will continue counting casualties after every rainy season while congratulating itself for responding to disasters it should have been far better prepared to prevent.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

Unesco has reportedly asked the government to reverse what it considers “reconstructions” that have undermined the authenticity and integrity of these monuments, warning that failure to do so could see Taxila placed on its ‘danger list’ and, ultimately, delisted as a World Heritage Site.

At the heart of the dispute are allegations that original masonry has been replaced with new material and that surviving ancient walls have been raised in height in the name of conservation.

Photographs published in the media appear to show a clear distinction between the ancient stonework and the newer additions.

Unesco’s concerns merit serious attention. International conservation practice does not seek to make archaeological ruins appear complete or aesthetically pleasing; rather, it prioritises preserving a monument’s original fabric through the principle of minimum intervention, ensuring that conservation neither obscures nor replaces authentic historical evidence.

The Punjab archaeology department, however, disputes the characterisation of the work as “reconstruction”, maintaining that the interventions are intended to stabilise vulnerable structures and prevent further deterioration. It also says the work was explained during a recent technical visit by national and international experts. This explanation deserves consideration.

Conservation often involves difficult technical judgments. However, when concerns are raised by the very organisation entrusted with safeguarding the world’s cultural heritage, technical assurances alone do not suffice.

The most appropriate response, therefore, is complete transparency. Unesco has asked for conservation plans, heritage impact assessments, laboratory test reports on the materials used, compatibility studies, archaeological documentation and photographic records before and after the interventions. These should be shared without delay and subjected to independent professional review.

Such openness is essential not only to address Unesco’s concerns but also to strengthen public confidence in the management of Pakistan’s archaeological heritage.

The issue should be approached not as a contest between competing bureaucracies but as an opportunity to ensure that conservation practices conform to the highest professional standards.

The episode also underscores the need for stronger institutional safeguards. Conservation decisions affecting nationally and internationally significant sites should be guided by multidisciplinary expert committees operating under clear protocols aligned with Unesco conventions. Pakistan has witnessed similar controversies before.

The proposed construction of a stadium near Bhir Mound in 1998 threatened another component of the Taxila complex before public opposition forced its abandonment. That episode, like the present one, illustrates how decisions affecting irreplaceable heritage require rigorous scrutiny before, rather than after, they are implemented.

Taxila is more than an archaeological site; it is one of the region’s foremost repositories of human civilisation. Its significance lies not in how complete or visually impressive it appears, but in the authenticity of what has endured through the centuries.

The government’s engagement with Unesco should therefore be guided by one overriding principle: where the integrity of an irreplaceable heritage site is at stake, transparency, scientific conservation and adherence to internationally accepted standards must take precedence over all other considerations.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026

The Overseas Investors Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OICCI) estimates that cotton production has fallen from around 14 million bales at its peak to just 6.85 million bales this year, costing the economy between $2 billion and $3 billion annually through additional imports and lost export earnings.

More troubling still, the report concludes that regulatory delays and inconsistent policymaking, rather than any shortage of technology or investment, have become the principal obstacles, preventing agriculture from realising its potential.

That finding deserves far more attention than the headline numbers. Pakistan has always possessed a natural comparative advantage in agriculture.

Fertile land, one of the world’s largest contiguous irrigation systems and generations of farming experience should have made agriculture one of the country’s greatest competitive strengths.

Instead, successive governments have steadily transformed that advantage into a missed opportunity through poor policymaking, bureaucratic inertia and regulatory uncertainty. The result is visible across the sector, but nowhere more starkly than in cotton.

This matters because cotton extends well beyond the farm.

The textile industry, which earns roughly 60 percent of Pakistan’s export revenue, depends heavily on domestic cotton. Every decline in local production forces mills to rely more heavily on imported fibre, increasing pressure on already fragile foreign exchange reserves while reducing the competitiveness of the country’s largest export industry.

At a time when Pakistan struggles constantly to generate sufficient export earnings, allowing the supply chain feeding its flagship export sector to deteriorate reflects a remarkable failure of economic management.

The report’s diagnosis is refreshingly candid. Climate shocks and pest infestations have undoubtedly contributed to weaker production, but policy failures have amplified the damage.

Delays in approving improved seed varieties, poor seed quality, blanket restrictions on pesticide ingredients without credible transition arrangements and slow regulatory decision-making have all reduced productivity that should have been improving rather than deteriorating.

Unfortunately, cotton is only one example.

The report identifies the same pattern across maize, potatoes, dairy and tobacco. Hybrid maize technology capable of substantially raising yields remains trapped in implementation delays despite the recent approval of the National Biotechnology Policy.

Potato productivity continues to lag behind international benchmarks because certified processing seed remains scarce.

Pakistan ranks among the world’s leading milk producers, yet only a small proportion of milk is processed while inadequate cold-chain infrastructure allows significant production to be lost before it reaches consumers. These are different sectors suffering from remarkably similar administrative failures.

Perhaps the most frustrating aspect is that none of this is inevitable.

The report notes that investors have already introduced advanced seed technology, crop protection products and precision farming techniques into Pakistan. The expertise exists.

The investment appetite exists. The opportunities certainly exist. What repeatedly stands in the way is an official machinery that moves too slowly, regulates too inconsistently and often appears incapable of translating sound policy into practical implementation.

This pattern extends well beyond agriculture. Across multiple sectors of the economy, governments have demonstrated an unfortunate ability to identify the right reforms while delaying their execution until the underlying opportunity has already begun to disappear.

As the OICCI rightly observes, the direction of policy is often correct. It is the pace of implementation that continues to impose enormous economic costs.

The recommendations contained in the report are hardly revolutionary. Faster approval of seed varieties, predictable pesticide regulation, stronger action against counterfeit seed, reduced post-harvest losses and improved credit access for small farmers all represent practical reforms rather than ambitious experiments.

None requires technological breakthroughs. What they require is administrative competence and political will.

Pakistan’s agricultural decline is therefore not primarily a story of nature turning against farmers. It is increasingly becoming a story of governance turning against one of the country’s greatest economic strengths. The latest OICCI report should serve as another warning.

Whether it becomes another document acknowledged briefly before being forgotten, or finally prompts meaningful reform, now depends almost entirely on the government itself.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026