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The political clamouring following the dharnas in Islamabad and the establishment of military courts after the Peshawar school attack has reignited the nostalgia for army rule in some quarters. Even certain economists and public intellectuals have lately been found openly saying that the army rule (of more than half of Pakistans existence) isn to be blamed as much as critics do.
The oft repeated argument goes that civilian rule has left a vacuum since Pakistans inception - one marked by bad governance, corruption and what not, and this is why the army takes over. Others for example, build a case that the fact that Pakistani businesses aren globally comparable (in terms of size, innovation etc) proves that military interventions, overt or covert, is not to be blamed for all of Pakistans problems.
Both of these are interesting positions, though they seem to be falling into an absolutist trap. No one is saying the military rule is responsible for all of Pakistans problems. Social realities are usually nuanced with an intricate web of reasons behind them. But be that as it may, there are still plenty of reasons why 35 years of overt or covert military rules is the mother of most (though not all) major problems in Pakistan.
Three of Pakistans biggest problems are an absence of critical thinking, radical Islamization, and increasing bipolarity. All of these are a gift from the khakis.
It is not popularly known but liberal arts and science was once valued in this country. However, in the 60s under General Ayubs rule the education system was systemically transformed into professional streams. Even private universities established in the 80s stuck to the professional studies model until very recently.
Universities are supposed to be a place for critical thinking and discourse. Both are needed not only for building a vibrant society but also fostering creativity and innovation in business world and elsewhere. Systemic professionalization of education has killed that very spirit.
The second gift came from General Zia and his stick-wielding Islamization, followed by the puppet masters of the 90s that ensured that civilians stuck to the "strategic depth" and the unholy alliance of Mujahideen and military. Enough ink has been spilled to explain the nature and pervasiveness of that problem. The seeds sown in 80-90s are being reaped in the form of Peshawar school attacks and all other forms of terrorism even today, aside from the whole guns, drugs & Kalashnikov culture.
The third gift came from General Musharraf, who understood the problem of radical society. But his response: a crash-course programme in enlightenment moderation - as if the society is a foot soldier that can be commanded exactly as and when the general pleases. The result: an increasing bipolarity with both ends (radicals and enlightened) stretching the social fabric so hard that it is almost tearing apart.
While the army may be good at real estate planning, it needs to learn that social planning is a different art form. In planning any social change it becomes even more paramount to look not only at the final result but also the transition stage. Clearly, that concept was lost under Musharrafs enlightenment moderation, whatever it means.
In addition to these metaproblems, is the problem of political underdevelopment. One could argue that because Pakistans political society wasn developed, the army had to step in. Then again, because of the armys persistent overt and covert interference, the political society could hardly be formed.
It is common knowledge that Pakistan never existed as a nation before 1947. The formation of a nation couldn simply be expected after the birth of this country. Post-natal pains were only natural. But with the army stepping at every step of the way, that process wasn allowed to be followed through and how could it, when the khakis - the strongest of the institution - simply didn give two hoots about the constitution.
In The Army and Democracy: Military Politic in Pakistan, Aqil Shah, a Pakistani scholar currently visiting asst. professor at Dartmouth, US, has used a diverse dataset (military interviews, National Defence University (NDU) training curriculum and research papers, Pakistan Army Green Books (1991-2011), and historical archives) to get a peek inside the militarys institutional thinking. Some of his findings are worth reproducing here.
At one point, Shah parses the NDUs 2012-13 curriculum and finds that of the 987 contact hours in the NDU course, there was only one two-hour lecture on the constitution of Pakistan and just one-fourth of that lecture was on the constitutional role of the armed forces.
Moreover, during the Musharraf era, Shah investigates that 70 percent of NDU officers "declassified" research papers were concerned with resolving civilian/political problems. These included political party reforms, administrative decentralization, anti-corruption, civil service reforms, tax reforms, etc.
At various points in the book, Shah narrates former military mens musings that incompetent politicians are a threat to national security; that uneducated politicians are unfit to rule; and that the geopolitical scene requires the army to take on a greater role.
Recall that even societal interactions in the business world were clamped by the army. It was in the Ayub era when organisations were forced to structure their activities to conform to the draconian 1961 Trade Organization Ordinance. That legislation restricted the ability of chambers of commerce and business associations from operating competitively. The successive periods of martial law ensured that the chambers in Pakistan did not develop.
Still feeling nostalgic about the military regimes? Answer this: Outside a few institutions like Nadra, which regulatory institution or government department has been strengthened under military rule. Did this country witness reforms in bureaucracy, taxation, water and power management, etc under the military rule? Did Pakistans education and health radically improve in 35 years plus of military rule?
If anything the army set the wrong examples for the civilian leaders. Case in point: the politicisation of energy where they fixed low electricity and gas prices during the Musharaff and Zia eras respectively when in fact economic prudence demanded otherwise. And again it is the seeds of that politicisation that are being reaped at present in the form of severe energy shortages.
The bottom-line: while the army should be given support in its operations against the militants, lets not fall back to nostalgia of quick-fix economic growth models of the military regimes. Lets build on democracy, however noisy and fragile it may be, and lets get busy at that.

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