Violence: addressing the grassroots

Ever wondered how the menace of conflict and terrorism breeds to a scale deemed beyond-repair? Many would be quick to comment on rising religious fundamentalism, the lack of well-read religious clerics and the consequent misinterpretation of Holy Scriptures. Some would go as far as to blame an underlying conspiracy theory of another country, which they might not even know enough about.
But how often has the lack of institutional strength been cited as fodder for the rampant insurgency seen today?
The World Banks Development Report 2011 on Conflict Security and Development highlights some unconventional pointers with respect to pervasive terrorism in the world today.
The World Bank indicates that violence-imbued countries are lagging far behind countries with negligible or no violence in terms of poverty reduction (see graph).
A key reason frequently highlighted in these columns, is the consequent discouragement of investors, both local and foreign, since their risk perceptions increase appreciably for a conflict-ridden state.
According to the report, "a civil war reduces a countrys average rating on the International Country Risk Guide by about 7.7 points (on a 100-point scale); the effect is similar for criminal violence."
This cascades into a loss of trade, which can take years to recover. On an average, the report stresses, it takes about 20 years for trade to recover to pre-conflict levels, while also emphasising indirect costs of conflict, such as reduced developmental outlays due to increased military spending, as well as lower productivity due to stress and mental trauma amongst workers.
Interestingly, widespread social and economic inequity and perceptions of injustice amongst the populace creates a void for militants to fill. "The Taliban gained support in Pakistans Swat valley in part by building on a variety of local grievances, including weaknesses in local law enforcement and justice institutions," states the WB.
An even more worrisome highlight is the vicious cycle of scant institutional strength leading to recurring violence in a country, since weak institutions increase a countrys vulnerability to violence.
Therefore, short-term solutions such as arbitration with rebel groups, etc., are deemed to be myopic, since they leave underlying issues unaddressed. Without enhancing institutional capacity and without making religious, ethnic and social groups feel equally-served by the state, core grievances would keep breeding and lead to future outbreaks of violence.
The findings of the report carry some key suggestions for Pakistan to address the issue of insurgency in some areas. For example, perhaps an even better alternative to funding military expenditures in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa would be to tackle the prevalent inequity and social quandaries facing the inhabitants.
Attempts by the US in this economic arena were the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZ) in the FATA areas, with the purpose of enhancing infrastructural and industrial growth in the war-ravaged areas. While not much has been heard about the progress in this regard, it would be in Pakistans best interest to push the agenda with the US authorities.
Its time for policymakers to explore the problem from this new perspective. After all, without the states efforts, the only options left for the poverty-stricken citizens remains, to "(either) become a priest (perhaps of the kind preaching suicide bombings in the way of God) or a bandit" as quoted in the movie The good, the bad and the ugly.