ISLAMABAD (September 14 2006): Good governance is a distant dream for South Asia, and more so for Pakistan whose record is almost the worst, except Nepal or Bhutan, in the sub-continent.

Though Pakistan has specifically aimed at good governance as a priority under the second generation reforms, it is an elusive goal as indicated by a recent research study of the Mahbubul Haq Human Development Report 2006.

It has presented a comparative study of the status of governance in South Asian countries in the context of the four indicators of good governance devised by the World Bank. The four key indicators are Government effectiveness, Voice and Accountability, Political stability and Rule of law. The government effectiveness measures the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery.

Voice and accountability looks after political, civil and human rights. Political stability reflects the likelihood of violent threats to or changes in the government, including terrorism. And the rule of law takes care of the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.

In the face of ground realities vis-à-vis the indicators, only a few could claim Pakistan is doing well. The Human Development report says its findings on the indicators are instructive. Pakistan and Nepal have seen a dramatic fall in the quality of governance on all four indicators, while situation in other countries is not that bad. According to many, the governance problems are rooted in institutional failures and absence of checks and balances on the discretion of policy makers.

The report also mentions of a political constraint index based on a number of independent veto points in the political system ie executive, legislative, judicial and sub-federal branches of the government and distribution of political preferences. The report presents a bleak picture as institutional checks and balances are missing in Pakistan, Bhutan and Maldives, whereas India and Sri Lanka compare favourably with mature democracies.

A litmus test of any political process in the words of the report is whether it is accessible and accountable to non-elites, especially the poor people. This is discussed in the light of the electoral participation. A simple measure is voters participation in the electoral process. Their participation in the last 50 years has been falling in Pakistan.

Participation is well above 50 percent in other regional countries, but not in Pakistan, where it has stagnated around 42 percent. In Bangladesh and Sri Lanka it is around 77 percent comparable with established democracies.

However, in regard to participation of women in political mainstream, Pakistan has made remarkable improvement. Reservation of 33 percent seats for women at the local level is indeed creditable not matched by any regional country.

The report specifically speaks of under-representation of Baloch in bureaucracy, armed forces, and the government at all levels, limiting their voice in national decision making.

Politics of patronage and elitists' supremacy is well known. Despite changes in the political landscape, there has been a surprising permanence of vested political interests. Governments are merely shifting coalition of powerful families deriving their political influence either from land, money or civil and military connections.

According to it, political power remains concentrated among narrow political elites, often dynastic families, who raise their sons and daughters to positions of political eminence. Distinguished political lineage is a real asset for contesting elections in South Asia. The truth is, it says, that in much of South Asia political incumbents have an unfair advantage. For the non-elites, it is difficult to beat inherited political advantage. Elections are often a means of recycling the same old elites.

The privileged position of families and vote catching by the rich and mighty is a common phenomenon in other countries. The report points out that the poor rarely have access to higher echelons of power.

Even when political ties are weak within the family, access to land, big businesses and high offices in civil and military bureaucracy confer an undue political advantage on elites. Elections are thus often a means of recycling the same old elites.

The report then studies who are the real players behind such unequal power structures in South Asia. The two categories are landlords and civil and military bureaucrats.

Thanks to the skewed patterns of land distribution, the report says, the rich peasantry in South Asia uses land to further its political capital. Feudal interests are well represented in the political structures of Pakistan, Nepal and some parts of India.

Between one-half and one-third of parliamentarians in India and Pakistan are landlords. In Pakistan wealthy landlord wield tremendous political influence in parliament and cabinet. Traditionally between one-third to two-thirds of the cabinets have been made up of landlords.

INDUSTRIALIST: Across the region, private money opens the door to political power. The political arena is marred by rising corporate influences, burgeoning costs of contesting in elections, and an increasing criminalisation and corruption of the political life.

The result: politics is pursued like a business, underpinned by a cold arithmetic of profitability. Once in political office, politicians recoup their financial costs of contesting in elections-and too often with a generous return. Clearly, contesting in an election has become a costly affair, making political office a preserve of the rich.

In Pakistan in 1997, a parliamentarian spent, on average, about $120,000 in order to get elected. Corporate financing of political parties is common even in well-developed democracies, but in South Asia comprehensive legislation to regulate these finances is often lacking or weakly enforced.

Party funds are sometimes shrouded in secrecy. The excessive commercialisation of politics has blurred the distinction between business and politics. In several countries, business interests are now well represented in national parliaments. In Pakistan, the share of businessmen in the national assembly and the cabinet has doubled since 1980.

THE CIVIL-MILITARY BUREAUCRACY: Another constraining influence on parliamentary sovereignty comes from bureaucratic interference, both civil and military. In most South Asian countries, the origins of current bureaucratic structures can be traced back to British colonial rule.

These structures were devised to rule people and to consolidate British rule. In many countries, civil servants are not merely policy executors, but have also assumed the role of policy formulation. At least in Pakistan and Bangladesh, the bureaucratic involvement in politics remains high.

When civilian institutions lack legitimacy, military increasingly occupies the civilian space. Bangladesh and Pakistan had been directly ruled by the military for half of their history. In Pakistan, the military's involvement in civilian affairs has increased tremendously since 1999. India and Sri Lanka, however, have maintained relative civilian supremacy.

Even in democratic times, the military has indirectly interfered in the political process. Pakistan's premier secret intelligence agency, the ISI, has been notorious for its involvement in the creation of a major political alliance, the IJI, during the 1988 elections.

THE FAILURE OF INSTITUTIONS: The origins of weak democratic governance can be ultimately located in the failure of political institutions. This is because political power remains unchecked without strong institutions. Democracy is much more than elections.

It rests on a core set of well-functioning institutions: an efficient and able bureaucracy; military that functions under civilian control; legislatures that represent the poor; judiciary that is independent, fair and works at an arm's length from the executive; censorship, and security force that is democratic and accountable to people.

Speaking of institutional failures the report adds:

LEGISLATURES: The existence of parliaments does not automatically guarantee the protection of rights and interests of ordinary people. In fact, weak parliamentary practices remain an important obstacle to human security in the region.

Democratic traditions are most fragile in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. In many countries such as Pakistan, political parties espouse democracy without embracing democratic governance within their parties.

Perhaps more importantly, ideological politics is on the decline. Criminalisation of politics has strengthened the disconnect between parliament and people. Criminals use political offices as an instrument for preserving their privileges at the expense of subjugating the rights of common people. In Pakistan politicians have been accused of power theft, refusing to pay their rents and horse-trading.

In India, which has an otherwise record, corruption and criminalistion are abiding features of the political landscape.

JUDICIARY: Democratic governance is difficult to envisage without an independent and watchful judiciary. In particular, an independent election commission forms the linchpin of electoral democracy. In several parts of South Asia, the executive often dominates the judiciary. In Pakistan by contrast, the Supreme Court granted powers to a president in military uniform for amending the constitution.

With perhaps a partial exception of India, judicial systems in the region remain generally weak and inefficient. In the final analysis, the litmus test for judicial effectiveness is whether it protects the poor from various injustices and defends their democratic rights. It would not be wrong to say that judicial systems in the region fail to pass this test: the quality of justice is particularly poor for poor people.

Besides being unresponsive to people's needs, the delivery of justice in South Asia faces the following key challenges: First of all, separation of powers between the executive and judiciary-an important institutional requirement-is not always ensured in countries other than India.

Secondly, the judicial systems are considerably backlogged with cases, resulting in long waiting times. Justice is often delayed-and, therefore, denied. Court delays increase the cost of seeking justice, reducing faith in the judicial process.

Thirdly, low pays, high costs and rampant corruption make a mockery of the system. Judges are poorly remunerated: salaries of high court judges are, therefore, increasingly susceptible to bribes and hidden payments.

Far from being viewed as guardians of liberty, the police is often seen as part of the problem, rather than as part of the solution. Physical torture, beatings, illegal detentions and other ill treatments at the hands of police personnel are a common occurrence. Police and security forces are also routinely implicated in extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, fake encounters and custodial deaths.

Poor people are more likely to fall victims to police injustices. It comes as no surprise then that ordinary people are fearful and reluctant to seek police's help.

In sum, the Human Development Report presents a grim picture of the intractable issues. Is there any hope these would be addressed to the betterment of all. A recent example is an eye-opener. A driver engaged by a bureaucrat in Islamabad wanted to quit his job. He was allowed to do so if only he makes good Rs 70,000 stolen by him and paid another Rs 80,000 for the unstitched clothes stolen by his wife.

The police had been called in, the driver and his wife have been asked to stay put or face police brutalities. When, this incident was told to a friend, the latter came out with a similar story. The maidservant in another house in Islamabad has been accused of stealing Rs 250,000. She could not leave the employer till full amends are made. She is forced to serve them for years.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2006